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GLASGOW
Summary
The primary aim of this thesis is to explore the ideas of four Russian 
thinkers - Vladimir Solovyov, Lev Shestov, Semyon Frank and Nikolai 
Berdyaev - in light of how their views contribute to an understanding of 
the religious individual.
I begin with an introductory chapter which looks at the roots of the 
religious individual in Russian thought, focussing on the two areas which 
most influenced the above thinkers: Slavophilism and the Russian  
literature of the nineteenth century.
I then proceed to look at each thinker in his turn, examining in particular 
what each one has to say about religious individualism. I also attempt in 
each chapter to compare and contrast the ideas of the other thinkers 
represented in the thesis, so that each one is not looked at in isolation, 
but as part of a larger ‘discussion’.
In the final two chapters I summarize the thought that has been explored 
in the dissertation, and give an account of what modern Soviet criticism 
has to say about the four Russian philosophers.
I hope in this dissertation to be able to show all four of these thinkers - 
although in different ways and to different degrees - as sensitive to the 
religious individual.
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Chapter One
In troduction
At the end of 1922, five years after the October Revolution had taken 
place, Nikolai Berdyaev, Semyon Frank and Lev Shestov were living outside 
their homeland of Russia. Shestov had left soon after the Revolution out 
of concern for the safety of his family and himself; Berdyaev and Frank 
had been exiled in October, 1922 in a general deportation of 100 or so 
intellectuals from the country. These three men were never to return to 
Russia, although each of them had played a major role in the intellectual 
life of the country. They belonged to a renaissance of Russian religious 
and philosophical thought which took place at the end of the nineteenth 
century and beginning of the twentieth, a renaissance defined by Berdyaev 
as "a time of great intellectual and spiritual excitement, of rebellious 
searching, of the awakening of creative f o r c e s . I t s  representatives  
were essentially responsible for the rediscovery of the religious leaders 
of the nineteenth century: of Aleksey Khomyakov, Fyodor Dostoevsky, Lev
Tolstoy, Nikolai Fyodorov, Vladimir Solovyov. But this renaissance did 
more than hark back to the ideas of earlier religious thinkers; it produced 
its own, highly original philosophers. Many of these philosophers had 
initially been attracted to the revolutionary movement in Russia, but the 
farther they advanced in their appreciation of their spiritual forebears, 
the more critical they becam e towards the revolutionaries. It is the 
philosophies of three members of this Russian renaissance - Shestov, 
Frank and Berdyaev - plus Vladimir Solovyov, which the present thesis 
intends to explore. More specifically, its aim is to exam ine the 
importance of the religious individual in the thought of these four.
For the social revolutionaries in turn-of-the-century Russia, religion 
was identified with a corrupt State, and the individual was considered 
much less important than the collective; the social contract was vital, the 
divine contract was not. The religious renaissance, however, which 
countered this perspective, did not attem pt to defend the Russian 
Orthodox Church, its traditions and customs, or the State which supported 
the Church, but tried rather to find a form of religious expression that 
also gave credence to individual expression, and looking back to the rich 
nineteenth century it found plenty to draw upon.
All four of these men lived at a time when social problems often seemed 
to outweigh individual ones. Many thinkers were concerned above all with 
questions of national identity, political development, the education of the 
Russian people, etc. But the appearance in nineteenth-century Russian 
literature, for instance, of Tolstoy's and Dostoevsky's spiritually hungry 
protagonists, presented to Russia for the first time the im age of 
individuals whose lives cried out for meaning. Both of these novelists, 
who exerted a huge influence on the renaissance, were continually doing 
battle with explicitly religious issues, and the questions they raised were 
taken up with great enthusiasm by all four of our thinkers. In terms of 
Russian Orthodoxy theology, the nineteenth century saw the first efforts 
to sanctify the individual, by treating him not as a submissive member of 
a hierarchical Church, but as a free person whose duty it was to unite 
spiritually with other free persons. There are many shades of 
individualism which appear during this fruitful period, from Dostoevsky's 
wretched, isolated characters to the peaceful, spiritually-united members 
of the Church envisaged by the Slavophiles. Each of the four thinkers to be 
studied here favoured a particular shade of this individualism, although as 
we shall see the shades are often quite different one from the other.
Having settled on this theme, one might then ask why these four 
thinkers in particular have been chosen. Their ideas do not form a single 
school of thought; they do at times complement and agree with each other, 
but it is often common to find disagreement rather than agreem ent in 
their ideas. While one thinker seems distinctively Russian, another seems 
convincingly "Western" or European. While one is more concerned with 
religion in terms of the Church, another gives priority to the single 
person, regardless of the movement he belongs to. We can compare these 
thinkers' ideas, especially since they themselves (especially the later 
three) often commented on each others' views, but we would have little 
success in creating a school out of them. So what is the bond which 
unites these four? Basically, it is these thinkers who - in turn-of-the- 
century Russia - give the most weight to the idea of the religious 
individual. It would be a mistake to begin our discussion by labelling them 
all religious individualists, but we can affirm that these four especially 
provide the most substantial material for such an examination.
The Four Thinkers
Vladimir Solovyov properly belongs to the nineteenth century, as he died 
in 1900, but his importance to the twentieth century is summed up by 
Andrey Walicki;
It was only after his death that Solovyov's ideas became really 
influential. It is no exaggeration to say that an entire generation 
of Russian idealist philosophers and religious thinkers was 
schooled in his philosophy. Thanks to his many eminent disciples 
(largely working outside Russia after the Revolution) he gained
the posthumous reputation of being Russia's greatest 
philosopher.2
Solovyov was the first systematic philosopher in Russia, and he is the 
main link between the development of traditional nineteenth-century and 
modern twentieth-century religious philosophy. Although some of his 
main ideas were based around practical goals - the most important one 
being his efforts to unite Russian Orthodoxy and Catholicism after a 
separation of eight hundred years - it was his spiritual ideas which took 
hold of many religious thinkers of the present century. Not just Berdyaev 
and Frank, but other Russian thinkers have claimed their indebtedness to 
him, for instance Sergey Bulgakov, Pavel Florensky, N. Losski, Sergey 
T r u b e t s k o y . 3 (Indeed, during the revival of religious thought at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, there was even a society called 'To the 
Memory of Vladimir Solovyov', to which many of these figures - Bulgakov, 
Berdyaev, Trubetskoy - b e l o n g e d . S o l o v y o v  places his individual firmly 
within the confines of his religious system; as we shall see, a great 
debate takes place amongst the four thinkers to be studied here as to 
whether the individual belongs inside or outside a religio-philosophical 
system, i.e. whether the system or the individual has primacy.
Lev Shestov, thought by many to be the most radical non-political 
thinker of his time in Russia, is the sole figure of the four who broke with 
all traditions of religious thought in his country. His genius lay not in the 
fact that he created any system or philosophy of his own, but in just the 
opposite: that he was able to persist in rejecting every system and yet
still be a creator in his own right. He was scornful, at times seemingly 
contemptuous, of the philosophies of most Russians (Tolstoy and Solovyov 
came squarely under his axe), and in this respect it is impossible to 
include him in any school of Russian thought. Berdyaev says as much about
him: "His independence from the thought which surrounded him at the time 
is striking."5 This is not to suggest that Shestov was anti-Russian in his 
outlook, or disdainful of all his contemporaries; Dostoevsky was his 
primary Russian hero, and he admired the work of Chekhov, Pushkin and 
Gogol. But it is just because of his refusal to submit to the trends of his 
time, or to the movements of any other age, that he stands out as such a 
distinctive voice of the individual in Russian thought. Of the four, he 
came latest to an explicitly religious standpoint; his early work even 
appears at times to be anti-religious. Moreover, he never calls himself a 
Christian. But one has to include him in the religious category because his 
search for meaning in life so persistently points in a religious direction. 
"He searched for God," Berdyaev says, "he searched for the emancipation of 
man from the authority of necessity."®
Solovyov's most influential follower was Semyon Frank. While disciples 
of Solovyov such as Pavel Florensky and Sergey Bulgakov inclined towards 
distinctively Russian Orthodox interpretations of the nineteenth-century  
philosopher, Frank put Solovyov's thought into a more universal 
perspective. Frank was a member of the Russian Orthodox Church, but he 
was also considered a first-rank logical philosopher (he was a Professor 
of philosophy at various Russian universities), and so he developed  
Solovyov's thought not from a purely Russian point of view, but rather 
from one which approached faith with an accent on analysis and logic. 
(The legitimacy of the union between faith and knowledge poses one of the 
fundamental questions of this essay; for Solovyov and Frank it was a 
happy and a viable union, while Shestov expended great energy in trying to 
expose the union as one which inevitably destroys faith.) Curiously, 
though, while many of Solovyov's and Frank's ideas coincide, Frank claimed 
that it was partly accidental that their thought was so sim ilar.7 His 
greatest inspirations came not from Solovyov - or at least not only from
Solovyov - but from ancient and medieval philosophy. Nevertheless, like 
Solovyov he was a confirmed idealist, an essential feature of both their 
philosophies.
Frank's significance as a thinker is not limited to his being one of the 
main exponents of Russian idealism; in the highly political atmosphere of 
turn-of-the-century Russia he was a leading voice of opposition to the 
revolutionary movements. Along with Berdyaev, Bulgakov and others, he 
contributed articles to anti-revolutionary journals; he was not a political 
activist like many of his contemporaries, but nonetheless he made his 
religious voice heard in the political debate.
Nikolai Berdyaev is the most significant voice in this thesis. Whether or 
not he is the most profound thinker remains an open question for the 
moment, but his great importance for our purposes can be expressed in 
two ways. The first is that he was intimately acquainted with the works 
of his contemporaries, and thus has much to say on the state of Russian 
philosophy from its earliest days, as well as on the other thinkers being 
examined in this paper. Of all Russian philosophers, Berdyaev is the best 
known on a worldwide scale; although many of his works do not touch upon 
Russian thought at all, he nonetheless was greatly influenced by Solovyov, 
and he was far more interested in (and obliging towards) his fellow  
Russian religious thinkers than was Shestov. Thus he is an invaluable 
source of comment on Russian thought. The second and more significant 
way that he is important to us is in his own body of original thought. 
Berdyaev could justly be described as a philosopher of the individual, 
religious personality; he is concerned above all with the personality in all 
its manifestations. How the spirit lives (and dies), where it breathes 
freely, and where is suffocates, these are his primary concerns. As this 
paper itself is based around the individual, it will become apparent that 
Berdyaev's thought deals mainly, in one form or another, with this very
problem. Like Shestov and Frank, Berdyaev's Inspirations are not limited
solely to Russian thinkers; nevertheless he acknowledged a debt to
Russians such as Solovyov and Dostoevsky, although, unlike Solovyov he 
was not a system-builder and, being generally suspicious of religious 
movements as a whole, he does not fit into a neat pattern of Russian 
thought. But it is undeniable that he was at the very centre of spiritual
and intellectual life in Russia at the turn of the century, and he is in large
part responsible for his age being called 'The Silver Age' of Russian 
let ters.
Each of these thinkers developed in his own distinctive fashion, but it is 
important to keep in mind at least two facts which connects them all. The 
first is that each one in his youth had called himself either a socialist or 
an outright Marxist. When Solovyov was an adolescent Marxism had not 
yet become universally known, but for a short time he was filled with 
socialist ardour. As for Berdyaev and Frank, they were both expelled from 
their universities for revolutionary activities, and even Shestov, the least 
political of all four, was a Marxist for a time. In late nineteenth-century 
Russia, anyone, as Frank says, who was a bona fide member of the 
in telligentsia belonged to such a school of thought.® Socialism
represented the opposition to tsarism , and few  young Russian
intellectuals who were concerned with social issues supported the 
crumbling autocracy. Other thinkers who were later to become strongly 
anti-Communistic, such as Father Sergey Bulgakov, a Russian Orthodox 
priest, and Peter Struve, a friend of Frank's, amongst many others, had 
been Marxists originally. Each of these thinkers, however, had become
disenchanted with the movement well before the Revolution. This
disenchantment did not turn them towards the political right and in the 
direction of tsarism, as might be expected, but rather towards a spiritual 
orientation which avoided both extremes. Berdyaev and Frank, two former
8Marxists who represented Russian thought at its most developed, came to 
be the fiercest critics of the movement which in their youth they had 
espoused.
The second similarity which they share is their identification with 
religious spirit. There is such variety in the thought of all four that it 
may at times appear that little unites them, but this is not so. We will 
have ample time to explore the significance each gives to the individual, 
and to decide whose interpretation is more convincing, but from the 
beginning we can recognize that all these thinkers were motivated by 
religious impulses.
SobornosV
Before embarking on a study of each of these four thinkers, it will serve 
the purpose of the thesis to exam ine briefly the roots of the Russian 
religious view of the individual. There are two primary sources to turn to: 
Russian literature and Russian Orthodox theology, which began to develop 
in the mid-nineteenth century, and which placed the individual firmly in 
the midst of community. The first important Russian religious term is 
sobornost': it was coined by Aleksey Khomyakov, and means, essentially, 
togetherness amongst believers. Sobornost' is a type of fellowship, or 
unity amongst believers, that avoids both self-willed individualism and 
restraint by coercion. Khomyakov, along with Ivan Kireyevsky and later 
Solovyov to a lesser extent, were leading Slavophiles working to preserve 
the traditions and beliefs of ancient Russia, and it was felt that through 
the Russian Orthodox Church and its inherent sobornost', these traditions 
and beliefs could be preserved.
Berdyaev describes sobornost' as:
...an internal spiritual community which stands beyond the 
external ecclesiastical structure, a mysterious community 
which consists of the living and the dead, which is blessed by 
the Holy Spirit, united by Christian love, completely free, and 
which knows no kind of compulsion or external authority.^
S o b o rn o s t '  was neither an organized community of believers, nor an 
acknowledged aspect of the official Church. In fact, Khomyakov's concept 
was actually frowned upon by the Russian Orthodox Church leaders, 
because it was thought likely to undermine Church authority and to lead to 
the neglect of external forms of religious r i t u a l . Sob ornost' was above 
all an ideal vision of the Church, in which the symbolic rituals would play 
a lesser role than the spiritual life of the community. In practical terms 
the idea never became established, but it is clear that Solovyov, Frank and 
Berdyaev all drew inspiration not from the external structure of the 
Russian Orthodox Church, but rather from an ideal, spiritualized Church, 
that Church envisaged in the concept of sobornost'.
As Berdyaev further points out, the spiritual movement was directed 
towards Christian freedom, but if the individual drew himself away from 
his spiritual community that was a rejection of freedom. In the West the 
Reformation and the Renaissance created a chasm between authority and 
the individual, but while sobornost' was opposed to enforced authority, it 
did not thereby sanction individualism, if by this term was m eant 
isolation from community. Berdyaev says of Orthodoxy that its concept of 
Christian freedom "is in no way a struggle for the right of the individual 
who is protected and distinguished from other individuals...."^ 1 Thus 
through s o b o rn o s t ' ,  the individual is given freedom  from external 
constraints, but his freedom  must be used to unite him with the 
community. Throughout Russian religious thought there exists a tension
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between the duty of the individual to himself and to his spiritual 
community.
Russian Orthodoxy, thought many of the Slavophiles, was in an ideal 
position to unite the spiritual forces of the world. Catholicism, in 
Kireyevsky's words, was alienated "further and further away from the 
truth, and produced all the destructive features of Western culture with 
all the consequences for itself and for us."i2 Catholicism had used 
worldly means to achieve its spiritual ends, claimed the Slavophiles, and 
Protestantism was equally unacceptable as it seemed capable only of 
expressing a negative idea in its opposition to Rome.i® Slavophilism was 
opposed to the individual in the sense that he was simply a unit in society, 
isolated by his private property and legal conventions. Khomyakov saw 
this as being a primarily European, i.e. non-Russian, problem, where there 
was either "unity without freedom", or "freedom without unity".1 ^
Khomyakov's formulation of sobornost' indicates a spiritual equality, a 
decisive departure from the hierarchical structure of the Church. It is 
perhaps easy to confuse this type of equality with that demanded by the 
social reformers of the day, by Westernizers such as Herzen and Bakunin. 
The notion of so bo rn o st ',  had it not been a specifically religious idea, 
might well have been used as a tool for social reform. The future 
inspiration of the social reformers, the "Communist Manifesto", deals 
alm ost exclusively with this sam e idea of the isolated individual, 
although in economic rather than spiritual terms. The bourgeoisie, claims 
the Manifesto, "has resolved personal worth into exchange value..."''® The 
counterpart to Slavophilism, Westernism, embraced this idea, and on the 
point of some kind of unity and equality both sides seem to be in 
agreem ent. But while the social reformers in Russia, influenced  
eventually to a great degree by Marx and Engels, saw the economic 
restructuring of society as the answer to the woes of the world, the
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Slavophiles, leaning on idealized Orthodoxy for support, saw sp ir itua l  
unity as the only valid form of "togetherness".
Russia during most of the nineteenth century was concerned with the 
question of national identity and direction. How could the nation express 
itself as a collective, what was its mission, in what way could the people 
of the land be released from the bondage of autocracy to reveal its true 
character? The Slavophiles saw religion as a means of reform, but it is 
important to remember that most of the other movements for social 
change were anti-religious in character. (Of course it was eventually the 
anti-religious forces which gained the upper hand in the country.) 
"Togetherness" was crucial to the revolutionaries' creed, but in the 
writings of Chernyshevsky, Belinsky, Herzen and others this idea had little 
or no religious meaning. Belinsky, for instance, was so convinced by the 
need for radical social change, that he declared that, to achieve the 
happiness of the greater part of mankind, he was willing to let a thousand 
heads roll.1® Chernyshevsky, who had suffered greatly at the hands of the 
Russian autocracy (he was sentenced to seven years of hard labour for his
attempts to help the p e a s a n t s ) ^ was acutely aware of the need for
change in Russia, but nevertheless his outlook, as expressed in his most 
famous book, What Is To Be Done?, was an inspiration to the growing 
number of Russian nihilists. As already mentioned, religion and State 
were inseparable to the socialists, who identified Christianity not with
freedom but with slavery, a notion that Solovyov, Berdyaev and Frank
would work hard to dispel.
From the seeds sown by the early socialists/materialists grew even 
more radical thought. Nechaev, for instance, was a socialist who believed 
that the revolutionary should be willing to sacrifice all of his personal 
interests, his feelings, his property, even his name, for the sake of the 
revo lu tion .1® And Bakunin, at one time an ally of Marx, was passionately
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anti-religious, claiming that Christ should have been thrown into prison 
as a vagrant loafer.■* 9
The point of mentioning these various social beliefs is to stress that 
while there w ere different strands of Russian thought which were  
concerned with unity and equality, certain ones based their argument on 
religious grounds; a sharp distinction has to be made between the 
religious and the anti-religious forces in Russia during the nineteenth 
century. And yet, paradoxically, the socialists were so committed to their 
materialistic philosophy that their revolutionary creed had at times a kind 
of religious significance to it. Reinhold Niebuhr, perhaps the most 
influential theologian of the twentieth century, says that the nature of 
such passionate belief in Marxism is closer to religious overbelief than to 
scientific truth .20 This question will be explored later by Berdyaev, but it 
is worth suggesting that the anti-religious revolutionaries were not 
simply scientific theorists, but were themselves possessed of religious­
like devotion to their cause.
In the concept of so bo rn o st ' there existed a role for the individual, a 
role which placed more emphasis on the Individual than did the purely 
utilitarian theories of the transformation of society. The Slavophiles 
made a distinction between "internal" and "external" truth. The internal 
truth is the voice of conscience in the individual, and it expresses itself 
through the values enshrined in religion, tradition and custom. The 
external truth, on the other hand, is represented by the law and the State, 
which to the Slavophiles were of secondary i m p o r t a n c e . 21 Thus the 
individual found his meaning not economically but spiritually, although it 
is clear that the individual at this early stage of Russian religious thought 
is far less important than the union of individuals.
A brief explanation of Slavophilism, itself important in this discussion 
as many of the religious ideas of the nineteenth century were born out of
1 3
it, should be offered here. The Slavophiles were a group of conservative 
thinkers, but their conservatism was not connected with the rulers in 
Russia at the time (especially not with the martinet Nicholas I). The 
Slavophile position held that the reforms of Peter the G reat had been 
harmful, since they had drawn Russia closer towards what they saw as a 
corrupted Europe, and away from the ideal Russian peasant community 
which supposedly existed before the Emperor Peter's changes. It was 
claimed by the Slavophiles that pre-Petrine Russian Orthodoxy had been 
free of pagan rationalism and the secular ambitions of Catholicism ,2 2  
With this supposedly pure form of Christianity, combined with the binding 
power of sobornost', the Slavophiles believed that religion on Russian soil 
would provide Christianity's greatest source of spirituality. This 
movement was not motivated only by religious impulses; in general it 
wanted to convince the enlightened sections of society (i.e. those on whom 
European culture had had the most influence) to return to the people, that 
is, to return to the principles embodied in the village commune, of which 
Orthodoxy was a vital ingredient.23
The Slavophiles developed their ideas in part through, ironically, an 
outside influence: German philosophy. Its first influence was felt in the
Society of Wisdom-Lovers, founded in 1823 and including amongst its 
members future Slavophiles such as Kireyevsky. The Society was formed 
as a reaction against the rationalism of eighteenth-century French 
philosophy; its dependence upon German idealism for a romantic form of 
expression was summed up by one of its founders, V. F. Odoevsky: "Land of 
ancient Teutons! Land of noble ideas. It is to you I turn my worshipful 
g a z e ."24 The Society happened to look to Germany at a moment when 
Schelling's star was in the ascendant, and thus he became a symbol to the 
Wisdom-Lovers of all that was most profound in philosophy.
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Kireyevsky willingly admitted that the Slavophiles were attempting to 
create a new philosophy which combined the idealistic outlook of current 
German thought with the old ideals of peasant Russia. He says, "I believe 
that German philosophy...could serve us as the most convenient point of 
departure on our way from borrowed systems to an independent philosophy 
corresponding to the basic principles of ancient Russian culture..."25 What 
Kireyevsky and his fellow Slavophiles found in Schelling and German  
philosophy as a whole was the acknowledgement of an ideal world, along 
with a disinclination to focus solely on reason and speculative philosophy, 
as he claimed that Roman Catholic apologists had done. (Of course the 
typical Russian peasant would not have had the foggiest idea what German 
idealism was all about; this movement found itself in the odd position of 
introducing foreign elem ents so as to retain its purely nationalistic 
character.)
In Berdyaev's essay entitled "On the Character of Russian Religious 
Thought of the Nineteenth Century", he maintains that actual Russian 
Orthodox philosophy had been non-existent until the nineteenth century. 
While Catholic thinkers had abounded for centuries, and Protestant beliefs 
were firmly established, Orthodoxy had no scholarly tradition, had had no 
renaissance of thought. Russian culture flowered from the beginning of 
the nineteenth century, and with this flowering religious thought for the 
first time found its expression. Berdyaev points out what has just been 
mentioned, that the ideals of Slavophilism,and the power of sobornost', 
while enriching the Church itself, was not indeed integrally related to 
Russian Orthodox tradition. In fact he declares that there is an analogy 
between Orthodox thought and Greek thought during the early Christian 
times, when an attem pt was made to rationalize Christianity. (This 
attem pt to ra tionalize  fa ith , incidentally , evokes the passionate  
resistance of Shestov.) As the G reek philosophers used the most
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enlightened philosophy of their time, Platonism and neo-Platonism, for 
the defence and unveiling of Christian truth given in revelation, so the 
Russian religious thinkers did the same, using the most enlightened  
philosophy of their time, Schelling and German i d e a l i s m . 2 6  Berdyaev is
convinced that without the influence of German philosophy, Russian 
religious thought would simply have been something other than what it
w as .27
However, Berdyaev is not insisting that because of the mixture of 
sources such Russian thought is insufficiently Christian or Orthodox. 
Khomyakov's teaching of sobornost', however alien to the Church itself, 
was nonetheless a stage in the development of Christianity in Russia; it 
also happened to represent Christian freedom far more than did the 
patriarchal Church of earlier centuries, which was, claims Berdyaev, 
firmly connected with the Russian state and the founding of an Orthodox 
kingdom .28 |f the teaching of Kireyevsky, Khomyakov and others showed 
the influence of German idealism, it nonetheless claimed to represent 
Russian Orthodoxy, and was far more enlightened than previous Orthodox 
thought. Further, for our discussion, these early thinkers are far more 
significant than all the tradition and the history of Russian Orthodoxy, 
because it was they who first voiced the idea of freedom in a spiritual 
context on Russian soil. Berdyaev justifies the Slavophile adoption of 
German idealism by saying: "There came a time when Christian freedom  
had to be revealed more than it had been revealed in former times."29
A study of Schelling and German philosophy here Is not necessary; it 
suffices to point out that Schelling aided the young Russian thinkers in 
their efforts to find a romantic Russian interpretation of the past and an 
interpretation of the spiritual foundations of society. After Schelling, the 
Russians began to take their theories of art, nature and religion from 
Hegel; it is important to remember that Slavophilism was, from the first.
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painted in colours that were not exclusively Russian. It is a paradox that 
Slavophilism should take much of its spiritual inspiration from the 
German idealists, while the socialist revolutionaries of Russia were also 
informed by Hegel and Schelling, mainly through the interpretation of Marx 
and Engels. The same influences created two very different outlooks.
One final point on this subject is that while Solovyov emerges in large 
part from G erm an-inspired Slavophilism , Shestov bases his whole  
philosophy on opposition to the methods and conclusions of thinkers like 
Hegel and Schelling, the systematic philosophers. Although Shestov and 
Solovyov both argued from a religious perspective, we can already see a 
confrontation looming between them.
IV
Russian Literature 
It was from Slavophilism that Solovyov, and after him Frank and others, 
acquired some of the basic principles of their philosophies. W hile 
Solovyov is the first systematic philosopher in Russia, without the 
influence of Kireyevsky and other Slavophiles his early work would have 
been dramatically different. However Solovyov was the first Russian who 
attempted to do what the early Christian Greek philosophers and the 
German idealists had done: to provide a systematic explanation for the
divine foundations of the world. We can discuss Solovyov's concept of the 
individual primarily because his early ideas of Russian Orthodoxy came 
not from the Orthodoxy of old Rus' (Russia), but from the developing 
tradition of Orthodox philosophy.
The ideas which influenced Solovyov, and which he in turn developed to 
influence others, form a tradition in Russian religious thought. It is to
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this tradition of thought that we will often return in our discussion. But 
as already mentioned, not all four of our thinkers fit neatly into the 
tradition: in the case of Shestov, for instance, it can hardly be considered. 
Berdyaev and Frank borrowed ideas from the tradition, but they too cannot 
be said merely to be expounders of it; their thought has its own 
originality. However, there is one primary source which all of these 
thinkers share, and that is the Russian literature of the nineteenth  
century. While it is perhaps typical for philosophical thought to allude, in 
its premisses, conclusions, etc., mainly to previous philosophical ideas, 
the nineteenth-century Russian literature was so rich that It influenced 
all aspects of thought. In fact, the appearance of Pushkin and the dawn of 
a new Russian culture made the very existence of the Slavophiles possible. 
Pushkin, an aristocrat deeply affected by European culture, may have had 
little in common with the Slavophiles, but it was he who first awakened  
the Russian imagination. Berdyaev, Shestov and Frank may have been 
concerned above all with religious and philosophical ideas, but it was 
often to the novelists more than to the philosophers that they turned for 
their inspiration. Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Turgenev, Gogol, Chekhov, all of 
these writers were fundamental to the development of Russian culture, 
and therefore to Russian philosophy and theology. Dostoevsky especially 
played an important, sometimes vital role in the thought of all four of our 
thinkers; each of them was influenced by his writings. Tolstoy, too, the 
other great Russian novelist, occupied the thought of all four, although we 
shall see that all were more critical of him than of Dostoevsky.
In terms of the role of the individual, Russian literature has more to say 
than the developing Russian philosophy, and thinkers like Berdyaev and 
Shestov don't fail to notice this. For these two, Dostoevsky's Notes From  
U n d ergrou n d  and The Brothers Karamazov  are not merely entertaining 
works of fiction; they are creations which have shaped these thinkers’
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perspectives. If one were to categorize (loosely) the relationship of the 
individual to Russian philosophy and Russian literature of the nineteenth 
century, one might consider the individual in community to be of primary 
interest in the philosophy and the isolated individual to be of greater 
importance to the literature. Both of these trends are vital to our 
discussion of the four thinkers.
W e have now introduced the two primary influences of Russian 
philosophical and religious thought: the Slavophile movement and Russian
literature. These are not the only influences; we shall see that all four 
thinkers draw on foreign, ancient, medieval, modern sources, but these 
two Russian streams will lead us to the main body of water. It is also 
worth mentioning that the political clim ate In la te -n ineteenth /early - 
twentieth century Russia made a strong impression on Solovyov, 
Berdyaev and Frank. The revolutionary atmosphere in Russia, and the 
significance of the changes in the country are addressed by Solovyov 
before the turn of the century, Berdyaev and Frank after. Each of them is 
in part a social thinker, with views which are often similar, however 
different other aspects of their thought may be. This thesis will examine 
some of the political ideas of these thinkers, as they strongly contribute 
to their overall conception of the individual. For the most part they 
represent the line of thought which goes back to the Slavophiles, and 
which is fiercely opposed to the creeds which were at the root of the 
October Revolution.
A note must be added about the use of certain terms. The most 
important is "individual"; both Frank and Berdyaev prefer the word 
lichnosV, which means "personality", and not individual. (For both of them 
l ic h n o s t '  is a positive term, which has little to do with a potentially 
destructive notion such as kul't lichnosti, the cult of personality.) Where 
l ic h n o s t'  is used I will translate it literally, but I consider this term to
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be integrally related to "the individual". Both words suggest the notion of 
the single person, although all four thinkers have their own ideas about 
what "the single person" means. Also, the word "truth" makes a frequent 
appearance in the writings of these thinkers; there are two words for 
"truth" in Russian: istina and p rav d a .  Unless stated otherwise, I intend
/sf/na-truth. Pravda is a term generally used in common speech, and also 
means "justice", while istina means philosophical, or enlightened truth, 
the "higher" truth.
All four of these thinkers were at the centre of or greatly influenced a 
religious and cultural renaissance, although until very recently their 
impact on Soviet culture has been nil, since both their ideas and they 
themselves were prohibited from living in post-revolution Russia. This 
paper has little to do with the actual suppression by the Soviet Union of 
religious thought But the contrast between the Soviet refusal to allow 
individual expression and each thinker's belief in the individual is a stark 
one. Each of these four offered a definition of the individual which 
sought freedom for him based on religious principles, and each thinker's 
writings were banned from the Soviet Union after the deportation of 1922. 
Only today, almost seventy years after this ban came into effect, have 
these writings again begun to be welcomed in Russia. After we have 
looked at each thinker in his turn, we will exam ine the awakening  
response to them in the Soviet press, and try to guage the extent to which 
they have been rehabilitated in their homeland.
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Chapter Two
Vladimir Solovyov 
I
By the time Vladimir Solovyov died in 1900, he had become a 
s tra n n ik ,  a wanderer, who reiied on the goodwill of his friends to 
provide food and shelter for him. He was poor, his ideas were not 
popular in Russia, he had no close family, no career. It would hardly 
have been surprising if he had been forgotten after his death, or at best 
remembered as only one of many struggiers for Truth on the unique 
landscape of nineteenth-century Russian thought. And yet within a few  
years of his death he was recognized as a great, if not the greatest, 
influence on Russian reiigious thought of the twentieth century. The 
spiritual renaissance in Russia at the turn of the century claimed him 
as an inspiration, he was admired by almost every well-known religious 
thinker in his country, and his writings gained a deep appreciation 
which they had never had during his lifetime.
And yet Solovyov was far from being a "modernist"; if anything many 
of his views even during this religious renaissance would have seemed 
outmoded, the beliefs of an age which had vanished. Many of his 
idealistic notions might have seemed anachronistic and unrealizable to 
the twentieth-century thinkers who faced the reality of revolution, and 
who could no longer maintain the optimistic philosophies which he had 
held till almost the end of his life. But in his thought was to be found 
an unconquerable belief in the divine spirit in man, and also in man's 
unconditional significance in this world. It was this especially which 
made such a great impression on his religious heirs.
Solovyov's primary theme is that of all-unity (v se e d in s tv o ).  E v e r y  
aspect of his thought manifests his attempts to unify: he aimed to
2 2
unite phiiosophy and religion, church and church, man and woman, human 
being and God. No being, no unit could be an entity unto itself, surviving 
alone. For each person the significance of aii-unity was that it required 
relationship in the divine sphere. According to Solovyov, the worst fate 
man could encounter was to be cut off: from God or his fellow-man or
society. Isolation was the road to evil and suffering; the individual 
became an individual not through his own efforts or through his self- 
sufficiency, but through the divine, where humankind was truly united. 
There is a definite danger, however, for the individual in any system of 
aii-unity, because It threatens to engulf him. Ali-unity can become so 
all-important that the individual loses his distinct features. This was 
always Shestov's claim, and we shall see if it can be applied to 
Solovyov.
Vladimir Solovyov was born in 1853 and brought up in Moscow. He 
was related to an earlier religious philosopher, Skovoroda, on his 
mother's side, and his father was Professor Sergey Mikhailovich, an 
eminent historian. When Vladimir was nine years old he experienced a 
mystical vision in church; the apparition was a feminine being he was 
later to call Sophia. This vision was to occur twice more in his life: 
once in the reading-room of the British Museum, and once in the deserts 
of Egypt, whither he had been sent by the reading-room Sophia. Later he 
fit the id ea  of Sophia into his rellgio-philosophical system, giving this 
feminine presence the quality of world-soul. At 21, after he had 
defended his thesis at St. Petersburg University, entitled "The Crisis of 
Western Philosophy", the Russian historian Bestuzhev-Ryumin remarked, 
"Russia may be congratulated upon a new genius".1
From 1875-1881 he lectured in Moscow and St. Petersburg, during 
that time delivering his Lectures on Godmanhood. However, in 1881, 
soon after the assassination of Tsar Alexander II, Solovyov at the end of
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a public taik proposed that the new tsar, Alexander III, should as a 
Christian monarch show clemency to his father's assassins. This 
created a bad impression and in November, 1881, Solovyov handed in his 
resignation. For the rest of his life the philosopher earned a meagre 
living by writing. In the 1880's he made efforts to reunite the Russian 
Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches; when Pope Leo XIII learned of 
this, he said, "Bella idea, ma fuor d'un miracolo, e cosa impossible" ("A 
beautiful idea, but short of a miracle, impossible to carry out"2). There 
has been controversy as to whether Solovyov actually converted to 
Catholicism, but it is unlikely that he gave himself fully over to "Rome". 
The end of his life was spent moving from one friend’s home to another, 
and he died on the estate of Prince Sergey Trubetskoy in July, 1900, at 
the age of 47.
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Sophia
One of the most difficult aspects of Solovyov's thought, which 
repeatedly arises and in different guises, is that of the Divine Sophia. 
From the age of nine Solovyov was aware of the existence of a mystical 
feminine being. In his early years he was interested in spiritualism and 
occultism, and in fact had gone abroad to study mystical doctrines when 
he had his visions.^ He did associate this figure with a feminine image, 
but the figure herself becam e incorporated into his philosophy as a 
world-soul, thus perhaps losing her personal element. She appeared in 
the structure of his thought in his Lectures on Godmanhood, when he 
connected her with Christ. “Sophia is God's body, the matter of Divinity 
permeated with the beginning of divine unity. Christ, who realized that 
unity in himseif, or is the bearer of it as the internal divine organism - 
universal and at the same time individuai - is both Logos and Sophia.”4
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She is in Christ as the ideal or perfect hum anity, as opposed to God 
himself, the all-divine. So from the boy's original vision in church of a 
mystical woman, Sophia has now become that part of Christ which is 
related to the human rather than to the divine. He then says that the 
idea existed even before Christianity; in the Old Testament the Proverbs 
of Solomon develop the idea of Sophia - under the Hebrew name of 
Hohma.5  Eventually, Solovyov settles into a fairly consistent definition 
of this mystical figure: she is the world-soui. In Christ, she is his
human element, and in the world of mankind she is the spirit which 
moves humanity, yet she is both distinct from a n d  able to turn away 
from God.
...the soul [in this sense meaning world-soui or Sophia]...can 
assert herself outside of God...With the segregation of the 
world-soul, how ever...the particular elem ents of the universal 
organism lose their common tie in her, and, left to themselves, 
are doomed to the particularized, egoistic existence, the root 
of which is evil, and the fruit, suffering.6
Thus Sophia seems to be transformed - or developed. She is in Christ 
and she is in man. She is a mystical presence, but she is connected with 
the human rather than the divine. She can be possessed of what 
Solovyov calls divine beginnings, but she is also able to be separated 
from God and result in evil. Is this contradiction or complexity? The 
fact that Solovyov calls both his visions and his conception of the 
worid-soui "Sophia" tends to blur the meaning of the feminine presence, 
but he does eventually associate her with the world of man, the "other" 
through which God is fulfilled, in The Meaning of Love he says that God 
wants mankind to realize and be united with "the image of complete
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femininity “Such a realization and Incarnation is also the aspiration 
of the eternal Femininity itself, which is not merely an inert image in 
the Divine mind, but a living spiritual essence possessed of the fulness 
of power and a c t i v i t y . She is like the collective will of man. This 
notion raises a dilemma: if Sophia is the world-soul and  has freedom to 
turn towards or away from God, then individual man loses his own 
freedom , and is subjected to the dynamics of Sophia. Basically, 
Solovyov wants to insist that freedom is organically connected with the 
world-soul; man is not free when he is isolated. He is insistent that 
man should not be deprived of his personality as a member of the world- 
soul, but that he should be part of a great whole - a constant theme 
with this philosopher - which completes him, rather than reduces him 
to insignificance. As we can recall from the Introduction, this is 
largely the definition of Khomyakov's sobornost': man's personality is
expressed from within spiritual unity. Sophia is, perhaps, essentially 
an extension of sobornost'.
Let us make one final point about Sophia. In his younger days Solovyov 
was a strong supporter of the Slavophiles, and such a concept as Sophia 
had a distinctly Russian flavour, however much he may have tried later 
on to attach it to broad European thought. Of all those who were  
influenced by Solovyov, the thinkers who specifically incorporate  
Sophiological concepts into their work are representatives of the 
Russian Orthodox Church, Sergey Bulgakov and Pavel Florensky being the 
most renowned expounders of this idea. Bulgakov, an Orthodox priest 
who settled in Paris after being expelled by the Communists from the 
Soviet Union in the deportation of 1922, writes in The Unfading Light 
that Sophia is "the world of ideas, i.e. the ideal basis of the w o r ld ".8 
Bulgakov accepted the femininity of the world, and he asserted that the 
universe, which is actually  chaotic, is potentia lly  Sophioiogicai.^ From
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Solovyov, Bulgakov takes both the notion of Sophia as the ideal rather 
than material aspect of this world, and of her existence between man 
and God. Florensky too, who preceded Bulgakov, calls Sophia "the ideal 
personality of the world". She is like the substance of the Divine 
Trinity...; even the Church becomes "the bearer of Sophia".10 it is 
significant to find this mystical notion fully developed only with the 
exponents of Orthodoxy; thinkers like Berdyaev and Frank, who do not 
preach Orthodox theology but who were under the influence of Solovyov, 
steer clear of Sophia, at least in explicit terms.
In terms of the individual, the concept of Sophia represents the 
w eakest point in Solovyov's thought. This mystical notion is too 
abstract to apply to the single person. Solovyov developed it especially 
in his early days, before he had fully matured as a thinker, and in his 
later work a much greater accent is placed on explicitly moral 
questions.
I l l
H istory
Another vital component of Solovyov's thought is his understanding 
of history. Indeed the philosophical historian Zenkovsky says that, 
" H is to r io c e n tr is m  ra th e r  th an  c o s m o c e n tr is m , or ev en  
anthropocentrism , defines Solovyov's approach to all problem s " . 11 
Solovyov, quite simply, believed that the kingdom of God would be 
realized on earth; history was moving in such a direction that mankind 
as a whole would eventually turn fully towards God. Because Solovyov 
was always returning to all-unity, he tried to fit many diverse beliefs 
into a single pattern, and this pattern was history. Like the Marxist 
doctrine, Solovyov asserted that one inadequate social order would 
finally give way to another, better order. But he counted on man
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growing disillusioned with his own self-assertion, his own exclusive 
will. (Again the notion of being "cut off") In the L e c tu re s  on 
G o d m a n h o o d  he says that the way towards salvation, towards the 
realization of true equality, true freedom and brotherhood, is that of 
s e l f - d e n i a l . 12 He affirms that the negative development of Western  
civilization is necessary, because it wiil iead man to see the futility of 
self-assertion , and turn tow ards se lf-denia l. (As feudalism  and 
capitalism are necessary stages which lead to communism, according to 
Marx. This kind of claim was made by various socialists during 
Soiovyov's day, who thought that Russia had to live through bad 
capitaiism so as to reach good communism.).
When the Western part of humanity will be convinced by facts, 
by historical reality, that the self-assertion of the will...is 
the source of evil and suffering: then...Western humanity will 
be ready to accept the religious principle, the positive 
revelation of true religion.1 ^
As with his notion of a worid-soul asserting her own will, so here does 
Solovyov tend to obscure man's individual role in history: true equality
and brotherhood will alight on earth when mankind as a body is 
disillusioned with self-assertion.
This tendency of Soiovyov's - to put whatever aspect of life he is 
exploring into a historical setting - is repeated in his analysis of 
Christianity. In an article he wrote in 1891, On Counterfeits, he says 
"...the central idea of the Gospel...is the idea of the kingdom of G o d " . i 4  
He insists that this idea has to come from within each man - "the 
kingdom of God is within you"is _ but it also has to embrace the whole 
of mankind, it has to spread from the inner to the outer. Solovyov is
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unreservedly Messianic - the kingdom of God will be restored on earth, 
this is the message of the Gospels, and man must serve such a cause. 
His belief that the kingdom of God will be restored on earth leads him to 
the idea of Christian politics; if man is to establish God's kingdom on 
earth, ail aspects of society must be turned to God. (There must be all­
unity, wholeness.) Thus the secular arms of society have to become 
religious. "The task of Christian politics is to perfect [social and 
political] forms and transmute them into realities fit for the kingdom  
of G o d . "18 As will be seen later, Solovyov emphatically does not believe 
in a theocracy whereby man assumes the voice of God; he takes  
literally this divine kingdom on earth where Christian principles rule, 
and not the iron hand of man-sanctioned theocratic tyranny. But he did 
believe that politics could join ranks in the Christian march of history: 
in his Philosophy of History he expresses admiration for Constantine the 
Great, the Roman emperor who established Christianity as a state 
r e l i g i o n . 17 The state would not wither away, as Marxism had it, but 
would blossom in its new Christian form: "The Christian Church, the
Christian State and the Christian Society as the three inseparable  
modifications of the kingdom of God (in its earthly form) have one and 
the same essence - God's truth and righteousness (pravda)"^^
This theme of the spiritual transformation of all humankind was later 
to be adopted by Frank and Berdyaev, most notably in the anti- 
revoiutionary compendia Vekhi  and Iz glubiny. Both of these thinkers 
shared Solovyov's optimism - indeed were inspired by it - in thinking 
that all humankind could become Christianized.
As Christianity is the end of his historical process, it is natural to 
enquire into his views on Christ's role in history. Solovyov is not one to 
dwell on the person of Jesus Christ; he is in fact central to Solovyov's 
system, but it is the system itself that is more prominent than the
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figure of Jesus. Nevertheless he does appear in the middle of the 
historical process. In the Philosophy of History, Solovyov suggests that 
the Romans paved the way for Christ and Christianity. The Roman 
Empire at one time embraced almost the whole of humanity, both 
through their power (which was abused), and through their formulations 
of reason and justice.19 (And we can see how attractive the idea of an 
all-humanity-embracing force would be to Solovyov.) But their great 
achievem ents were external,  and could not cure the illness of human 
egoism. Thus to give substance to form, "...the first thing that was 
needed was a divineiy-human fact."2o
As Solovyov accepts the self-assertion of modern W estern  
civilization because it leads to disillusionment and then to self-denial, 
so he accepts the Roman Empire as a great era externally (despite its 
corruption), which leads to The Great Era internally. And the divineiy- 
human fact is of course Christ. W e can employ Roman (or Greek or 
Jewish) principles in building society, but Christ himseif has altered  
history by giving substance to reason, justice, etc., and he now becomes 
history's focal point. Thus, Christ is not only a source of inspiration for 
each of us, but he is also an historical turning point for all of us.
Based on his attitude to Western civilization, Christianity and Christ 
himseif, we get a clear indication of Solovyov's "historiocentrism": he
had a Messianic view of the end of history. It is not irrelevant that 
Solovyov was an admirer of the Prophets of Israel, who also foretold of 
a kingdom of God on earth, when wrongs would be righted.21 But in the 
final year of his life, Solovyov wrote a tale, called A Short Story of 
A n ti-C h r is t ,  in which he seems to refute all that he had previously 
asserted about history moving naturally towards the divine. In it, a 
young man who is good, intelligent and spiritual, begins to turn away 
from God and Christ, and towards himself (self-assertion). He writes a
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book on peace and well-being which is so rapturously received that soon 
he acquires power, and before long becomes Emperor of the World, with 
a magician named Apollonius advising him. He always seems just and 
good, and tries to lure the representatives of Catholicism, Orthodoxy 
and Protestantism over to his side. Many succumb, but the most devout 
see him as the anti-Christ. Elder John (the Orthodox) and the Pope, his 
opponents, are then struck by lightning through the magic of Apollonius. 
But when he goes to Israel and declares himself the Deity of the 
Universe, the Jews rise against him, and in a terrible war manage to kill 
him. Christ then descends from heaven and all the righteous reign with 
him for a thousand y e a r s .22 This is fairly Apocalyptic stuff, filled with 
hellfire and brimstone; but although we find familiar them es (the evil 
of self-assertion and the union of all faiths, led by Christ), there is a 
change in Solovyov's historical process. No longer does mankind move 
steadily in the direction of the kingdom of God, driven by historical 
necessity; now it can only be won through force, through fighting 
against evil. The result is the same, though: Christ does appear in order 
to redeem the righteous. W e are left with this final testam ent of 
Solovyov either to believe that he had revised his views on history, or 
that his poetic nature had overcome his philosophical one.
Until almost the very end of his days Solovyov seemed to believe that 
authority could become spiritualized; authority had the power to unite, 
and if it were only to accept the task of spiritualization, history's goal 
would be realized. It took Solovyov a long time to see that authority 
was in no way becoming, or would become, spiritualized.
IV
Godmanhood
31
From his understanding of the worid-soui and of history, we can 
already see that Solovyov thought in universal, rather than in 
individualistic term s. Solovyov's universalistic perspective was  
religious, but his awareness of the individual's role in religious life has 
yet to be clearly defined. But before we condemn him to being 
indifferent to the individual, let us explore two more areas. The first 
of these has been mentioned briefly, and this is his idea concerning 
Godmanhood.
Godmanhood, as the term implies, involves God and man. It is the 
relationship between the two, in which both are active participants; 
God needs man to fulfill his mission on earth, man needs God to give his 
life divine significance. The relationship is a personal one, in the sense 
that God is not 'out there' or 'up there', but is in man himself.
Throughout his Lectures on Godmanhood, Solovyov presents several 
opposites which indicate a dual world: conditional/unconditional,
m aterial/ideal, hum an/divine .23 Separated from God, man is reduced to 
material existence which leads inevitably to death. Therefore some link 
is necessary to unite the two: "Religion is the reunion of man and the
world with the unconditional and integral p r i n c i p l e " 2 4 .  in this respect 
Christianity becomes essential; we have seen how integral it was to his 
historical process, but here Solovyov goes even deeper to explain why it 
should be so important. For him Christianity acknowledges four 
principles: 1) asceticism 2)idealism 3) monotheism and 4) the
doctrine of the triune G o d . 25 Christ is the primary Godman, but because 
the human personality has unconditional, divine v a l u e , 2 6  each human 
being can and must participate in Godmanhood. (Berdyaev's philosophy 
was to focus around this very concept, that of the personality having 
eternal significance.) In embracing Christ's appearance on earth, 
Solovyov is less concerned with his moral teachings (which are found in
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the Old Testament as well as in aspects of Hinduism) than he is with 
the fact of Christ himself, who united the divine and human: "The oniy
new doctrine specifically different from all other religions is the 
teaching of Christ about himself, the reference to himself as to the 
living, incarnate truth."27 a  commandment such as "Love thy neighbour 
as thyself" is for Soiovyov relatively m eaningless as coming from  
Christ; it could be found in the Ten Commandments, in Greek notions of 
reason, Buddhist notions of compassion (all of which have their own 
value, nonetheless). But the divine-human reality of Jesus Christ bears 
witness to a world beyond our own, and with the divine-hum an  
established, it is death to man to Ignore this reality.
Solovyov sets out to prove that the divine world is not a puzzle for 
mankind; rather it is our natural world of fact which constitutes the 
real puzzle. Indeed, Frank says, "The first thing that strikes one in ail 
Soiovyov's writings...is the keenness and clearness with which he sees 
the invisible - the spiritual world."28 For Solovyov the invisible was 
real, perhaps more real than the visible. This notion is entwined around 
his vision of Godmanhood; God the invisible and man (in the visible 
world) must take part in a union which gives unconditional significance 
to both. Solovyov has built up to the proposal that God, in order to exist, 
must have an "other" in order to manifest himself29 This "other", as has 
been mentioned, is the world of man. But what God wants from man is 
not that which binds him to the mundane, but rather that which releases 
him to the ideal: God wants man's humanity. It is when man is united 
with God, the all-unity, that he becomes unconditional and eternal. 
W hen he ceases to participate in this unity, then he breaks away, 
reverts to his isolated self.
It is here that we begin to see the role that the individual might have 
in Solovyov's thought, and here too that Berdyaev and Frank are
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especially admiring of Solovyov. Man as a being who has an active 
relationship with God: this is centrai to the thought of all three.
As we have mentioned, Solovyov maintained through most of his iife a 
very optimistic understanding of humankind. Human beings are, 
according to him, not intrinsically fallen creatures, but by the very 
nature of their divine-human quality they are creatures possessing 
dignity. (Shestov, incidentally, believed exactly the opposite, that man 
was indeed fallen.) Man according to Solovyov is not merely another 
member of the animal kingdom, and this is because he contains three 
ennobling virtues: "The fundamental feelings of sham e, pity and
reverence exhaust the sphere of man's possible moral relations to that 
which is below him, that which is on a level with him, and that which is 
above him."3o Soiovyov sees the good in man; this is a fundamental 
aspect of his thought, because by means of this good - by means of 
shame, pity and reverence - Soiovyov posits a divine world.
For Soiovyov it is nothing less than obvious that man should want to 
be good; on one hand this recognizes man's potential for spirituality. 
But on the other hand, it reveals Solovyov's weakness as a psychologist. 
As Shestov especially, but also Berdyaev point out frequently, man does 
not always want to submit to the demands of morality. Sometimes to 
protect his individuality he wants to destroy morality, but Soiovyov 
with his vision of divinely-inspired man as a bearer of shame, pity and 
piety exposes both his strengths and his weaknesses as a thinker.
Opposed to Godmanhood is nature: "...the actual being of the natural 
world is something that ought not to be, or something abnormal, in so 
far as it is contraposed to the being of the divine world".31 Solovyov 
sees that nature in ail its manifestations, be it a blade of grass or an 
animal, endeavours to exist by itself. Man is part of nature, but 
crucially, he is also the uniting link between the divine and natural
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w o  r i d . 3 2  This places all of the burden on man - in his own, natural 
world he is nothing, but in reaching out to participate in a Godman world 
he is filled with meaning. The appearance of Christ on earth has made it 
absolutely necessary for man to reach for this divine world, to
recognize his dual nature. In so doing he gives ultimate meaning to
himself and to God; he becomes an individual.
Essentially, it is through the formulation of Godmanhood that the 
individual finds his greatest role in Solovyov's thought. It is here
especially that Solovyov attempts to portray man not as a meaningless 
unit in the historical or cosmic sweep, but as a creature having a
relationship with God, and thereby given significance as an individuai.
Godmanhood declares that man is not a passive agent, but has divine
meaning. This idea of the personal relationship between man and God - 
was, as we shall see, of enormous importance to Berdyaev.
V
A ll -U n ity
The fourth and final concept of Soiovyov's to be discussed here is all­
unity; each of his other ideas is reflected by this light. As Sergey
Bulgakov says, man of the present day thirsts after this basic principle 
of Solovyov's: the positive unity of all.33 This idea was not confined
simply to one branch of thought; Solovyov meant the all-unity of 
philosophy and religion, church and state, man and God. His analysis of 
human relations takes its starting point from here, as do his 
philosophical enquiries, although it is not certain that he succeeded in 
both directions.
One of his basic tenets is that reason and faith can travel hand in hand 
to the kingdom of God. He says that reason gives the ideal form, while 
the content  of reason or of rational knowledge is reality.34 His Lectures
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on Godmanhood  is an elaborate attempt to "prove" the divine nature of 
man. He analyzes the invisible world from an almost scientific  
standpoint, stating that being is composed of three parts: the atom, the
living force and the idea.^s From such notions he goes on to "reveal" the 
nature of God, the role of man, the meaning of Christianity. Soiovyov 
does not rely solely on reason; on the contrary he claims that abstract 
thought alone is oniy the shadow of ideas.36 But his approach to most 
reiigious problems is a logic-orientated one. To Bulgakov this is 
legitimate: "Solovyov's theory recognizes the validity of empirical,
living or 'concrete' knowledge; such knowledge indissolubly combines all 
the three sources of cognition: faith, reason and experience."37 Man's
consciousness must make use of all the faculties given to it, so as to
move towards the divine, say Solovyov and Bulgakov. But this belief
comes under sharp attack by Shestov. In his essay "Speculation and the 
Apocalypse", he belittles Solovyov for asserting that faith itself has to 
be answerable at the court of Reason. To Solovyov, the exaltation of
reason by the Greeks fits in well with the faith of the Jewish prophets,
but Shestov thinks differently: "We face a dilemma: we follow either
th e  pa th  of p ro p h e tic  in s p ira t io n  or th e  p a th  of 
in te llec tu a l...search in g ."38 This is a central view of Shestov’s; here it is 
used as an attack on Solovyov's ali-unity in relation to "religious 
philosophy". Shestov puts him in line with Spinoza, and the German 
idealists Kant, Hegel and Schelling who, because they could not "explain" 
God, subjected him to their conception of reason. According to Shestov, 
Soiovyov tried with ail his strength to take freedom away from man, to 
make him obliged to see his purpose in the submission to rules.39 (His 
attack on Soiovyov, it should be said, had nothing to do with political or 
social considerations.) While Bulgakov sees this all-unity as valid, for 
Shestov, "Every philosophy which strives for all-unity is above all
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concerned with removing man's freedom."4o Solovyov does seem to be 
over-confident in ascribing too much authority to a "faceless" Reason. 
He is certainly not a "captive of freedom", as Berdyaev was labelled. 
When we look at Shestov's thought, however, we will see how critical 
he was of any  system of knowledge, and so it is to be expected that he 
would accuse Solovyov of stripping man of his freedom. Berdyaev and 
Frank, on the other hand, felt that Solovyov was doing a great service to 
freedom in his notion of Godmanhood.
This question of the importance of freedom is one with which ail four 
of our thinkers grapple. For Berdyaev and Shestov it is a term they link 
specifically with man’s individuality (even though each defines it 
differently). For Soiovyov freedom lies within  aii-unity. Man freely 
participates in divine life; he can never be compelled to do so. The 
weakness of this argument, according to Shestov, is that man's freedom  
must release him from his obligation and duty to moral absolutes, and 
not bind him to all-unity or to any other absolute.
The great irony of Shestov's polemic against Soiovyov is that, while 
at one time Solovyov considered Shestov to be a destroyer of moral 
values (he criticized Shestov's book. Good in the Teaching of Tolstoy and  
Nietzsche), it is Shestov who chastises Solovyov for not obeying purely 
biblical teachings. Shestov says, "It is not possible, in the manner 
of...Solovyov...to remove the soul of Holy Scripture only so as to 
'reconcile' Greek reason with biblical Revelation. Every such attempt 
will inevitably lead to one result: the autocracy of R e a s o n . " 4 1  it is
Solovyov, claims Shestov, who has sullied the purity of revelation by 
introducing reason into his thought.
We have looked at Solovyov's attempts to unify God and man, and then 
reason and faith. This effort to find all-unity also extended into the 
reiigious and social community. He believed firmly that the kingdom of
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God was to be realized through the organ of the Church, and if all-unity 
was to take shape this meant that discrete religious movements had to 
be united: Orthodoxy, Catholicism, Protestantism, even Judaism. (He
was iittie interested, it seems, in Eastern religions such as Islam and 
Buddhism.) His greatest efforts were spent in trying to reconcile 
Orthodoxy to Catholicism; he claimed that it was ancient cultural and 
political antagonism  betw een East and W est (and not religious 
principles) that caused the official break in 1054.42 Solovyov saw  
Catholicism as being too concerned with papal authority, insisting on 
the Church being the Supreme Arbiter, while Orthodoxy concentrated 
more on faith and religious contemplation, and was thus weak in 
combating the force of an alien faith.43 But no single Church is to be 
preferred over the other; rather: "The real strength of theocracy lies
entirely in its reiigious, superhuman character."44 These two main 
churches must be the basis for all-unity, because they uphold both 
tradition and community. Protestantism proclaimed man's reiigious 
freedom but did not acknowledge a universal truth independent of each 
man; the Protestant isolated himself.4s And Judaism, while declaring 
for the first time the personal nature of God, nevertheless had a 
national God, one who excluded other nations and called the Jews the 
Chosen P eople .46 Solovyov thinks that the best elements among the 
Jews will enter the Christian theocracy and the worst will remain 
outside. He does remain ever-consistent in his vision of a unified 
Church: all faiths are to join in to form one ali-unifying Christian faith,
leaning neither towards Orthodoxy nor towards Catholicism. (The fact 
that Judaism will have to convert to Christianity is not an obstacle for 
h im .47) He remains more consistent in this view than does Bulgakov, 
who, while praising Solovyov for preaching "the positive unity of ail".
3 8
nonetheless gives stronger support to the Russian Church. ("Orthodoxy 
is the Church of Christ on earth", he boldiy declares.48)
Closely connected with this vision of all-unity within the Church is 
Solovyov's picture of society and the state, which cannot cut itseif off 
from the Church. He sees as paradoxicai the idea that mankind could be
striving towards all-unity and the kingdom of God, while the state
lagged behind, secular and indifferent to Christianity. "The Christian 
State, inseparable from the Church, is concerned with members of the 
body of Christ...it must quench national hatred, rectify social injustice, 
correct individual v i c e . "49 Solovyov is well aware of the abuse of power 
(he reveals this in an attack on the corruption of Christianity during 
medieval tim es). But with his mostly-optimistic view of divineiy-
inspired humankind, he does not dweli for too long on man's will-to- 
power, his capabiiity of evii, his 'faiienness' (Frank, too, wiii encounter 
simiiar probiems in his system). In trying to unite reason and faith, he
invites the sharp objection of Shestov, who insists that, at the court of
reason, faith is seen as foolishness, and at the court of faith, reason is 
unnecessary. In trying to bring together ali of the different religious 
strands in the world, Solovyov declares that the Jews must abandon 
their faith and adopt a new one, and the Protestants must rejoin an 
order they had long ago departed from. One final example of the way in 
which Soiovyov attaches ali-unity to ail things occurs in The Meaning of 
Love, a series of papers pubiished between 1892-1894. In it Solovyov 
gives an acute analysis of human relations, but insists that;
Our personal concern (our relations with other individuals), so 
far as it is authentic, is the concern of the whole world - the 
realization and individualization of the ail-one idea and the 
spiritualization of matter.so
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Solovyov sees the divine value of human relationships, but why does he 
feel it necessary to make each one a concern of the whole world?
So far Solovyov's philosophical thought has tended toward the 
systematic; he has concerned himself with the minutiae of this world 
and the wholeness of the other, from the atom to God the all-embracing. 
But if he were to be represented oniy as a propounder of the historical 
meaning of Christianity, one who insisted that man was guided by a 
world-soul, then he would seem to be almost indifferent to the human 
personality. However, we have already seen, with his notion of 
Godmanhood - so important to Berdyaev and Frank - that the historical 
process does not run roughshod over man, but that man too has a role to 
play: that of uniting with the divine.
V I
Nature
The young Vladimir Solovyov had a precocious mind; he was brought up 
with the traditions of the Orthodox Church, but at the age of fourteen he 
rejected religion and becam e an ardent atheist, m aterialist and 
socialist. His boyhood friend, the philosopher Lopatin, says that he 
never met anyone who believed so firmly in the quick and final salvation 
of mankind through social revolution as did Solovyov in his boyhood.^i 
In other words, while hoping to create a union amongst men, he rejected 
God and an ideal world, both of which he was to defend zealously later. 
This was during the 1860's in Russia, a period of social turmoil, and 
Solovyov was simply accepting the nihilistic creeds that were prevalent 
at the time. (The 14 year old Vladimir is like a younger version of 
Bazarov, the social revolutionary depicted by Turgenev in Fathers and  
Sons.) But having studied at the Moscow Theological Academy, and then
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having travelled to Britain and Egypt where he had encounters with his 
Sophia, he em erged from adolescence a life-long opponent of 
materialism and positivism.^2
Solovyov's lifelong task was to prove that humankind had to be united 
in a spiritual world; we can understand this better if we look at his 
attitude to nature. In his Godmanhood lectures, he says that the law of 
nature is the struggle for existence.S3 By itself, this is Darwinian: only
the strongest creatures will survive, the weaker ones will by necessity 
be sacrificed. As mentioned earlier, Solovyov defines nature in terms 
of e n t it ie s ,  a blade of grass, a worm, an animal, all of which are 
supposedly concerned with their own preservation, growth, possibly 
even domination. But he takes this idea of separation in nature even 
farther, by saying that evil is the state of tension of a will which 
asserts itself exclusively, denying every other.s4 This is a significant
leap, because it not only defines the state of nature, but passes moral 
judgment over it. There is a struggle for existence, he says, but those 
who are involved in the struggle are involved in evil, for they are trying 
to assert themselves apart from all others. At an elemental level, such 
as with a blade of grass, it would be ludicrous to suggest that there is 
an evil process at work, but Solovyov wants to make the point that man 
is a part of nature, and it is in man  that separation becomes evil.
One of the primary tenets of the Russian religious renaissance was 
that man did not have it in himself alone to perfect himself or society. 
Vekhi and Iz glubiny are filled with essays which attack the prevalent 
notion that man has all the tools at his disposal to save the world. This 
reminds one of Solovyov's view of nature, which includes the human 
being: man cannot  create an ideal world by himself, because without
the divine element his natural self-assertion will get the better of him.
41
Thus the forces of nature are directly opposed to divine forces, 
merely because they aim to separate, while divinity aims to unite. But 
as Soiovyov often asserts, man is placed squarely at the crossroads of 
these processes. And because man is a quaiitative and not just a 
quantitative being, turning toward nature means not simpiy seif- 
assertion, but also evil. In the Lectures on Godmanhood he says:
The subjection to this externai and biind force (nature) is
the fundamental source of suffering for man; but the 
realization that nature is evil, deceit and suffering, is at the 
same time the realization of his personal superiority, of the 
superiority of human personality over nature.ss
Solovyov more than once links suffering with evil; it is a curious
connection, since suffering is intimately bound up with Jesus Christ, 
who is at the center of Solovyov’s philosophy. As we shall see,
Berdyaev believes that suffering is a vital aspect of freedom; Shestov 
chooses suffering over intellectual abstraction. But Solovyov rejects 
it, and suggests that it is the result of self-assertion. Nevertheless, 
this passage indicates the accent that he places on personality; it is
manifest away from externai and blind forces. Man's self-assertion is
egoistic, through allowing the mundane aspect in him to conquer the 
divine, but in overcoming the dark force of his nature he can manifest 
the wholeness of his personality.
This understanding of nature explains primarily what religious 
individualism is not. Solovyov's philosophical and quasi-scientific  
notion of disharmony in nature was only the starting point for a
rejection of disharmony in ail forms of life. The fact that every
organism isolates itself means that there has to be a principle which
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unites all organisms. It was this idee fixe which led Bulgakov to praise 
his "positive unity of ail"; Solovyov dives down into the depths of nature 
to prove the principle of self-assertion, just as he wiil reach for the 
firmament to prove the principle of all-unity. The 14-year-old boy who 
succumbed to nihilism, and thought that unity had meaning only in a 
social context was much different from the young man who saw chaos in 
material nature, which led him to search for unity elsewhere.
V II
The Divine World
Solovyov rejected materialism and the self-subsistence of the natural 
world on the grounds that there was division here, and not unity. We 
have already looked into the notion of Godmanhood, and can see that this 
was an integral concept in his thought, because it gave man an "other" 
(just as the world of man was an "other" to God); it provided him with 
his most serious relationship: to God, in the divine world. Since man is 
located on a material plane, he relies on an ideal world, in order to have 
access to relationship This ideal sphere Solovyov unhesitatingly posits:
The doctrine of ideas, when it is correctly developed, indicates 
for us the objective essence of the divine beginning,...which 
is independent of the natural world of phenomena, although 
connected with it.^s
In taking his lead from the German idealists and from the Platonic 
conception of Ideas, Solovyov offers a world w here man is not 
abandoned to his own devices, able only to protect, preserve and assert 
his ego. (Solovyov in fact acknowledges Greek idealism as the first 
positive phase of reiigious r e v e l a t i o n . ) S 7  The potential problem in both
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a material and an ideal world, though, is that each threatens to be 
without substance; to achieve harmony and a divine relationship even in 
an ideal world there must be an "other", some content to complement 
and complete man. The idea, without a corresponding subject or bearer 
to realize it, he says, would be something completely passive and 
im p o te n t.88 For Solovyov this ideal content is God, in whom all is 
united. He rejects the notion that God is too incomprehesible to have a 
relationship with, a notion, by way, also rejected by the other three 
thinkers in this thesis. In seeking for man's role in the ideal kingdom, 
we can find an answer in Solovyov's definition of God's role:
God is the whole; this means that as every real being has a 
definite substance or content, in reference to which he says "I 
am"...in the same way the divine being asserts its "I am", not in 
relation to any separate particular content, but in relation to 
a li.59
Solovyov gives to God the content which each man needs for divine 
relationship, and he makes him a being with substance rather than one 
who is simply unapproachable, although at the same time he returns to 
his refrain of all-unity.
Solovyov does give the ideal world its content, which is God. God is 
unconditional, eternal, divine; therefore through relating with him man 
also becomes all of these, and he escapes from the natural world which 
leads to death and decay. A significant question now arises: what sort 
of relationship is it which exists in the divine kingdom? In essence, 
according to Solovyov, it is the same as the relationship between man 
and Christ. Jesus taught that the way to salvation was not through 
upholding the old law (that which was given to Moses on Mount Sinai),
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but in surrendering to him as the new law, which was both eternal and 
internal. For Solovyov the Old Testam ent Commandments were only 
transitional, marking the passage to a non-externai relationship. He 
quotes from the Book of Isaiah to show that ceremony, which the iaw 
established, cannot by itself express God's will: "Bring no more vain
oblations; incense is an abomination unto me; the new moons and 
sabbaths, the calling of assemblies, I cannot away with".®o Solovyov 
clearly does not abide by empty ritual (and yet he was a supporter of the 
traditional Church). He thinks that love is God's will,8i and love is 
implicit in relationship.
The will of God must be the law and norm for the human will 
not as ratified despotism, but as the conscious good. Upon this 
relationship is to be established a new covenant between God 
and mankind, a new divine-human order [Godmanhood], which 
is to replace the other, preliminary and transitory, religion 
which was grounded in the eternal iaw.62
That means nothing other than Christianity. Solovyov uses the word 
"Godmanhood" (Bogochelovechestvo) instead. So it is this which opposes 
the natural world of man: there is an ideal kingdom in which man finds 
relationship through God (and God through man), and this kingdom is 
reached by way of the renunciation of the external plane of existence, 
which at its worst is evil, at its best only carries out the old law. 
Without substance, the ideal has no meaning; it is the relation itseif 
between the ideal substance and man which completes both.
It is through the ideal world that Solovyov's religious individuai is 
asserted. We have seen how determined he is to establish ali-unity, and 
at times it may seem that each individual is rendered insignificant.
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having value only as a miniscule part of an all-embracing whole. His 
world-soul and all-unifying God would seem to sacrifice the One for the 
All. But while Solovyov opposes all those who assert above all the 
rights of man, he nonetheless takes great pains to invest each person 
with ultimate unconditional significance. This is accomplished, says 
Solovyov, by a willingness to enter the ideal world and to become bound 
up in relation ideally, rather than to succumb to the natural world, and 
truly lose individuality. In The Meaning of Love he says:
...every person, as such, possesses absolute significance and 
worth. There is nothing absolutely irreplaceable and too high 
at which he cannot value himself...The disclaiming on behalf of 
himself of this unconditional significance is equivalent to a 
denial of human worth...63
The unconditional is the divine world: the divine world has substance,
which requires an "other". Thus man as an individual asserts himself 
not necessarily apart from his fellow man (for that leads to egoism and 
evil), but in connection with the divine. Godmanhood requires each 
person as much as it requires God. Solovyov is willing to grant ultimate 
individuality only on this higher plane, where man is beholden to unify, 
rather than to separate.
W e find proof of Solovyov's spiritual individuality in his book T h e  
Justification of the Good, in which he says, "Human personality, and 
therefore every individual human being, is capable of realizing infinite 
fulness of being, or in other words is a particular form with infinite 
c o n te n t."64 These words could be taken directly from Berdyaev, so 
accurately do they portray his thought. Solovyov's universalism, as we 
begin to see, does not abandon man, but focusses on the personality as
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the divine elem ent in man. Solovyov's thesis in this book, written 
during the last decade of his life, is that man is a moral creature and is 
united with other men through his morality. We had trouble seeing how 
Sophia, and the historical process, related directly to the individual, but 
Solovyov's belief in man's moral value points to the personality's 
relationship with the divine.
Even when we look at his economic beliefs we can see that close
attention Is paid to the rights of the individual. Solovyov's attitude to
man in economic society largely prefigures Berdyaev's and Frank's. He 
was dissatisfied with the meaning which both capitalism and socialism  
gave to man. Capitalism is inimical to moral life because "free play of 
economic factors and laws Is only possible in a community that is dead 
and d e c o m p o s i n g . " 6 5  Socialism is no better because in it "man is
exclusively a producer and consumer, and human society is merely an
economic u n i o n . "66 Solovyov tries to find the middle ground in economic 
relations in which humankind is not merely a tool for the system itself. 
Inspired by the divine, man ceases to consider the material element as 
im portant.
V I I I  
The Church
Solovyov devoted a great deal of thought to the nature and destiny of 
the church. If there was any hope of history attaining the kingdom of 
God, then great responsibility was placed on the church for directing 
mankind. Throughout his mature life Solovyov sought to find the one 
faith, or combination of faiths, which would be able to lead man. He 
progressed from Russian Orthodoxy to Catholicism to a combination of 
the two, with aspects of Judaism, Protestantism and the Greek pagan 
"religion" mixed in. But his views changed not by whim, but because he
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seemed to observe a basic principle: that of finding the faith which
allows all of mankind to take part in the divine world, and to become 
united with an unconditional God. His disillusionment arose out of the 
inability of any particular faith to provide the wholeness of unity, 
which was to him the sine qua non of life.
Solovyov was first of all a Slavophile, who strongly supported the 
Russian Orthodox Church. In 1877, the year of the Russo-Turkish war, 
he gave a public lecture called "Three Forces", in which he declared 
Orthodoxy to be the religion most accessible to God.67 in the lecture, he 
described three distinct cultures which governed man: the Moslem East,
W estern civilization (in which he curiously did not include Catholicism  
at this point), and Slavdom.68 The Moslem East was a despotic unity 
which precluded progress or individual independence, and W estern  
civilization had its last word in a multitude of separate entities
unconnected by any kind of inner bond.69 Only the third, Slavdom, was 
capable of achieving a synthesis of singularity and m ultiplicity, 
humanizing God and reconciling East and West. (Berdyaev, incidentally, 
also believed that Slavdom could play a leading spiritual role amongst
the nations, especially during the first world war. Berdyaev and
Solovyov often seemed to have a love-hate relationship with their 
fe llow -R ussians, seeing them as capable of leading the way to
salvation, while being stifled by great inertia. Shestov and Frank, as 
Jews, were spared this concern.) Solovyov went so far as to say that, 
initially, integral life among mankind could be attained only by the 
Russian nation. According to the critic Mochulsky, Solovyov had in fact 
taken his ideas in toto from one of the original Slavophiles, Kireyevsky, 
removing only the notion of Russian Messianism.^o It isn't difficult to 
see that Solovyov was influenced by the Russian Orthodox concept of 
sobornost', rather than by the official side of the Church His beliefs,
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however, began to outgrow the often-narrow Slavophile perspective, and 
as Shestov, perhaps Solovyov's most severe critic, says:
Solovyov didn't follow the Slavophiles in the way that students 
usually follow teachers. He accepted them in so far as he found 
in them that higher truth, in the search for which he saw the 
sense and purpose of his life. But he turned decisively away 
from them when his conscience demanded it.7i
The seeds of all-unity were planted early in Solovyov, and they sprouted
first into Orthodoxy, where he saw a unifying force. Within a few years, 
though, he had changed his mind about the Russian Church, and saw it as
an integral part of the universal Church, but no longer in the ecumenical
vanguard. The reason for this was that Orthodoxy was not sufficiently 
well-organized to be a driving force; in other words, it lacked the 
human-spiritual authority that Catholicism offered.
The East, Orthodox in theology and unorthodox in life, 
understood Christ's divinely-human nature, but could not 
understand the divine-human significance of the Church...The 
Church was for it simply something holy, given from above in a 
final form, preserved through tradition and accepted through
p iety .72
Originally Orthodoxy had reigned supreme with him because it provided 
a universal truth, but when he saw that it did not in fact have the 
authority to unify all mankind he turned toward Catholicism, which had 
certainly asserted its authority as the link between God and man. His 
was not a wholesale betrayal of the Russian Church, but rather the first
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step along a long road of attempts to unify; in this case it was the 
Eastern and Western Christian Churches.
In 1883 he broke with the Slavophiles, ceasing to publish in R u s \  the 
Slavophile journal, and instead started contributing to Vestnik Evropy, 
the liberal and W estern -in fluenced  j o u r n a l . 73 in a letter to Ivan 
Aksakov, the editor of Rus\ he claimed that Aksakov saw only papism in 
the Catholic Church, whereas Solovyov saw the great and holy Rome, the 
eternal city, a fundamental and inseparable part of the universal Church. 
(Shestov continues his above-quoted passage with these words: "They
called him a deserter, a traitor. Both his friends and his enemies were 
angry at h i m " . 7 4 )
In a sense Solovyov had not betrayed the Slavophiles, because he had 
never really belonged to them. Unity was his all-consuming passion, and 
under the early influence of Kireyevsky and Aleksey Khomyakov he had 
thought that Slavdom provided this - he later saw that it did not. On the 
other hand, Solovyov was also aware of the corruption which the Roman 
Catholic hierarchy had allowed. He insisted that a) the Church cannot 
be united by compulsion, b) the Church cannot be dominated by 
compulsion and c) man cannot be saved by c o m p u l s i o n . 7 5  He saw 
clearly that the medieval popes had asserted their authority badly; he 
did not condemn them for affirming spiritual power over secular (which 
he thought was necessary), but for employing secular means to do 
th is .76 The task Solovyov set himself was to bring together the 
spiritually contem plative Orthodoxy and the authoritative Roman  
Catholicism; if he could accomplish this, then the kingdom of heaven 
was realizable. He "solved" his problem by finding the links between the 
two Churches: in both there was recognition of the divine-human
element through apostolic succession; there was recognition of Christ 
at the head of the Church; and there was participation in the divinely-
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human life through the sacraments.77 He thought that the two Churches 
were not radically different bodies, but part of the one true body of 
Christ - their differences were essentially minor.
It is fairly clear that Solovyov had in mind a union of these two bodies 
and not a dominance of the one over the other, but it was still felt by 
some that Solovyov had indeed converted to Catholicism. Both a Uniate 
(G raeco-C atholic) and an Orthodox priest said that Solovyov had 
received communion from them towards the end of his life. (The  
Orthodox priest affirmed that he had communicated with him on his 
death b e d . ) 7 8  The question as to whether Solovyov inclined more 
towards the East (Orthodoxy) or the W est (Catholicism) is one which has 
been raised more than once, but as Berdyaev points out, Solovyov was 
above all a "universalist", whose arguments pro  and con  either Church 
were not indicative of a leaning in either direction, but of a desire to 
see unity triumph. Berdyaev says, "Solovyov is not a Slavophile and not 
a Westernizer, he is not Orthodox and not Catholic, because during his 
whole life he belonged to the universal Church."79 W hat Solovyov 
worked for in practical terms was a Church which played an active role 
in history and society, but whose activity was inspired by God and not 
by man. Solovyov managed to escape from the Slavophile view, which 
was very suspicious of Catholicism as being, inter alia, opposed to 
Orthodoxy, and yet he still believed that in Russia the Church had divine 
rather than human authority. According to Berdyaev, Solovyov devoted 
too much attention to the actual arguments and formal treaties between 
the ecclesiastical leaders, thinking that once the official reunion had 
taken place spiritual union - Solovyov's real aim - would follow. 
Nevertheless Berdyaev recognizes this spiritual goal of Solovyov's 
practical efforts, and says, "With such love Solovyov was much more
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able to unite the Churches, to decide the problem of East and West, 
rather than by his efforts at formal agreements and treaties."®o
The most significant point that Berdyaev makes is that whatever 
Solovyov was said to be. Catholic, Orthodox, Uniate, etc., his beliefs did 
not centre around one institution, but around universalism. His eventual 
rejection of Moscow as the third Rome, and his criticism of man- 
centered authoritarianism in the Catholic Church indicate that he was 
searching for a universal ideal which neither Church fully provided.
So this was his second stage; the desire to fuse the two main 
Churches. How, though, did he view Protestantism and Judaism, both of 
which are central to historical Christianity? Protestantism was for 
Solovyov a breaking-away from the Church. Recalling his philosophy of 
nature, the essence of which he saw as organisms tending toward 
isolation and self-preservation, one can see that he viewed the 
Protestant movement similarly. He did laud their proclamation of the 
religious freedom of the individual, but declared that "man must through 
a moral act of self-renunciation overcome his actual limitations and 
voluntarily surrender to the universal truth that is independent of 
him."S'* And where is universal truth to be found? W here else but in a 
united Church, which Protestantism has rejected. Solovyov did accept 
that Protestants were right in rebelling against external compulsion, 
but he felt that they had refused to recognize the inwardly binding 
moral authority of the universal C h u r c h . ® 2  He also criticizes the 
Protestants for being threatened by pure rationalism.®® Solovyov 
consistently maintains that reason is a necessary aspect in drawing 
closer to God, but he says that it is only the ideal form, and not the 
content itself; he worries that Protestantism will devote itself to the 
form and lose all content. He does not consider, however, one of 
Shestov's heroes and the most important Protestant of all, Martin
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Luther, who declared that the just shall be saved by faith alone. By 
Protestantism , Solovyov really seems to mean G erm an, academ ic, 
pedantic theology.
As for the Jews, his attitude towards them was characterized by 
strong, warm feelings. He embraced their conception of God as a living 
God, and thought that he himself had recognized this and made the Jews 
his Chosen P e o p l e . ® 4  He sees in them a profound faith in God coupled 
with great intensity of human energy, and he even believes that the 
materialistic instincts which they are said to possess is in fact of a 
religious nature: "...the religious materialism of the Jews made them
pay the greatest attention to material nature - not in order to serve it, 
but in order to serve God on high in it and through it."®® The God of the 
Jews is Solovyov's picture of the divine "other": He is personal, "living", 
unconditional, ever-present amongst them. But their downfall comes 
firstly in cutting themselves off from the divine, so that all of their 
bad qualities are manifest, and then in denying universal Christianity by 
remaining isolated as a nation and adhering to the external law rather 
than the internal Christian commandment:
But as soon as the purely human and natural peculiarities of 
the Jewish character gain preponderance over the 
religious element, that unique and great national 
character manifests itself in the distorted form which 
accounts for the general dislike of the Jews.®®
That is the one problem; the other he explains as such: "The more fully 
the Christian world expresses the Christian idea of spiritual and 
universal theocracy...the more probably and speedily will the conversion 
of the Jews take place."®7 His approach to the Jewish people is typical
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Solovyovian analysis: he affirms their personal God, declares that the
"general dislike" of them is due to their being isolated (not only from 
other peoples but also from the divine world), and insists that their 
only recourse is a speedy conversion to universal Christianity. 
Solovyov, like Berdyaev and the converted Frank after him, make a clear 
distinction between the Old and the New Testament, seeing the Old as a 
manifestation of law, and the New as a manifestation of spirit, but this 
amounts to little more than a dismissal of Jewish faith.
We have seen now the development of Solovyov's ecumenical thought: 
while consistently maintaining that Jews and Protestants had to move 
under the umbrella of a universal Church, he shifted the centre from 
Orthodoxy to a fusion of Catholicism and Orthodoxy, never losing sight 
of his dream of unification. But in 1891 he read a paper at the Moscow 
Psychological Society which attacked what appeared to be the whole 
basis of traditional Christianity. In the paper, called "The Collapse of 
the Medieval-World Conception", he accused Christianity of the Middle 
Ages of being essentially pagan, of never really accepting the truth of 
Christ. He traces this back to early Christian days when under 
Constantine the G reat and Constantinus pagan m asses adopted  
Christianity wholesale, not out of conviction, but rather from slavish 
(not Slavic!) imitation or self interest.®® Thus, life remained much the 
same for the pagans, who adopted a few Christian ceremonies but 
preserved their secular kingdom. In medieval times true Christianity 
had still not arrived, and the blood that was shed in Christ's name was 
essentially to protect pagan life.®^ As for the monastic communities 
which formed during the Middle Ages, Solovyov recognized that they 
fulfilled the demands of Christian humility and self-denial, but were 
marred by their withdrawal from the world. “They did not and could not 
save the Christian Society, the Christian world, because in spite of all
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their righteousness and holiness they m istakenly believed that 
individual souls alone could and ought to be s a v e d . "^o
Solovyov challenged the legitimacy of the Church, at least up to that 
point in history, and then he paid respect to his former adversaries, the 
individualists of the Enlightenment, who had undermined the false  
m edieval-w orld conception, thus acting for the benefit of true  
C h ris t ia n ity .91 This brings us to a paper that Solovyov read on the 
French positivist Auguste Comte, in 1898, called The Idea of Humanity, 
when he likened Sophia to Comte's Le Grand Etre . This concept was not 
religious in nature, but like Sophia it embraced humanity as a whole, 
motivating and uplifting it. The two notions were opposed on religious 
grounds, but as forces which moved humanity Solovyov saw much 
similarity between the two. These essays of Solovyov’s, on the 
medieval-world conception and on Comte, were written in the last 
decade of the philosopher's life; they were not indications that he was 
becoming anti-religious, or even that his notion of all-unity had 
diminished. But his need to turn to the Enlightenment for inspiration 
reveals the disillusionment he felt towards the various religious forces 
which he had once embraced. From the end of his adolescence to his 
death he affirmed both the internal significance of Christianity and the 
need to unify the faith amongst all peoples. In each system he found 
contradiction inherent until, while still clinging to his belief, he turned 
towards anti-religious thinkers and then toward force itself (A Short 
Story of Anti-Christ ) as a means of conquering evil. All of this was a 
long way from his claim in the Lectures on Godmanhood  that history was 
leading towards the kingdom of Heaven on earth. It is important to 
identify the reason why these patches and odd new patterns were  
attached to the garment of his philosophy. Solovyov’s views were  
altered because in each system he saw a breakdown of unity, a unity
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which had to be accessible to all mankind. Each new movement that he 
espoused revealed inconsistencies eventually, and he was ever in search 
of the perfect system of unity, which he never would find.
V I I I
Human Relationship
W e have seen the way in which Solovyov envisaged the relationship 
between the natural and the divine worlds, between God and mankind, 
and between church and state. There is a final type of relationship to be 
discussed, which is that between human being and human being. In 
assigning m ankind's u ltim ate m eaning to the d ivine and the  
unconditional, Solovyov was not content to leave this notion in its 
theoretical form, but tried to apply it to practical life; it was natural 
to him that he should be concerned with questions of justice - he 
sacrificed his academic career by publicly urging Alexander III to have 
mercy on his father's assassins - as well as the way in which human 
beings can most ideally live together in society.
Solovyov approaches the question of justice and punishment by first 
rejecting the Old Testam ent declaration of "an eye for an eye"; he 
claims that taking a murderer's life is misusing the algebraic formula 
of two minuses equalling a plus, because “the corpse of the victim may 
be added to the corpse of the hanged murderer and then there will be 
two lifeless bodies - that is, two negative qualities, two m in u s e s " .®2 
Solovyov gives a significance to the murderer's life which the state 
itself might be willing to deny. Man may be able to condemn the 
criminal as incapable of rehabilitation, but according to Solovyov man’s 
judgment is limited. "In its blind madness human pride puts its relative 
knowledge and conditional justice in the place of God's all-seeing  
righteousness."®® Human pride is egoism, which Soloyvov attaches to
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the natural, isolated world. He bases his opposition to capital 
punishment not merely on the notion of treating criminals humanely, but 
on the principle that man usurps God's right by taking life in such a way. 
"A criminal, like every immoral man in general, receives his real 
punishment from the judgment of God in accordance with moral laws."®4 
He sees capital punishment as being spiritually harmful to a society 
which wants to develop morally. This is a significant thought, because 
his ideas of a theocracy, in which the state submits itself to the 
church, and his attraction to the authority of the Catholic Church, 
suggest his acceptance of the use of any means possible to bring man 
under the yoke of the church. But his repudiation of brutal forms of 
punishment, even for brutal criminals, places the emphasis for ultimate 
justice not in man's hands, but in God's. He even accepts that in order to 
reach moral heights, man must have a certain amount of freedom to be 
immoral.®® This, however, is a long way from Raskolnikov's belief in 
Crime a n d  Punishm ent  that he has the right to transcend the law 
established for ordinary humans, for Solovyov believes that legal 
justice is necessary to prevent a kind of hell on earth.®® Retribution 
and even intimidation are to be ruled out in punishment; rather, society 
must take away the criminal's liberty but must also help him actively 
so that he can morally reform himself.®7 Thus the criminal who has cut 
himself off from society by his crime is not to be cut off by society; 
rather the two, transgressor and victim, must enter into a relationship.
When we think of crime and retribution in terms of nineteenth- 
century Russian thought, the name of Dostoevsky springs automatically 
to mind, he who was himself branded a criminal in his youth and who 
later wrote about crime in all his major novels. It is worthwhile 
mentioning Dostoevsky in connection with Solovyov because the  
philosopher had a close relationship with the novelist. They became
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acquainted late in the novelist's life; Dostoevsky attended Solovyov's 
Lectures on G odm anhood  in 1878, and the two of them made a 
pilgrimage together to the monastery Optina Pustyn' after the death of 
Dostoevsky's son, Aleksey.®® Upon the novelist's death, Solovyov said in 
a speech to the Women's University that "Dostoevsky preached the 
spiritual rebirth of man and society In the power of infinite and all- 
embracing love to realize the kingdom of universal truth on earth."®® 
This is an intriguing statement by Solovyov in that it is so completely 
different from Berdyaev's and Shestov's own perceptions of Dostoevsky, 
which we shall examine in due course. Solovyov and Dostoevsky both 
believed in the greatness of Russia and both were spiritually orientated, 
but Solovyov sees in his friend a universalism which, although it
supports his own philosophy, is certainly not a consistent aspect of 
Dostoevsky's thought. Solovyov, however, was not influenced by 
Dostoevsky as strongly as were Shestov and Berdyaev, but he saw in him 
a spiritual ally. At Dostoevsky's funeral, Solovyov said, "Above all he 
loved the living human soul in everything, everywhere, and he believed 
that we are all God's servants.
Solovyov wished to protect the life and dignity of every person, no
matter how corrupt his character might be, because he saw divine
significance in him, which society had no jurisdiction over. In this way 
too he defines the nature of relations between man and woman in T h e  
Meaning of Love. In terms of human relations this is his most important 
work; Berdyaev said of it, "I valued and still value Solovyov's essay...it 
is, perhaps, better than anything ever written on love."i®i Solovyov's 
problem at the beginning is to determine how sex-love (the love 
between a man and a woman - not exclusively physical) can have
meaning In the overall structure of the world. As he sees it, love is not 
an instrument in the genealogy of Christ; in other words, there is no
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place for it in the Bible.1 W e are back again to the fundamental 
Solovyovian task of trying to fit all life into the means of attaining the 
kingdom of God. He attempts to show initially how sex-love is not 
worthwhile simply as a means of reproduction, because there is no 
connection between reproduction and the salvation of the world.1°® He 
also explains that love and reproduction don't always c o i n c i d e . |p a 
sense he seems to approach his task reluctantly: since great love won't
produce babies, and anyway producing babies won’t save the world, he is 
entering an area where it will be difficult to connect the process of 
history with sex-love.
Nevertheless, once he gets the idea of history behind him, his analysis 
of love proves to be profound. He returns to the principle of isolation 
being inherent in wickedness; in human relations isolation is egoism. 
"The truth, as a living force, taking possession of the inward essence of 
the man, and effectively rescuing him from false self-assertion, is
L o ve ."10® It is love which provides the substance of the bond between 
God and man, and now love assumes the same responsibility between 
person and person. For Solovyov, genuine love is based on faith (even 
when the emotion of love passes away the faith remains) and it is that 
which will save us from death.10® This fits into his pattern of thought; 
love exists in the divine world, it is eternal and unconditional, while 
those who pursue only physical love are like fetishists, loving
something that will die, which has no connection with the divine
"other". He insists that individuality must make way for the divine
union, but not so as to negate the individual. The personalities of the 
man and woman unite in love, claims Solovyov, to create one true 
personality .
Zenkovsky says about this conception of love that it is magical, 
"connected in the c losest fashion with Solovyov's m ystical
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m e ta p h y s ic s ...”107 gut Solovyov rejects the idealization of love, of 
imagining it as that which it is not; if his notion is indeed magical and 
mystical, nevertheless, he says, "...it is only possible to love what is 
living and concrete."io® This is Solovyov's shining exam ple of 
relationship: he derides the exaltation of egoism and physical love, and
affirms that true love is realized only through faith and eternity. 
Unfortunately, he does not leave us with that, but returns to the 
historical process, insisting that the man and woman cannot themselves 
rem ain iso lated in their re lationsh ip , but must share the ir  
transformation, so that it will spread and thus transform the world. 
"Our personal concern," he says, "is the concern of the whole world".i o® 
Thus is the rem ark justified  that Solovyov w as above all 
historiocentric, even when concerned with the most personal matters. 
But if Solovyov clung to this belief it did not interfere with his 
approach to love, which aimed to sanctify both individuals involved in 
the relationship.
IX
Conclusion
Vladimir Solovyov lived before the Russian State was overthrown, but 
during a time when revolutionary activity was fermenting, and also 
when strong nationalist sentiment sought to defend Russia, Orthodoxy, 
and tradition. At 14 he was on the side of the revolutionaries, at 24 he 
defended Orthodoxy with zeal. By 34 he had abandoned both and looked 
for unity between East and West, and by 44 he had realized the 
impossibility of real unification between Churches which had denied  
Christ for centuries. His young adulthood saw him castigating the 
Enlightenment (for its belief in man over God) and prophesying the 
kingdom of heaven on earth, achieved through the historical process.
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The last years of his life found him praising the Enlightenment for a
humanity which the Churches had not shown, and suggesting that God's
kingdom might have to be reached by force, and not history. He was 
portrayed diversely; some saw him as a Russian Cardinal Newman (the 
nineteenth-century Anglican who converted to Catholicism ), some 
thought that Dostoevsky had based Alyosha, the saintly character from 
The Brothers K aram azov,  on him, and Dostoevsky's wife, Anna
Grigorevna, even saw in him characteristics of Ivan Karamazov; she 
likened Ivan's theocratic anti-u top ia to Solovyov's philosophical
th e o rie s . 110 Did his views alter so dramatically that he can only be 
seen as a curiosity in the history of religious philosophical thought, or 
is there truly some centre in his writings, and a centre which includes a 
sense of the religious individual?
If we admit that Solovyov's universalist system was not a practical 
success - because it was too idealistic - we can still claim that all­
unity found room for the individual. Solovyov was a moral teacher 
through and through, and because of this he did not have the kind of 
psychological depth which later thinkers like Shestov and Berdyaev 
possessed; he did not comprehend sufficiently that man is not merely 
striving for good. But nevertheless, his moral understanding was 
mindful of the individual and it tried to secure for him a spiritual world 
which could not be threatened by authority or secularism. His moral 
teaching was an attempt to restore dignity to each human being by 
insisting that he was a part of a spiritual whole.
Solovyov's all-unity is composed of individuals who b e c o m e  
individuals only through the divine, religious sphere. At no point does 
he allow this principle to be compromised: he hopes for a theocracy
through the union of the churches, but rejects one which would use 
force to rule; he posits an ideal world, but insists that there is a
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subject at the centre of it, God, who is to provide the divine 
relationship. Indeed, man finds all his meaning, be it through God or 
other humans, in this ideal world where there is always an "other". 
Solovyov's world-soul at time appears to threaten man's individuality, 
but because man is the mediator between God and the world, he is given 
responsibility for seeking after the divine relationship. Solovyov sees  
folly in separation, nature, Protestantism and Judaism (when they are 
disconnected from the source of truth, all-unity), secularization, self- 
assertion. He sees truth in love, a unified Church, the divine, self- 
denial. This truth is represented by Christianity, with Christ as the 
Godman at the centre. Christ’s appearance heralded the final stage of 
history: realization of the kingdom of God on earth.
Solovyov's emphasis on the grand sweep of history, the world-soul and 
the all-embracing all-unity cloud the more important principle in his 
writing: that man is a creature dependent on relationship, on other
subjects which com plete his personality, and not on finite, ego- 
boosting, objects. His efforts to unify everything at times result in 
untenable propositions; but his belief in the realization of each human 
being’s individuality through divine relationship locates his most 
profound idea. This was one of the main ideas that Russian religious 
thinkers were to turn to a few years after Solovyov's death in 1900. 
Solovyov, in going beyond the often-narrow  limits of traditional 
Orthodoxy, in embracing a universalism that was not materialistic but 
rooted in the divine, struck a chord in the hearts and minds of the 
renaissance thinkers. Berdyaev and Frank, as we shall see, owed a great 
debt to Solovyov, since it was he who first developed a philosophical 
system in Russia which included an ideal, divine world, capable of 
uniting all humankind, and it was he who most strongly espoused the 
notion of a relationship between God and man involving man as an
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individual. The idea of the religious individual was in its early days in 
Russian philosophical thought, but Solovyov had taken the first steps in 
that direction, allowing others to develop the idea much more clearly 
and strongly.
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Chapter Three
Lev Shestov 
1
Tolstoy and Nietzsche
Vladimir Solovyov's philosophical system - rooted as it is in religious 
soil - at times seems to lose sight of the individual in the philosopher's 
quest for all-unity, but we cannot claim that the religious element in his 
thought ever weakens. Now, however, we come to a thinker whose
orientation is just the opposite: the individual is of such primary
importance that the religious element in his thought struggles for a long 
time to emerge. Lev Shestov (1866-1938) could not really have been 
called a religious thinker early in his writing career, but by the end of his
life his idea of the religious individual was so pronounced as to be
rivalled only by Berdyaev.
Let us begin with a diary entry of Shestov's, noted in 1920:
This is the twenty fifth year since "the time fell out of joint"
- the anniversary, more accurately, will be in early autumn, 
at the beginning of September. I write this down, so as not 
to forget the most important events of my life. No one knows 
anything about them except you - they are easily forgotten. 1
This mysterious passage is a revealing introduction to Shestov's ideas, 
which are always so intimately linked with his life. Shestov devoted all 
his work to the task of uniting life with thought; his most strident 
attacks are delivered against abstract thinkers: m oralists and
philosophers - including Solovyov - who choose knowledge over the
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individual, artists who find comfort in culture instead of seeking after a 
personal, lonely voice. If the diary entry is a sincere one, it is evident 
that his writings would have been dram atically affected by the 
catastrophic events which occurred in 1895, before his authorship began. 
It is fitting that we should not know the content of this vital 
biographical detail, since Shestov's struggle was an internal one and does 
not easily lend itself to a description of the external events of his life. 
Nevertheless, he was to say frequently that life was to be lived as 
tragedy, and this unexplained, seemingly tragic episode, points towards 
the wellspring of his beliefs.
Shestov, born in Kiev as Lev Shwartzm ann (Shestov was his 
pseudonym), was neither a political nor a sociological thinker; unlike 
Solovyov, Berdyaev and Frank he had few ideas to contribute to the 
betterment of society (even though for a short time in his youth he had 
been a Marxist, and he did write a short work attacking the Bolsheviks). 
This may seem at first glance odd - not only did he live through great 
unrest in his homeland, but he and his family had to flee their country 
because of the revolution. (He ended up in Paris, where he spent most of 
the last two decades of his life.) How could he be mostly silent on 
political matters amidst the cataclysmic changes in Russia? Intellectual 
life in Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century was explosively 
political; his close friend Berdyaev, also from Kiev, willingly entered  
political discussion in his attempts to warn against the nihilism which 
was widespread in the intelligentsia at the time But from a mature age 
Shestov's tyrants lived in the realm of ideas, and his conception of 
tyranny was that which destroyed the individual's internal life, making 
it finite or limited. Shestov's individual did not live in the mundane 
world; the union of the churches, for example, would have been a matter 
of indifference to him. This thinker sought only that which freed each
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man from the fetters of abstraction and gave him back his own existence. 
W e cannot look to Shestov, as we can to Solovyov, for answers to division 
within the State or the Church. His writings dwell outside the social 
sphere, and find their home in a world which is purely personal.
This outlook of Shestov's, which gives primacy to the individual spirit, 
can be characterized mainly by two terms. The first is "struggle", and 
the second, which did not become fully realized until fairly late in his 
life, is "faith." Shestov rejected dogma and the common assumptions of 
morality, and he looked towards thinkers who, he believed, embodied 
struggle or faith or both. His first heroes w ere N ietzsche and 
Dostoevsky: as he developed he turned to Pascal, Luther, and Kierkegaard 
(whom he discovered in the last decade of his life), and biblical figures 
such as Abraham and Job. If these figures have one feature in common, it 
is that they rejected the conventional approaches to morality, reason 
and/or God, and established themselves as isolated creatures, sacrificing 
their ordinary lives in recognition of enormous personal struggle. 
Shestov's concept of the individual is not anything like Solovyov's. His 
individual is not made complete by another subject in the spiritual 
kingdom. Rather, he stands alone, usually, although not always, facing 
God, and his significance as a human being exists not in regard to his 
beliefs, but rather to his personal involvement with life. As Shestov was 
to suggest many times, the mere adherence to belief was dangerous, 
because it could allow for an easing of the struggle. This viewpoint alone 
makes him a radical thinker, and it compelled him to em bark on 
relentless attacks against many different philosophers and theologians, 
be they contemporary, medieval or ancient.
The fundamental aspects of Shestov's thought changed little throughout 
his mature years. Once he had found his own ground (or lost it, one might 
say; one of his early books is entitled The Apotheosis of Groundlessness)
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fought for the same ideas for the rest of his life, the primary change 
occurring in his religious development. The bulk of his work, we shall 
see, takes the form of criticism, and it is the differences in the stages of 
his criticism which are most apparent. In his first period he is concerned 
mainly with the artist, through the works of Dostoevsky, Tolstoy and 
Chekhov, among others, and occupying a first rank in this period is also 
Nietzsche. (His first book was actually on Shakespeare, but Nietzsche  
became a much more important figure to him.) In the second period he 
turns decisively towards philosophy, against which he wages constant 
war. His final period is a religious one. In these stages there is much 
overlapping: his attitudes towards philosophy and religion develop at 
more or less the same time, and he was interested in literature until the 
end of his life. But in this examination of him these three aspects will 
be separated, so that we can look at each one more closely. While the 
focal points for his criticism frequently change and develop, his main 
objective never alters: to protect the internal freedom of the individual.
Shestov's first truly radical book was entitled Good in the Teaching of 
Tolstoy and Nietzsche. Indeed, while he was trying to get the essay 
published, none other than Vladimir Solovyov remarked "Conscience does 
not allow me to assist in the printing of such a work in Vestnik Evropy. 
Tell the author from me that I do not advise him to publish this essay."2 
If Solovyov was forbidden by conscience from approving of the essay, he 
must have thought it immoral in some way, and in a sense, it was just 
that. Shestov delivers a sharp attack against morality, at least that 
morality which was preached by Leo Tolstoy.
One of the events in Tolstoy's writings which most outrages Shestov is 
the death of the eponymous heroine of Anna Karenin. He feels that the 
novel is constructed so that those characters who follow the proper rules 
will succeed (i.e. Levin), and not only succeed but attain salvation, while
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those who destroy the same rules will themselves be destroyed. This is 
highly apparent with Anna, thinks Shestov; she who is the most gifted is 
also the greatest sinner, and Tolstoy has doomed her to an ignominious 
death. "In all Russian literature, and perhaps foreign as well, not one 
artist has so pitilessly and calmly led his hero to such a terrible fate...It 
is not enough to say, ‘pitilessly and calmly' - with joy and exultation."3 
This is the first sign we get of Shestov's impassioned defence of the 
individual. He accuses Tolstoy of portioning out this fate to Anna directly 
on account of her adultery with Vronsky.
But, Shestov continues, it is not only sinners who are required to pay a 
heavy cost. In War and Peace we encounter Sonya, who had once hoped to 
marry Nicholas Rostov but who by the end of the novel has lost him and 
must languish without a real destiny. Shestov quotes a conversation 
between Natasha and Mary, the two ultimately successful and satisfied 
women of the novel, in which Natasha suggests that Sonya has failed 
because she is a "barren flower."4 Shestov thinks it is clear that this is 
also the opinion of the author, and he is highly critical of Tolstoy's 
attempts to make everything come out just right. The sinners won't 
survive, but neither will the meek, while those who want to live active, 
healthy lives (like Levin in Anna Karenin and Pierre Bezukhov in War and  
P e a c e )  will get their wives, children and large estates in the end. It is 
the notion of conformity to a set of moral standards which Shestov finds 
so objectionable, and he sees this in the personality of many of Tolstoy's 
fictional characters.
Also, Shestov has in mind Tolstoy's late work What is Art, in which the 
Russian count claims that basic human morality should dictate our 
approach both to art and to life. Shestov sums up the two principles of 
the essay thus: The artist must a) write what all can understand and b)
write about that which will awaken good feelings in people.^ Tolstoy
71
was critical of great artists such as Shakespeare and Pushkin, because he 
felt that they were irrelevant to the vast majority of mankind. "The task 
of Christian art is to establish brotherly union among m en."6 By this late 
stage of his life Tolstoy was a passionate moralist, contemptuous of high 
society and committed, like Solovyov, to preaching a morality which 
could apply to all humankind. It is here that Shestov most sharply 
contrasts Tolstoy with Nietzsche; he accuses the Russian count of 
sacrificing his personality for the sake of good, and claims that for 
Tolstoy, God himself is nothing more than "good." Responding to Tolstoy's 
claim in What is Art that our life is nothing other than a striving for 
good, or as Tolstoy would have it, for God, Shestov declares; "Good - that 
is, God! Which is to say, outside of good there is no aim for man."7 Where 
Tolstoy sees good, Shestov sees a wall, and one which keeps the isolated 
person out. Nowhere, he says, are God and good equated in the Bible, and 
he declares that Tolstoy for all of his preaching of morality never says a 
word about faith.8 It is perhaps easy to see why Solovyov would have 
objected to such an essay; anyone looking for a brotherhood of man 
through a moral structure might well see a rejection of good (in Tolstoy's 
terms) as immoral.
Part of Shestov's polemic centres around the personal lives of Tolstoy 
and Nietzsche. The former, it is pointed out, had a dissolute past to look 
back on. As a young man he had gambled, drunk, and had made a habit of 
conquering peasant women, yet in his later life he dem anded strict 
adherence to moral practices. (He went so far as to declare that married 
couples should abstain from sexual relations.) Nietzsche, on the other 
hand, had been an upright Christian youth. He who seemed to glorify evil 
and who mocked morality had actually been very religious in his younger 
days, and unlike Tolstoy had participated in no drunkenness, no duels, no 
d e b au ch e ry .9 (Since the relationship between life and ideas is so vital to
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Shestov, he does not balk at introducing personal elements into his 
argument.) In this context it is curious that he pays little respect to 
Tolstoy for the enormous personal struggle he himself underwent. 
Tolstoy's conclusions were clearly misguided to Shestov, but his life was 
nevertheless much marked by internal struggle. (One example of this 
occurred after Shestov's book was written, when Tolstoy, in his life's 
final act, decided to abandon home and family and left his estate. Before 
he had gone far, though, he fell ill and died, at Astapova train station.)
According to Shestov, Nietzsche had lived a good life as a youth - he 
gladly submitted to a Tolstoyan conception of the world - but in his need, 
it was good itself which abandoned him.
He was not yet thirty when he underwent that terrible 
metamorphosis which is called disease....Almost immediately 
he who had been a sleeping youth awakened a broken old man, 
with the terrible awareness that life had left him and would 
never return . 10
To Shestov it was Nietzsche's illness that had made him realize the 
hopelessness of appealing to a general good; Nietzsche was no Pierre 
Bezukhov, whose health and sanity would allow him to fall back on 
accepted notions of morality. Shestov's admiration for N ietzsche  
consists not in the G erm an th inker's hostile attitude tow ards  
Christianity, but rather in his hostile attitude towards the teaching of it. 
Indeed, he admired Nietzsche for rejecting all teaching, and looking 
instead at his own life to guide him. "Whoever might consider rejecting 
Nietzsche, would first have to reject life, from which he extracted his 
philosophy."11 Nietzsche, in going beyond good and evil, in scorning the 
workaday morality of his contemporaries, demanded that the individual's
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own passionate struggle for individuality reign suprem e over any 
complacent or submissive attempts to find greater truths (like good, or 
morality). Shestov embraces the notion that man is not simply an agent 
through which good achieves its end (like a Solovyovian Sophia), but is 
himself the ultimate reality. Man forges his own meaning, and does not 
have it ready-made or pre-packaged for him. The fact that Nietzsche is 
anti-religious and seems to condone evil is irrelevant to Shestov. The 
very last words of Tolstoy and Nietzsche are: "We must search for God." 
Nietzsche did not turn Shestov away from God, rather he turned him 
toward the search.
Shestov is, in fact, dismissive of certain aspects of Nietzsche's  
thought. Nietzsche himself, the great struggler, is repelled when he tries 
to establish doctrine of any kind, which Shestov thinks he does in
positing his Superman. "We see how alien to Nietzsche is his ideal of the 
Superman, which for him plays the role of the Tolstoyan 'good'; he 
commands people to oppress and destroy, just like Count Tolstoy with his 
' g o o d . ' " 1 2  Shestov is not interested in the Superman or in Nietzsche's
declaration of eternal recurrence; these are merely attempts to establish
knowledge. It is Nietzsche's fierce anti-moralism - which would have
repelled Solovyov, who thought that morality gave man his sense of 
dignity - it was this total opposition to the stone wall of morality that 
so attracted Shestov to the radical German thinker.
11
The Underground
Although Shestov closes his book on Tolstoy and Nietzsche with a call 
to search for God, it is Nietzsche the god-destroyer whom he praises, and 
not Tolstoy the believer. But he was sincere about these final words of 
this essay; he was just beginning to look for thinkers who embodied both 
the struggle and the faith. His other main hero of this period is
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Dostoevsky, he whose novels are full of religious passion; Shestov's next 
book was devoted to Dostoevsky and Nietzsche and is subtitled, 
significantly, The Philosophy of Tragedy.
Nietzsche himself says of the Russian novelist; "Dostoevsky is the 
only psychologist from whom I was able to learn anything."13 Like 
Nietzsche, Dostoevsky had had many ideals in his younger life, but while 
for the former the breaking point was his illness, for the latter it was 
his years spent doing penal servitude in Siberia. The first half of 
Dostoevsky's work, from Poor Folk to The House of the Dead, reveals a 
talented if somewhat awkward writer who improved considerably over 
the years. But, says Shestov, the appearance of Notes from the 
U n d e rg ro u n d  marks a new development; the writer is whistling a far 
different tune and seems even to renounce his past:
Up to this point he had considered himself marked by fate to do a 
great work. But now he suddenly felt that he was not a bit 
better than anyone else, that he cared as little for all ideals as 
the most common mortal. Let ideas triumph a thousand times 
over: let the peasants be freed, let just and merciful courts be
set up, let military conscription be abolished - his heart would 
be no lighter, no happier because of it."i4
Dostoevsky's Underground man is truly a repulsive character. He 
avoids paying his servant so he can squander money on an extravagant 
dinner, he insinuates himself into the company of old acquaintances who 
despise him, he is wretchedly unhappy and unkind. But Shestov exults 
over this paltry figure, because he sees in him one who has renounced all 
his ideals and looked squarely at his paltriness. This man is indeed 
contem ptible, but for Shestov what matters most is that he has
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acknowledged his own reality, which is far more meaningful than any
lofty ideals about Russia or humanity.
Shestov's book established him as an Underground man himself. He
welcomes Dostoevsky's replacem ent of grand moral ideals with self-
loathing, he embraces Nietzsche's replacement of everyday Christianity 
with a loathing of common morality. And here he again strikes out at 
Tolstoy, who he claims did indeed have the seeds of the Underground man 
in him, but refused to let them grow. He suggests that Levin in A n n a  
Karenin  is an unhappy man, capable of despair, and yet one who must have 
firm ground ('groundfulness') under his feet. He marries Kitty, for
instance, so as to prove that he is no worse than anyone else.is Shestov 
sums up the differences betw een the two Russian writers thus; 
"Dostoevsky's Underground man, upon noting the falsehood of his life, 
becomes horrified and immediately severs himself from his entire past. 
But Count Tolstoy's heroes never cease to believe in ‘the lofty and the 
b e a u t ifu l.”’18 At this point in Shestov’s life, his primary influences 
express their individuality in negative terms. Tolstoy he cannot accept, 
because his outlook on life, even when it involves a struggle, arrives at 
the sam e conclusions as Dostoevsky and N ietzsche before  t h e i r  
conversions. These conclusions are full of hope and ideals, which in no 
way fit in with a philosophy of tragedy.
It is worth noting that Shestov always embraced the idea of the 
Underground man even during his most religious periods. He goes so far 
as to say that Notes from the Underground could serve as an excellent 
comm entary on the works of the great saints, because the saints 
themselves "all regarded themselves as the most horrible sinners...the 
most vile, the weakest, the stupidest of creation. St. Bernard, St. 
Theresa, St. John of the Cross, all the saints were filled with horror at 
their nothingness and sinfulness until they had drawn their last
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b rea th s ."17 Dostoevsky's creation never lost its force for Shestov; even 
later in his life he was able to invest this seemingly nihilistic creature 
with religious significance.
Shestov's acuteness as a thinker is in part related to his ability to 
recognize the most crucial moments of a writer's life and thought. Thus 
he is inspired by Nietzsche's going "beyond good and evil", but he is quick 
to realize when a philosophical assertion is being made, as he thinks is 
the case with the Superman. In the same way he eagerly goes out to meet 
the Underground Man, but he has little use for other aspects of 
Dostoevsky's thought, such as his tendency towards preaching and 
prophecy. W here a single soul is at the centre of Notes from the 
U n d e rg ro u n d ,  that is not true of many of Dostoevsky's other writings, 
such as The Journal of an Author, which began to appear in 1873 and was 
full of predictions of the future of Russia, none of which cam e true. 
Shestov says "Dostoevsky desired at all costs to prophesy, he prophesied 
constantly and was constantly m istaken. W e have not taken  
Constantinople, we have not united the Slavs, and even the Tatars still 
live in C r i m e a . "i 8 Shestov's theme concerns the isolated man, and he 
clearly does not want to engage himself in any other aspect of the 
writer's thought.
Both Nietzsche and Tolstoy greatly admired Dostoevsky's Crime and  
Punishm ent,  and Shestov wonders how this can be so. In analyzing the 
novel, though, Shestov claims that Nietzsche would have responded to the 
first half of the book, in which Raskolnikov asserts that he is above the 
laws and rules of ordinary people, and to prove this he kills an old woman. 
Tolstoy though, says Shestov, would have had little use for this claim to 
be a Superman, but would have embraced the latter part of the novel, in 
which Raskolnikov becomes aware of his mistake, and begins the long 
road to regeneration through his punishment, which is both physical and
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spiritual (and which in this sense bears a similarity to Tolstoy's last 
novel, Ressurection)^^
Nietzsche above all hated compassion. He felt that by accepting pity 
man entered into a conspiracy against life, he grew weak and was able to 
forget his misfortunes. To Shestov, Nietzsche's whole life amounted to a 
struggle, and it was natural to him, to Nietzsche, to hate the cowardly, 
those who confuse the few who have not yet lost c o u r a g e . 20 Shestov's 
acceptance of this is tantamount to his recognizing life as permeated by 
tragedy; those who ignore the tragedy (i.e. Tolstoy) ignore life itself, but 
those who are aware of it and who struggle with it (i.e. Dostoevsky and 
Nietzsche), come face to face with real life. Shestov's radicalism here is 
manifested in starkly negative terms. Perhaps this is related mainly to 
the event noted in his diary entry, perhaps it is on account of his strong 
attachm ent to Nietzsche and Dostoevsky, who replaced morality with 
beliefs that were negatively rather than positively expressed. (Shestov's 
study of Nietzsche concentrates mainly on Thus Spoke Zarathustra - any 
passage from it, taken at random, will express this negative power. 
"Genuine - that is what I call him who goes into god-forsaken deserts and 
has broken his venerating heart. "21 And consider the opening lines of 
Notes from the Underground, in which the protagonist/antagonist rails 
against himself, calling himself an angry and a sick man.)
At this stage in Shestov's thought we have a clear defence of the 
individual, but as yet little religious expression accom panies this 
defence. Indeed, although Shestov has told us that we must search for 
God, we cannot yet call him religious.
Benjamin Fondane, who was a friend and disciple of Shestov's in Paris, 
wrote, on reading his book on Dostoevsky and Nietzsche, "...in order to 
penetrate his thought, in order to reach it, one must...have endured some 
personal disaster...W hat man, for love or truth, would dare to wish on
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himself such a disaster?"22 This remark reminds one of Shestov's 
unknown catastrophe, but it also suggests the importance of tragedy in 
his writings. Shestov's work may not be inaccessible to anyone who has 
not endured personal calamity, but perhaps the only way in which one 
could understand it is through a keen awareness of tragedy in the world.
Out of Shestov's own life, and his discovery of these two writers, he 
was able to declare his philosophy of tragedy, which he held to be, in 
principle, hostile to the philosophy of the commonplace. At the end of his 
essay he says that Dostoevsky's novels and Nietzsche's books speak only 
of the ugliest people and their problems; indeed, they themselves were 
extremely ugly people, and had none of the commonplace hopes.23 Shestov 
is drawn to them because of their perception in locating and isolating the 
individual amidst the herd, but while he tells us at the end of his essay 
on Tolstoy and Nietzsche that we must search for God, the only way he 
offers us to do this is through "ugliness."
Berdyaev responds to this problem in an essay on Shestov entitled 
"Tragedy and the Commonplace". He agrees with Shestov's view of 
tragedy, that it begins when the individual is torn away from the world. 
But he doesn't accept Shestov's attack on "good", because he doesn't think 
that good is limited to the commonplace. Berdyaev suggests that Shestov 
was glorifying the Underground man but yearning for religion. "Shestov is 
also a humanist, he defends the Underground man out of his humanity, he 
wants to write a declaration of his rights, perhaps he even secretly sighs 
for the religion of Christ, perhaps the Christian rays can be manifested in 
h im ."24 Berdyaev was perceptive on this point, because Shestov would 
before long move steadily in the direction of a religious viewpoint. Also, 
as Berdyaev realized, Shestov was not adhering to some kind of evil, 
godless doctrine, but was mainly trying to defend the rights of the 
individual. Berdyaev claims that the commonplace itself is that which is
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beyond good and evil, what with its morally indistinguishable norms, and  
he says that "man must individually create g o o d ."25
Solovyov and Frank would certainly have agreed with Berdyaev, that the 
individual's responsibility is to create good; only Shestov of the four 
derides this judgement, seeing no relationship between the individual and 
good. And yet, it is Shestov's defence of the individual which is the 
fiercest and most uncompromising. W e can add that the other three 
thinkers were also social and political philosophers, and the good had 
significance for them in community; Shestov, who was not such a 
philosopher, could with an easier conscience enjoin the individual to 
abandon morality, without fear that he was advocating anarchy or the 
rule of the strongest, etc.
I l l
Hopelessness
While Dostoevsky and Nietzsche were the great influences of this early 
period, they were not the only writers to whom Shestov declares an 
allegiance. As he had not yet discovered his religious voice, the 
philosophy of tragedy was still expressed in negative terms. His faith 
had not yet been developed, but the opposite side of faith, hopelessness, 
had. And in Anton Chekhov he found, as he himself said, the poet of 
h o p e l e s s n e s s . 26 When Shestov calls him this, he means it not as 
criticism but rather as the highest kind of praise. When he says, "Art, 
science, love, inspiration, ideals...Chekhov has only to touch them and 
they instantly wither and d i e ,"27 he is showing his greatest possible 
respect for the Russian writer. How could he use such condemnatory 
language as a form of admiration?
The primary tale of Chekhov's that Shestov refers to in an essay on him, 
entitled, "Anton Chekhov: Creation from the Void", is "A Tedious Story".
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It is the narrative of an elderly, highly respected scientist who looks at 
his life only to see how meaningless it is. He does not rave like the 
Underground man, or renounce morality; rather he quietly recognizes that 
his family means little to him, his renown as a scientist will soon be 
forgotten, and before long he will be dead. His only fruitful relationship 
is with his foster-daughter Katy, but even when she turns to him for 
advice, support, help, he cannot give her any. All he can murmur is that 
he is beaten, he can utter nothing but that he will be dead soon. Shestov 
says, "When he has stripped his hero of the last shred, when nothing is 
left for him but to beat his head against the wall, Chekhov begins to feel 
something like satisfaction..."28 As with Nietzsche, who awakens an old 
man after his illness and has to go on living in spite of the enormous 
struggle that lies before him, Chekhov's characters have no way out of 
their situation. There are no ideals to appeal to, because ideals do not 
really soothe, there is no immediate death which could bring oblivion. 
The only action for these characters to take is to beat their heads against 
the wall while life goes on.
Shestov is not morbid; in fact he is not even pessimistic. In an essay 
on Berdyaev, called 'In Praise of Folly', in which he responds to Berdyaev's 
essay on him, he declares, "When I heard for the first time that I had been 
labelled a sceptic and a pessimist, I simply rubbed my eyes in surprise."29 
In affirming Chekhov's hopelessness, he does not preach gloom and doom, 
but glorifies the rejection of false answers to the problems of life. When 
life's misfortune is recognized, says Shestov, and no refuge is sought 
from it through idealism, this is where the struggle begins. Shestov says 
that no one can teach Chekhov anything; this is like Nietzsche in his later 
years, who rejected everything that philosophy had to teach him. Chekhov 
and Nietzsche have little in common as thinkers, but Shestov locates a 
characteristic which they both share: an unshakeable anti-idealism.
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For the reason that Shestov embraces Chekhov, that is, for his 
willingness to beat his head against the wall rather than to accept false 
solutions, he condemns another great Russian writer, Turgenev. Shestov 
sees him as the most cultured of the Russian artists, the one who most 
zealously took to European ideas. But while Turgenev viewed European 
culture as the highest form of enlightenment, Shestov saw it as one 
which had almost always caved in to idealism, leaving no room for 
insoluble problems. Turgenev to him became a finished product in Europe 
- refined, educated, completed. He mocks the novelist: "Try, he taught us, 
to be reconciled with life, and don't search for mysteries, for in any case 
you will find nothing."3o Once again Shestov returns to the division 
between life and thought. Turgenev, he felt, had simply been too weak to 
fight for life. Compared with him even Tolstoy, who fared badly against 
Dostoevsky and Nietzsche, is given some due respect. According to 
Shestov, Tolstoy was unwilling to concede his life to literature; even 
though his heroes and heroines em erge from his novels ordinary and 
happy, still, he fought against contemporary thinking. Turgenev, he 
suggests, did no such thing.31
Shestov's greatest task was still ahead of him: the battle against all
the bases upon which philosophy had been founded. One can see that his 
earlier writings are starting to scratch at the philosophical surface. 
When he examines Russian literature, it is not in terms of its beauty, 
style or artistic form; if it had been aesthetics which had interested him, 
Turgenev would likely have been at the top and Dostoevsky at the bottom. 
Berdyaev says of Shestov, "Not 'literature', not 'philosophy', not 'ideas' 
interest him, rather the truth about the sufferings of all these writers, 
their real spirit, the living e x p e r ie n c e ."32 The questions he asks in his 
study of Russian writers, and of Nietzsche, are, Must we accept a moral 
order already prepared for us? Are there problems which remain
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insoluble? Does knowledge have precedence over life, or is it the other 
way around? These are questions which philosophy and theology have 
above all asked, and it was towards these disciplines that Shestov was 
advancing.
Nevertheless, such questions are not limited to certain disciplines, and 
Shestov found that they were asked by great creative artists. He located 
the thought in these artists which most forcefully expressed their 
struggle: the thorough rejection of the commonplace in Nietzsche, the
despair of Dostoevsky's Underground man, and to a lesser degree the 
hopelessness of Chekhov. It was when all of these conditions were lived 
through, thought Shestov, that man started to get down to the business of 
his own life.
IV
The Groundless
Shestov was not trained in philosophy. He had studied law at Moscow 
University, his employment came from his family's estate (his parents 
were prosperous merchants), and his first books had been concerned with 
artists more than with philosophers. But the assumptions, methods and 
conclusions of philosophy came to be very real enemies for Shestov; the 
whole concept of philosophy was his most natural opponent. In 
summarizing Shestov's thought, Sidney Monas says, "Frightened by the 
Dark King, who came to all individuals, men entrenched themselves, 
walled themselves into a world of common agreement where they could 
seemingly ignore the presence of death. They agreed to limit their own 
possibilities. What was alive in experience, however, was in d iv id u a l . ..."33 
Where Shestov considered Tolstoy to be walling himself in by morality, 
he was to discover a field of thought whose whole effort, so he believed, 
resulted in a wall which not only limited, but devastated possibility.
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His final book was entitled Athens and Jerusalem] he made exhaustive 
efforts to distinguish between Athens, philosophy, on the one hand, and 
Jerusalem, faith, on the other. (At one point he even laments the fact 
that the two names are joined by the conjunction and, rather than or.)3 4 
Let us look at how Shestov viewed philosophy as a whole, with all its 
diversity and its two and a half millennia of practice.
As a condamner of philosophical claims of knowledge, Shestov is 
merciless. He doesn't flinch in his sharp criticism even from those 
philosophers who followed their own, lonely path to what they saw as 
truth. Foremost among these "lonely" thinkers are Socrates, Spinoza and 
Shestov's contemporary and friend, Husserl. And he has even less respect 
for those philosophers who, as he thought, sought truth along safe paths 
where there lurked no danger; into this category he puts, among others, 
Aristotle, Kant and Hegel.
He came to know history's philosophical arguments intimately; one 
could say that he knew his enemy well, even though he had become 
convinced that philosophy would be his enemy well before he had acquired 
a thorough understanding of the subject. After his book on Dostoevsky 
and Nietzsche, and still powerfully under the influence of these two men, 
he wrote The Apotheosis of Groundlessness, in which occur the first 
skirmishes in his great battle against philosophy. The book is distinctly
Nietzschean both in structure and content. It is filled with short
passages which are not quite as aphoristic as are Nietzsche's, but which 
jab at logic and reason, the heart of philosophy. Shestov is still in the
Underground here, but his attacks are basically the same as those he will
make when he has acquired his religious point of view.
The passages in this book refer less to philosophers and artists than to 
the ideas they embody. (Although in indicting philosophy he is not afraid 
to name names.) The meaning of this work is contained in its title: it is
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the sanctification of the groundless, the deification of all that has 
abandoned certainty and knowledge. In claiming that we know nothing of 
the ultimate realities of existence, he declares:
Therefore on principle man should respect order in the external 
world and complete chaos in the inner. And for those who find it 
difficult to bear such a duality, some internal order might also 
be provided. Only, they should not pride themselves on it, but 
always remember that it is a sign of their weakness, pettiness,
dullness."38
Internal order, thinks Shestov, quiets a man's soul, it lulls him to sleep, 
and he will have nothing to do with this. The above passage gives an 
indication of his attitude to the social and political world around him: he
welcomes order and peace in the external world, but of such a world he is 
almost dismissive, compared with the all-im portance of his internal 
sphere. Internally, he would rather see all elements at war with each 
other than a well-regulated, ordered system.
One of his images is that of a caterpillar, who, when transformed into a 
chrysalis, lives in a warm, quiet world. The other caterpillars think it is 
an act of insurgency that he would escape this warmth by growing wings 
and flying out into space.36 This is a natural image for Shestov - 
knowledge is for him a warm chrysalis, discouraging flight. Such an idea 
as this indicates a thinker who is not addressing his reproaches directly 
to specific philosophers but is more intent on calling the whole idea of 
philosophy into question. (His development, though, is different from his 
teacher, the author of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Nietzsche was a brilliant 
scholar and devotee of philosophy as a young man, but after passionately 
devoting himself to it he just as passionately rejected it. Shestov, on
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the other hand, was never an ardent follower of any philosopher or 
philosophical system.) One full passage should indicate Shestov's debt 
to Nietzsche:
Philosophers dearly love to call their utterances "truths", since 
in that guise they become binding upon us all. But each 
philosopher invents his own truths. Which means that he 
asks his pupils to deceive themselves in the way he shows, but 
that he reserves for himself the option of deceiving himself in 
his own way. Why? Why not allow everyone to deceive himself 
just as he l i k e s ? 3  7
This whole book argues for the groundless, especially concerning 
philosophy; the heroes are still those of old, Dostoevsky, Nietzsche and 
Chekhov ("Every creation," Shestov tells us, "is created out of the 
V o i d . " ) 3 8  Most of his attacks on reason and logic in the future will be 
able to offer religious struggle as the alternative, but this work, on the 
borders of his transition, still expresses the groundless in negative  
terms, chaos, the Void, uncertainty. However, although the expression 
continues to be negative, as always with him it is not pessimistic, but 
seeks to protect the individual.
V
Athens
So as Shestov discovered the great philosophers, he did so with "firm 
groundlessness". There was no chance that he would accept the order 
which was imposed by any one philosopher, and yet he immersed himself 
in a study of all the major ones. The thinker whom he carried on the 
longest, most intense struggle with was Spinoza. Him he saw as the
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most remarkable of logicians, and also as the most fatally misguided. 
W hat seems to have attracted Shestov most of all, though, was that the 
Amsterdam Jew, although mistaken in Shestov's eyes, was nonetheless a 
courageous and isolated struggler for his conception of the truth.
Spinoza was excom m unicated from his synagogue for heretical 
opinions, and he refused a chair of philosophy at Heidelberg the better to 
preserve his full freedom. (Nietzsche, incidentally, had himself given up a 
chair, at Basel University.) These details are enormously important to 
Shestov, because they link life to thought. "Spinoza spoke not what he 
wished, but what God commanded him to say. It is all one now whether or 
not he agreed with what he proclaimed to mankind: he could not help but
proclaim it."39
In the same way that Shestov admires Chekhov's refusal to accept 
ideals in the face of despair, he lauds Spinoza's personal involvement 
with his philosophy; his ideas were not for him an idle pastime, but were 
linked to a divine commandment. Nevertheless, he thoroughly disagrees 
with Spinoza's beliefs. Spinoza's conclusions are largely formulated  
through a mathematical approach, and by this method he establishes 
"facts" about the universe, such as that God is determined by necessity. 
Shestov attacks these basic principles, claim ing that they are  
representative of philosophy as a whole. His first disagreement with him 
concerns the notion of using mathematics when treating of God. Spinoza 
says his philosophy is the true one in the same way that one can know 
that the sum of the three angles of a triangle is equal to two right 
a n g le s .40 Predictably, this is a horrifying notion to Shestov; nothing 
could be more impersonal than turning God into an equation. (Consider the 
statement made by Dostoevsky's Underground man: "...twice two is four is 
not life, gentlemen, but the beginning of death.")41 According to Spinoza, 
God is the creator of the universe, but also one who is bound by the laws
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of the universe. Shestov says:
I ask again, if we judge of God, of the soul, of human 
passions even of man, or even to advise him, to love 
God and not a plane, a stone or a lump of wood? And 
why do we address the demand to love to a man and not to 
a line or an a p e ? 4 2
He accuses the philosopher of slaying God by using mathematical proofs 
to locate God's characteristics. By such proofs Spinoza reaches the 
second conclusion which Shestov so repeatedly rails against: God's will
and intellect are so different from man's will and intellect that it is only 
the common terms which they share, nothing else. It is, says Spinoza, 
like the term c a n is , which signifies the Dog constellation (in which 
Sirius shines) and the animal that barks.43 |n other words, declares 
Shestov, God and man have nothing in common; God is indifferent to man, 
but man must love G o d . 44 By so removing God from man's personal life, he 
concludes, Spinoza is in effect saying that God does not exist. As much 
as Shestov's thought differs from Solovyov’s, there is a measure of 
agreem ent between them on this point: man cannot regard God as
external to him. We know that Solovyov's Godmanhood was founded on the 
principle that God and man enter into a relationship, and while we cannot 
attribute to Shestov so frank a profession of belief, not yet anyway, it is 
clear from his criticism of Spinoza that he has slight regard for the 
doctrine that removes God from man.
For the Amsterdam Jew truth came before anything else. (Spinoza says 
of his own philosophy, "I esteem it not the best, but the true.")4s The 
truth revealed to him made the God of the Bible only a moral guide, but 
the real God was immobilized by necessity, incapable of being addressed.
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The problem with giving one's entire allegiance to truth, thinks Shestov, 
is that each philosopher believes that he has a monopoly on it. Each 
thinker is convinced that his truth is the true one, and should be able to 
persuade all men without exception. But, Shestov asks, would 
philosophers agree to limit their pretensions, so that their truths would 
be true only for those who are persuaded by them, but would cease to be 
truths to those who are n o t ? 4 6  Shestov defines philosophy as the middle 
truth, as opposed to the ultimate truth which no man can claim for his 
own. The ultimate truths are unintelligible, but not i n a c c e s s i b l e . 4 7
The mere thought that ultimate truth is unintelligible is hardly 
conceivable to philosophy, thinks Shestov, and this is where Spinoza's 
third principle which Shestov reacts against comes in. More often than 
any other of the philosopher's words, Shestov quotes these: Non ridere,
non lugere, neque detestari, sed intelligere (Laugh not, weep not, be not 
angry, but understand).48 Man, in searching for an explanation to the 
world, places truth first. To do this he must not only force both man and 
God to submit to this truth, but he, as philosopher, has to abstract his 
intellect from himself, in order to arrive at his truth. The laughter, 
tears, fury of the philosopher are only hindrances to understanding, and it 
is understanding which leads to knowledge, the final end of philosophy. 
In this connection Shestov was especially harsh on Hegel, who claimed 
that the philosopher is required to abstract himself, and to such an 
extent that it is a matter of indifference to him whether he is or is no t 
This, Shestov thinks, takes the whole notion to an extreme, but at any 
rate the notion itself, of understanding above all else, is seriously 
flaw ed .
Lev Tolstoy was the first intellectual giant whom Shestov opposed, and 
Spinoza was his major philosophical adversary. These two men loomed 
large in Shestov's life; Tolstoy was the greatest literary figure in the
8 9
Russia that Shestov grew up in, and Spinoza was, according to Shestov, 
the father of modern philosophy.49 It is noteworthy that Tolstoy and 
Spinoza were similar in significant ways: both acknowledged a God
which to Shestov seemed impersonal, and both underwent great personal 
struggle to conceive what they saw as the truth. (Tolstoy in fact was 
excommunicated from the Russian Orthodox Church, as Spinoza had been 
from the synagogue.) But one can see that in embarking on an exploration 
of philosophy, Shestov's orientation had changed very little. Tolstoy 
taught that God equals the good, Spinoza that God equals substance,so and 
Shestov taught that both formulae lead only to depersonalizing God, 
making it impossible for the individual to address him.
Neither morality nor reason allowed Shestov to laugh, weep or be angry, 
and it was in the figure of Socrates that he found morality and philosophy 
awarded the highest possible value. Socrates was another who had been 
committed mind and soul to philosophy; not only did he abandon the life of 
an ordinary Athenian to discuss virtue and immortality in the Acropolis, 
but even at the moment of his death, before he drank the hemlock, he was 
engaged in philosophy and teaching. W here for Shestov the id e as  of 
Spinoza were representative of philosophy's dead-end, it was the 
p ersona lity  of Socrates that is most typical of what philosophy worships.
In a passage from The Apotheosis of Groundlessness, Shestov remarks 
sarcastically upon all of Socrates' efforts:
When Xanthippe poured slops over Socrates as he returned 
from his philosophical occupations, tradition says that he 
observed: 'After a storm it always rains.' Would it not be 
more worthy...to say: After one's philosophical exercise, one
feels as if one had had slops emptied over one’s head.8i
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Socrates' life was dedicated to searching for truth in the world and to 
finding immutable principles by which we can guide our lives; Shestov's 
was dedicated to exposing truth and immutable principles as being 
illusory .
Socrates' went to his death fearlessly, because he believed that the 
"good" was autonomous, and could not be harmed even by one's own death. 
But, says Shestov, man is only deceiving himself by calmly accepting 
death, in the 'knowledge' that good will triumph. "And so our task - 
perhaps an impossible one, for Socrates has become second nature to us - 
should consist in eliminating from our souls all that is 'lawful' and 
' i d e a l ' " . 8 2  Shestov does not see Socrates' manner of death as victorious, 
because in believing to the end that reason reigns, Socrates has only 
deceived himself; he has 'understood' instead of wept. This is one of 
many examples in which Shestov gives knowledge the power of tyranny, 
and in such a way the death of Socrates, one of the great events in the 
history of the individual, is diminished in importance. According to 
Shestov's manner of thinking, Socrates was in fact weak, because he 
accepted knowledge; he supported deception rather than fought against it.
In an essay entitled "The Theory of Knowledge", Shestov turns to 
Socrates' treatment of the truths which live in poets, great and profound 
truths but at the same time inexplicable. The poets had a great many 
ideas, but they could never explain where they had got them. Socrates 
himself claims that he has frequently been guided by a force which is not 
reason, but a mysterious demon, a kind of secret voice. Shestov claims 
that these unrevealed truths seemed to Socrates a great misery, a real 
misfortune. "I do not know how it happened...but Socrates for some 
reason decided that an unproven and unexplained truth had less value than 
a proven and explained o n e . "83 Socrates, he thinks, made a fatal mistake 
when he began to find answers to mysterious questions. In Athens at that
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time, the gods themselves vouchsafed truths to men, but suddenly, with 
the appearance of Socrates, man wanted to acquire truths by himself, 
independently. The example of Socrates, he says, has been a bad example 
to all subsequent generations of thinking m e n . 8 4  Shestov is fiercely 
opposed to the task the Greek philosopher set himself, of "clearing up" 
the mysteries of life. It is noteworthy that one of Shestov's favourite 
sayings, from Pascal, is "Let us not be reproached for our lack of clarity, 
since we make profession of it."85 Socrates recognized a demon which 
did not offer explanations in terms of reason, but that didn't stop him
from seeking after reason-based truths in spite of that. This is perhaps
the kernel of Shestov's whole argument: philosophy has demanded
answers of a demon which has no answers to give.
His deep disbelief in knowledge manifests itself continually. Two 
exam ples should give some indication of this; the first concerns his 
attitude to the legend of the Fall, to original sin. He insists that we
should accept the story with its every detail. Eve being tempted by the
serpent, the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, the Fall itself. He 
realizes fully that the legend cannot be defended by common sense, and 
that if we use rational means to arrive at the truth, then the story should 
simply be erased from the Holy Scriptures. "All our 'spiritual' being cries 
out: let the origin of sin be anything but the Tree of Knowledge of Good 
and E v i l " 8 6  in the Fall man asserts himself, and Shestov claims that this 
is the very origin of sin.
Philosophy, he thinks, is delighted by the Fall. Socrates believes 
philosophy to be the highest good, Spinoza wants to do nothing but 
understand, each philosopher considers his system a vital contribution to 
mankind. But in all these attempts at knowledge Shestov sees nothing 
but the consequences of original sin. The man who explains is the one 
who does not have the strength to act on his own, who has submitted to a
9 2
power outside himself.87 This power is the serpent, who seduces man in 
order to acquire knowledge. Shestov is not a literalist, the legend of the 
Fall has symbolic, not historical, value for him, but he does accept all 
components of it, seeing knowledge at the centre of man's first sin. 
Indeed, to Shestov, the Fall itself is far worse than any individual sin or 
sinner could be, for example, far worse than any political tyrant. Once, 
he said, 'For many years, day and night, I have been struggling with the 
serpent. What is Hitler in comparison with the serpent?"88
Another instance of Shestov's repudiation of knowledge occurs in his 
treatm ent of the thinker Philo, who lived at the beginning of the 
Christian era. Philo was a Jew from Alexandria; Shestov claims that he
was not a particularly profound thinker, but that certain thinkers were
fated to play an important role in history merely because of the time in 
which they lived, and Philo was one of these. It was he who brought 
together Athens and Jerusalem, who found a way to unite biblical and 
Hellenic thought. He did this through concentrating on the first words of 
the Gospel of John: In the beginning was the Word. Thus the doctrine of 
the Logos arose, and men were able, after that, to embrace both reason 
and the Bible.89 Clearly, Shestov sees the entire introduction of reason 
and logic into the biblical viewpoint as a harmful one. He is extremely 
suspicious of rationalism, partly because he sees it as taking all life 
under its umbrella, with neither God nor man being able to escape from
under it, and partly because he sees it as stripping the individual of a
personal life. Zenkovsky says, "Shestov is unable to accept the autonom y  
of reason, for this autonomy rapidly becomes a tyranny."^^  A tyrant's 
most unmistakable feature is his ability to destroy freedom, and Shestov 
in all his writings yearns for the autonomy of the spirit instead of the 
tyranny of the foreign invader: reason. Both the story of the Fall and the
confluence of biblical and Hellenic streams are for Shestov disastrous
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episodes in man's personal history. It is apparent, from these two 
examples, with what dismay he reacts to the victory of knowledge and 
reason.
One of his greatest adversaries, and also one that he had huge respect 
for, was his friend Edmund Husserl. Shestov was very aware of the 
philosopher's enormous personal involvement in his efforts to arrive at 
the truth. (In his essay "In Memory of A Great Philosopher; Edmund 
Husserl", he even mentions that when the two would meet, Husserl would 
hardly notice food in front of him and would not be interested in small 
talk, he would want only to discuss philosophy.) Husserl attacked the 
relativism of modern philosophy, and declared that there is truth in the 
world which exists independent of man's judgments, and that the truth is 
absolutely true. One scientific example of this is that the law of gravity 
could not be destroyed even if all gravitating bodies were to disappear. A 
philosophical example comes from Plato, who asks if something is holy 
because it is loved by the gods, or is it loved by the gods because it is 
holy? Both Plato's and Husserl's answer is the same: what is holy is
immutable, even the gods must submit to it.8i
One of the reasons Shestov so appreciated Husserl as a thinker is 
because Husserl believed that most philosophy was continually  
relativizing and giving in to some weakness or other, while Husserl 
refused to do this. Socrates had spoken of a mysterious source which 
moved men, and then tried to solve the mystery himself. Philo had 
weakened both Athens and Jerusalem by trying to combine the two. Even 
Kant, who had supposedly written a critique of p u re  reason, could not 
resist introducing postulates concerning God and the immortality of the 
s o u l.82 Everywhere along the philosophical road the travellers took 
detours and shortcuts to arrive at their destination, but Shestov found in 
Husserl a rare traveller who firmly kept his direction. The whole
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problem, though, was that the road led to no destination. W hat men 
claimed was one, says Shestov, was only a cul-de-sac.
Shestov says, "In absolutizing truth, Husserl was forced to relativize 
being, or more accurately, human life."83 To the Russian thinker there is 
no middle ground, no compromise to be made; either one accepts the 
dictates of truth (or reason or logic - they were all one to Shestov) and 
follows it everywhere, or one relativizes knowledge and absolutizes life.
Husserl rejects this attack, accusing Shestov of turning him into a 
stone figure, putting him on a pedestal and then smashing the figure with 
a ham m er into sm ithereens. The M arxist critic V. A. Kuvakin is 
sympathetic to Husserl's complaint, claiming that all Shestov's efforts to 
defend the individual are less legitimate than they seem. He says, "With 
all the seriousness which only he was capable of, Shestov, apparently 
fighting for the person, in reality draws his whole personality towards 
philosophy, towards intellectual ac tiv ity ."84 is this a fair comment? 
W hatever Shestov's personality may have been like, it has been pointed 
out more than once that his primary world was an internal one, and his 
tyrants were the lords of reason. Shestov may have been as immersed in 
philosophy as Husserl, but that does not make his condemnation of 
Husserl's thought any less valid. His attitude to every  attempt by logic or 
reason to find the meaning of life is a highly critical one. To him, 
systems create tyrants and stone figures.
In his essay "Penultimate Words", Shestov has a section which is 
entitled "What is Philosophy?" In posing the question, he does not ask 
which of the available systems is best, or more true; rather he wonders 
why it is that men are driven to philosophy, and what it is that they get 
out of it. In the 2500 years that it has been practiced, many diverse 
answers have been provided, which for the most part have been tedious to 
most and interesting to a few. But even for those who are interested.
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will it have meaning to them? Shestov answers this with a question of 
his own: "For what can be more terrible to a man than to be compelled, in 
the hard moments of his life, to acknowledge any doctrine of philosophy 
as binding upon him?®^ Shestov is not insistent that all systems of 
thought be rejected, he is even glad to admit that they are all true. But 
he does not want philosophy to claim to have found ultimate meaning. 
What is philosophy? Shestov says that to the philosopher it is art for 
art’s sake. The philosopher is like an artist whose works may be dearer 
to him than life itself. For the ordinary man, however, it is a refuge, 
where he can run for help and support when he has no other w e a p o n s . 6 6  
Neither path forces man to confront his own being in its innermost 
depths.
After Shestov faced philosophy head-on, he never turned away. 
Zenkovsky says of him:
It is strange that after his solemn burial of rationalism in one 
book, Shestov returns in his next book to a critique of 
rationalism - as though it had come to life in the meantime.
This is explained by the fact that, having destroyed one 
"stratum" of rationalistic propositions in himself, he found in 
him self a new, deeper stratum of the same rationalism.67
Again and again Shestov returns to his attack on reason; his thought 
develops, but the same philosophers and even their same words are met 
frequently (Non ridere, non lugere, neque detestari, sed intellegere is the 
battle-cry of the enemy which is forever sounding in Shestov's ears). One 
could hardly think of a philosopher, religious or otherwise, whom Shestov 
does not attack at some point; including the ones we have already  
discussed, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Flegel, Schelling, Solovyov, and
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his close friend Berdyaev are all accused of being knowledge-seekers. It
is apparent how deeply rooted was his objection to the assertions of
reason; it follows to see how he countered it.
V I
The Fall
We have seen that Shestov did not begin as a directly religious thinker, 
but by the time he had reached his most developed stage as a thinker, all 
of his works were in some way connected with the Bible. Until the end of 
his life he continued his attack on philosophy, always renewing, as
Zenkovsky pointed out, his battle against reason. But his criticism began 
to take root in the stories and the figures of the Bible. It was here that 
he found what he had been looking for when he had declared, in his early 
book on Tolstoy and Nietzsche, that we must search for God. This period 
in his development seems like an enormous change from the days when he
had glorified the Underground man but, as we shall see, his interpretation
of the Bible took him deeper into religious individualism, yet did not
change the direction of his thought.
It is Impossible to talk about Shestov's later religious life without 
drawing in Soren Kierkegaard. W e cannot say that Shestov became
religious after his discovery of Kierkegaard, because he had long been an
admirer of Luther, Pascal, Augustine, and even of obscure religious
writers such as Tertullian and W illiam of Ockham . But it is in 
Kierkegaard that Shestov was to find his greatest ally. Fie discovered the 
Danish thinker in the last decade of his life; he claims that Husserl
ins isted  that he read him. (This is a matter of surprise to Shestov; in his 
essay on Husserl, he cannot believe that his friend, the philosopher,
would insist that he read Kierkegaard, who attacked philosophy at every 
turn.) Shestov produced an entire book on Kierkegaard as well as various
9 7
essays, and although Zenkovsky claims that Shestov discovered the 
Danish thinker too late in his life to call him a real i n f l u e n c e , 68 this is 
not entirely true. Kierkegaard, whose own life had consisted of religious 
struggle, gave even greater force to Shestov's biblical orientation.
Shestov identified with Kierkegaard's insistence that the individual 
was greater than any system which could be constructed. We can 
sum m arize this thought with a passage from Kierkegaard's journals, 
which gets right to the heart of Shestov's thought:
In relation to their systems most systematizers are 
like a man who builds an enormous castle and lives In a shack 
close by; they do not live in their own enormous systematic 
buildings. But spiritually that is a decisive objection.
Spiritually speaking a man's thought must be the building in 
which he he lives - otherwise everything is topsy-turvy.69
W e might find these very words in Shestov's A p o th e o s is  o f 
G ro u n d le ssn ess , so accurately do they reflect his own thought. This is 
just what Shestov had been saying for decades, whether or not it was 
expressed in religious terms.
Shestov does, however, have one serious d isagreem ent with 
Kierkegaard; not surprisingly, he seeks out the other's conception of 
knowledge, and he finds fault with it. It was pointed out earlier how 
seriously Shestov regarded the Fall; man had acquired knowledge and this 
was death to him. He accuses Kierkegaard of ignoring the serpent, of 
trying to explain the Fall without seeing its full m e a n i n g . 7o And how did 
Shestov regard man before  the Fall, i.e. what is the opposite side of man 
who has acquired knowledge? As usual, Shestov refuses to offer his own 
vision, and he certainly doesn't provide some Miltonic view of the Garden
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of Eden, but he insists that pre-fallen man is infinitely better off.
"Indeed, the Bible says that in the state of innocence man did not know 
the difference between good and evil. But this was not a weakness, a 
defect; on the contrary, it was a power, a tremendous advantage."71
Kierkegaard himself could not conceive of man in a state of innocence. 
Here he sees nothingness. But Shestov thinks that man's acquisition of 
knowledge is so disastrous that he prefers by far a pre-fallen, uncomplex 
being who is pure innocence, to one who has succumbed to knowledge. 
This raises a question which Shestov never answers: if struggle itself
plays an essential role in life (as Shestov is repeatedly claiming), then 
what meaning does life have with no struggle at all?
Here is one of the few places where Shestov seems to establish a 
belief, instead of whittling away at the beliefs of others. For him the 
Fall is the perfect explanation of man's flawed nature. The outsider, in
the figure of the serpent, has tempted man away from his state of
innocence, and man has fallen, not through murder or adultery or
covetousness, but merely through the desire to acquire knowledge. To our 
ears this may sound strange; Adam and Eve only ate fruit from the wrong 
tree, while after them the real evil started, beginning with Cain's murder 
of Abel. But Shestov sees in the Fall that man's acquisition of knowledge 
leads to his loss of independence in personal terms. Berdyaev sums up 
Shestov's attitude to the Fall neatly:
The life in heaven was nourished by the Tree of Life. But 
from the abyss of non-existence came a serpent, 
and the voice of the serpent bewitched man. He tempted 
man with the fruit of good and evil. Knowledge took 
possession of the world, paradise ended, and terror and 
suffering began. The abyss of non-existence, through
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the temptation of knowledge, turns into necessity 
(the eternal truths of knowledge), necessity turns into 
reason and m orality /z
Having seen how Shestov contrasts morality with individuality, one can 
see how the Fall, in these terms, would be anathema to him.
Berdyaev himself sums up Shestov’s views on the Fall with a critical 
eye. He does not agree that renouncing knowledge is the sine qua non of 
the individual's life and, like Zenkovsky, Berdyaev claims that Shestov 
struggled so long against knowledge, because he found such strong 
rationalistic tendencies within him self.73 For Berdyaev, though, this 
struggle is a misguided one. He says, "But life is everything. Why is 
knowledge not life? Knowledge is also a part of life, it is an event in 
e x is te n c e ."74 This "reasonable" statement helps, on one hand, to reveal 
Shestov as the truly radical thinker that he was; attempts to make sense 
of the universe are, says Berdyaev, legitimate, and if Shestov rejects 
that, it seem s  to make a narrow thinker out of him, an accusation he was 
to encounter more than once in his life. On the other hand, Shestov's 
interpretation is also the biblical one, which we may or may not view as 
extreme: man's Fall happened not as a result of immorality, vice, or any
of the other terms in our vocabulary of right and wrong. It happened 
because of man's self-assertion, because he ate from the Tree of 
Knowledge of Good and Evil.
V II
The Biblical God
Shestov insists on the reality of the Fall in each man's life; he asserts 
another belief which remains consistent with his thought, yet seems to 
flirt with knowledge itself. He spent his whole life trying to break away
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from the necessity which man had fashioned for himself, the world and 
God. Faith he believed to be the individual's only positive path, but 
Shestov meant by faith much more than just plain personal belief. So 
abhorrent did he find the laws of necessity that he wanted the past 
itself, through faith, to be freed from these laws. So much freedom does 
he accord to God that he claims God could make what had happened not to 
have happened, according to his will. One of his inspirations for this 
belief was the medieval believer Peter Damian, who repudiated the notion 
"quod factum est infectum esse nequit" (What has once existed cannot 
become non-existent), and who believed that God had the freedom to 
change everything, even the past.75 The closest we get to an assertion of 
belief by Shestov is in the following words; "God can overcome the law 
of contradiction; God...can, by his power...make what has once existed into 
what has never existed, just as he can can cause that which has had a 
beginning to have no end."76 is it limiting God to describe him in any way, 
even as unlimited? If so, than Shestov himself tastes the forbidden fruit. 
But a description such as this is intended less to give God attributes than 
to deny others the possibility of forcing limitations upon him.
Faith could alter the past. This is Shestov's way of saying that to the 
individual, all things are possible. He often uses the Bible as his 
authority to make such a claim , but Berdyaev declares that in 
acknowledging the Bible as the source of his inspiration Shestov merely 
chooses those elements in it which most suit Shestov, but rejects the 
re s t.77 This is true, as Shestov had no use for the laws of Moses, the 
history of the Jews, etc. (Solovyov, Frank and Berdyaev, incidentally, all 
make a clear distinction between the Old and the New Testaments, as 
that between law and spirit, a distinction Shestov never makes.) The 
biblical figures he focusses on are the greatest sufferers and the 
greatest strugglers and are, as Shestov often points out, the antitheses
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of logic and reason.
One of the great biblical heroes for Shestov is Abraham, he who, in 
obedience to God's command, was prepared to slay his son Isaac, and had 
even raised the knife over him before the angel intervened. This was an 
act of faith, and for Shestov the greatest possible act, since it involved 
Abraham 's sacrifice of his son. Shestov was aw akened to the 
significance of this story by Kierkegaard, whose book Fear and Trembling 
was dedicated to the subject. Shestov's and Kierkegaard's claim is that 
in ethical (or rational) terms such an act is madness, and worse, is a 
horrible crime, the murder of one’s son. Socrates would have argued with 
all his powers to prevent such an act. For the ordinary consciousness, to 
oppose Abraham to Socrates is the greatest offence and the height of 
f o l l y . 78  But Shestov, in going beyond the good as he did with Tolstoy, and 
the absolute truth as he did with Husserl, approaches the apotheosis of 
groundlessness: the utter abandonment of ethical principles for a faith
which promises nothing but rewards the greatest. The story of Abraham  
and Isaac is one which Shestov naturally accepted; from his earliest days 
as a thinker he had argued for an abandonment of the moral, and here he 
found this abandonment accorded religious status.
The difference between Solovyov and Shestov is encapsulated by the 
Abraham -lsaac story; for Shestov, Abraham is a shining exam ple of 
genuine faith, while for Solovyov, the moralist, Abraham simply went too 
far. Solovyov says of Abraham that "he was simply lacking in the 
conception of what may and what may not be a good or an object of God's 
will - a clear proof that even saints stand in need of moral philosophy."79 
Certainly Abraham has committed an act which offends against the laws 
of morality; for Shestov this means that he has succeeded, for Solovyov, 
that he has failed.
The second biblical figure which Shestov, again with Kierkegaard,
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upheld was Job. While it was Abraham's act which Shestov finds highly 
meaningful, it is Job's whole situation and his response to it, which 
inspire Shestov. One of his favourite passages comes in Job's reaction to 
his comforters, who try to console him after he has had everything taken 
away from him: "O that my grief were thoroughly weighed, and my
calamity laid in the balances together! For now would it be heavier than 
the sand of the sea..."86 Job's Comforters, Shestov points out, were in the 
land of ethics; they urged him to accept God's wiil and not to curse his 
day. But Job is not consoled by them, and his grief rages even deeper. 
This is a classic Shestovian arrangement: a man is weighed down by the 
burden of life, and ethics (or reason, logic, morality, philosophy, etc.) 
tries to lighten his burden by persuading him that he can be comforted. 
"For Job, the ethical's 'you must' is an empty phrase, and the 
'metaphysical consolations' that his friends tossed at him by the handful 
are simply nonsense."81 For Shestov the story of Job involves the same 
problems as any struggle against philosophy: necessity must be
vanquished at any cost, even at the cost of grief.
Fie values Job for the same reason that he valued Chekhov's scientist in 
"A Tedious Story", who had no answers to offer his foster daughter, but 
could only beat his head against a wall. Real life, claims Shestov, takes 
place when one's grief is heavier than the sand of the sea; the difference 
between Chekhov's scientist and Job is that God does finally respond to 
Job, and this is of great significance to Shestov.
V I I I  
The Absurd
Before returning to his belief that what has happened could be made not 
to have happened by God, one more example shall be offered of Shestov's
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religious developm ent, and this involves Kierkegaard's personal life. 
Shestov was deeply struck by Kierkegaard's decision not to marry the 
young woman he loved, because he believed that his struggle for faith 
would not allow him to be a good husband. It was not so much the 
sacrifice of a fiancee that so impressed Shestov as Kierkegaard's belief 
that he could actually attain her through faith. She could not be his 
fiancee in the ordinariness of everyday life, but by throwing himself 
"headlong into the embrace of the A b s u r d " , h e  could claim her as his 
own. Shestov raises this sacrifice by Kierkegaard to biblical levels. 
Spinoza, Socrates, Job's Comforters insist that Kierkegaard cannot have 
his fiancee, that Abraham should not raise the knife over his son, and that 
Job should accept w ord#' of consolation rather than cursing God. 
Necessity, Shestov says, "does not even suspect the existence in the 
world of the indignation, the anger, the horror, of Job, Abraham and 
Kierkegaard, and does not in any way take them into account."®^
For Shestov, Kierkegaard's greatest term is "the Absurd"; it is here that 
Shestov's faith is most powerfully realized. Kierkegaard counters Hegel 
with Job, and reason - Shestov's great enemy - with the A b s u r d . By
throwing oneself into the Absurd, one renders oneself unassailable by
reason; Indeed according to reason it is absurd to raise a knife over one's 
own son, but reason has no means at its disposal to refute this. Even 
before Shestov discovered Kierkegaard he was fond of quoting the words 
of the early Christian Tertullian: "non pudet quia pudendum est, prorsus
credibile est quia incertum, certum est quia impossible" ("I am not 
ashamed because it is shame^pl; it is absolutely credible because it is 
absurd; it is certain because it is impossible").8® The Absurd Is the
highest form of faith, involving a thorough rejection of the credible for a
leap into the incredible.
Kierkegaard's greatest adversary is Hegel; Shestov's is Spinoza, but the
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philosophers were up to the same things, says Shestov. (He even thinks 
that Hegel is derived from Spinoza.)86 The only answer to reason is the 
Absurd, which is intimately connected with faith. Shestov eulogises 
Kierkegaard thus: "Rarely has anyone had the ability and the desire to
celebrate so ebulliently, so passionately, so ecstatically, the Absurd, 
which paves the way for faith."87 Elsewhere he says: "Faith means that 
God can give Abraham a new son...and return Regina Olsen to
K ierkegaard."88
Is Shestov, then, asserting a kind of knowledge when he claims that the 
past could be made not to have existed if God so wills it? In his book 
Two Russian Thinkers: Berdyaev and Shestov, James Wernham approaches 
Shestov's claim, and tries to see how it could be possible to wipe away 
the past. He uses the example of the annulment of a marriage, suggesting 
that although the marriage ceremony took place, the marriage was 
declared not to exist. In the same way one can expiate a sin, which 
makes the sin not to have been. But, says Wernham, there may not be sin 
and there may not be marriage, but the act took place and so did the 
ceremony: therefore we can say that the nature of something had been 
changed, but we cannot say that what had been was made not to have 
been.89
Thus, Wernham points out the contradiction in Shestov's claim, but he 
adds that Shestov knows that he is contradicting himself, and that one 
cannot refute his position because Shestov knows it is absurd, and yet 
still maintains it.so In essence this critic reveals the contradiction in 
Shestov's argument, but declares that nothing can be done about it. 
W ernham's argument, however, seems to overlook Shestov's belief: not 
that man can erase what once was, but that G od  can. Logic only tosses out 
a red herring by trying to resolve a contradiction which Shestov says can 
be in God's power, not man's.
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But by asserting the omnipotence of God, Shestov is not himself using 
or abusing knowledge. Rather he says that God can  alter the past, but he 
doesn’t insist that he does alter it. Shestov wants to free God from the 
iron hand of necessity, and he wants knowledge to leave God alone, but 
his appeal to the Absurd is not within, but without, the boundaries of 
knowledge. In the same way Shestov’s acceptance of the Fall is not really 
a form of knowledge but a rejection of it. He admonishes Kierkegaard for 
not recognizing the full meaning of the Fall, but this is not because he, 
Shestov, has access to knowledge himself about it, but because he sees 
all of man's folly as bound up with knowledge. Earlier it was asked if 
Shestov was himself participating in knowledge with his defence of the 
Fall, but his "assertions" are really all attempts to dethrone knowledge. 
His very embrace of the Absurd indicates his refusal to acknowledge the 
authority of reason.
It may not seem relevant, in exploring Shestov's concept of the 
religious individual, to determ ine whether or not he declared any 
concrete beliefs in his writings, but his whole rejection of knowledge is 
central to his attitude to life. When Shestov quotes the beginning of 
Psalm 130, "Out of the depths have I cried unto thee, O Lord", which he 
often does, he is insisting that to cry from the depths man must renounce 
all that he claims to know. Shestov's individual does not explain, he 
suffers. The two, he says, are mutually incompatible.
IX
Jerusalem
Although he was born a Jew, Shestov's attitude towards Christianity 
figures into his notion of the individual. Although he was greatly 
influenced by K ierkegaard, Luther, Pascal, Tertu llian , all of them  
Christians, he never labels himself one. Sergey Bulgakov says that
1 0 6
Shestov seemed to consider Jesus the most perfect of men, rather than 
God incarnate,91 and Berdyaev thought that Shestov was mainly concerned 
with proving the omnipotence of God, believing that Christianity was 
mainly an opium of the people which contained reason and morality.92 
Certainly Shestov didn't accept Christianity as w holeheartedly as 
Bulgakov and Berdyaev. (Incidentally, Shestov is critical of Bulgakov's 
end Berdyaev's own interpretations of Christianity; he is critical of
Bulgakov for preaching the word of Christ in the same tone as he preached 
that of Marx, and critical of Berdyaev for seeming to shift so suddenly 
from Marxism to Christianity.)93
It is not surprising that Shestov rejects Christianity as a doctrine. He 
em braces the Christian whose fierce independence from everyday  
Christianity resembles that of Nietzsche's, the god-destroyer. This is
why he is drawn to Kierkegaard, and he is much influenced by one 
particular passage of his:
My severity is not of my own making. If I knew a milder 
word, I would gladly comfort and encourage man. And yet!
It may be that the sufferer needs something else:
suffering that is crueler still.My friend, it is Christianity, the
doctrine which is offered to us under the name of gentle
consolation.94
Severe, cruel, sufferer; these are the words of Nietzsche, yet here they 
are applied to Christianity. For Kierkegaard Jesus is crucial to his life, 
and it is the severity, he feels, which pulls him to Jesus Christ. But for 
Shestov the severity itself is sufficient; when he does mention Christ, it 
is usually to show how reason or necessity has transformed him into a 
powerless being .95 in one curious way, Shestov's Christ is similar to
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Solovyov's; he is vital to their thought, but strangely absent from their 
works.
One would expect Shestov to be more enthusiastic about Jesus' task on 
earth - he who comes not to destroy but to fulfill the law - because 
Shestov Is willing to grant that the law (philosophy) has its place, but 
only on a lower level than the spirit. Jesus should be the primary hero of 
Shestov's, he who overthrows the traders' tables in the temple, who
places man before the Sabbath, but Shestov is strangely reticent about 
the man Jesus; he has no more interest for Shestov, and less even, than do 
Abraham, Job, Kierkegaard, Luther, Nietzsche, who all went beyond the 
ethical. Christ fits into this category, but he doesn't stand out from the 
rest. Rather, his role is, like the others, to make life more severe, not 
more comforting. Shestov is not really a Christian, but then, unlike
Solovyov, he never claims to be.
Shestov's "severity" lies at the heart of his beliefs. But if his thought 
were to be transferred from the purely personal to the social or political 
spheres, his "severity" could be subject to the kind of gross 
misinterpretation that Nietzsche was given by the Nazis. Shestov was 
not bloodthirsty or violently revolutionary in his political outlook; in fact 
he was just the opposite. But it is regrettable that this fierce
individualist was silent in his writings on the individual in society, since 
his existence was so threatened in the Russia that Shestov lived in. 
Indeed, Shestov at times even seems to scorn social conscience; he is 
always taking jabs at Socrates, for instance, and he calls it "vaudeville" 
when Turgenev, in his essay entitled "The Execution of Tropmann", 
declares his repugnance to capital punishment.®® Shestov often behaves 
as if society is meaningless, not worth mentioning, and yet he himself 
was forced to abandon his own society in Russia when revolution
threatened.
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This type of inwardness on the part of Shestov was not always seen as 
healthy, even by religious writers who defended internal, spiritual life. 
Semyon Frank, for instance, says that "any seclusion and internal 
concentration on oneself, and indifference to one's society, leads to 
sterilization and a weakening of one's spiritual life."®7 Shestov 
undoubtedly cut himself off from any real debate concerning his society; 
he may have had a profound belief in the individual, but unlike Frank and 
Berdyaev he does little to defend him as a member of society.
Shestov never ceases to insist on the groundless. Taken to its extreme, 
the term may mean internal anarchy, which he, especially in his early 
days, approves of, but it can also mean a lack of any direction. If a man's 
personal life is truly chaotic, then there must be no place to search for 
God, or to reject him, there must be no hope for any kind of orientation. 
One would be hard pressed to find anything that Shestov affirms. But he 
has a definite orientation, which is fully developed only later in his 
thought; "We must search for God." Whether this be in the Underground or 
in the Absurd, in hopelessness or in faith, Shestov never alters his basic
direction. It would seem that if he were truly groundless, or direction­
less, there would be no hope of getting him to agree with anything. But 
we are able apprehend the direction he moves in.
One of his most frequent statements is, "The beginning of philosophy is 
not wonder, as the Greeks taught, but despair."®® Shestov has no hero, 
from Job to Kierkegaard, who does not despair. Indeed, it is in despair 
that these figures find the deepest meaning of their lives. Shestov takes 
from the Bible, as he takes from various thinkers, the images and
expressions of suffering, struggle, severity, despair. But the Bible does 
not consist only of such types of expression, and Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard 
and Nietzsche do not express only such states. In the thinkers that
Shestov most admired one can also find profound expression of joy, grace,
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spiritual peace. But Shestov wants to have nothing to do with these  
aspects of man, and in this respect he could be accused of partially 
misunderstanding his heroes. (It was felt by one critic that he had 
extravagantly misunderstood Kierkegaard's understanding of the ethical, 
a category which Kierkegaard was not nearly so contemptuous of as was 
Shestov.)®® Shestov condemns constantly the pretensions of "Athens", not 
because it w onders, but because it explains  the wonder. In his essay on 
Solovyov, Shestov repeatedly says that revelation and not knowledge is 
m an’s guide.i®® He affirms Abraham 's faith, and Peter Dam ian’s 
omnipotent God, but even in the light of revelation, faith and an 
omnipotent God, he sticks to his despair. Shestov railed against what he 
thought were false hopes; idealism, morality, necessity, reason, logic. 
What he eventually replaced them with was faith, a faith which had room 
only for revelation and despair. Berdyaev says; "For Shestov, faith is the 
end of human tragedy, the end of struggle, the end to sufferings, the 
beginning of unlimited possibility and a heavenly life,"i ®1 but Shestov 
never really abandons the struggle; faith for him seem s to demand  
severity and suffering, not an end to them. What has to be said about 
such despair is that it was the most profound expression of man's soul 
that Shestov found, and for this reason he never forsook it.
This is one form of orientation; another is the unrelenting antagonism  
with which he responds to knowledge. He dedicated most of his 
intellectual life to the battle against this. Knowledge, according to him, 
is the greatest calamity that has befallen the earth. No other problem so 
burdens him; he is not interested at all in any of the Seven Sins; the 
social problems which surrounded him are given no attention in his 
writings. Constantly he returns to the problem of knowledge; in his 
essay on the Russian philosopher Fyodorov he says; "Fyodorov was 
com pletely penetrated by a belief in the all-conquering power of
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knowledge and r e a s o n . " 1 ® 2 ;  in  his essay on Martin Buber he says that he 
cannot find the answer to a certain question in his writings: ..."the
question of the role of knowledge...""*®3. Such examples could be cited 
from almost every essay Shestov ever wrote. He is concerned exclusively 
with man's pretension to knowledge (and morality), and the ways it can 
be resisted. Both Zenkovsky and Berdyaev believe this to be because 
Shestov continued to discover knowledge within himself. This may be 
true, because he returns to the problem in a way that no other thinker has 
done. His position is unassailable since one cannot reason with the 
Absurd, but one can question whether this dilemma deserves exclusive 
attention. Philosophy, or knowledge, does not have to involve abstraction 
and the removing of oneself, and a rejection of knowledge may not mean 
an acceptance of inward struggle.
We can see how rotten Shestov considered the apple of knowledge to be. 
So misguided did he think any attempt to understand the world was that 
he showed little mercy toward any philosopher or moralist. Socrates was 
willing to die rather than give in to his Athenian accusers (Kierkegaard, 
incidentally, considered Socrates to be the greatest man to appear on 
earth before the arrival of Christ); Spinoza rejected his religion, even 
rejected a life as a professor, in order to seek the truth in his own, 
lonely way; Tolstoy turned from the Church and even from his own family, 
in order to respond to his conscience, but Shestov does not spare them. 
From one side it is curious that he is so critical of these men, since each 
rejected easy ways out of his own personal situation, and sought truth 
where it was most difficult. He himself is well aware of this (witness 
his respect for Husserl). But on the other side, for Shestov the only 
question which really mattered was whether or not they searched for 
knowledge in the world. This is not to say he was contemptuous of these 
thinkers, because he did respect the high calibre of their intelligence (his
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passionate struggle against them testifies to that), but be it the 
"comfortable" philosophers such as Hegel or Kant, or the courageous ones 
like Socrates, they all tended with Shestov to be condem ned as 
knowledge-seekers. If we accept this sharp division between knowledge 
and faith, than Shestov's attacks make sense. But if there is not such a 
clear distinction between the two (as Berdyaev thought), then Shestov 
will seem unduly harsh on the likes of Tolstoy and others. Berdyaev, for 
example, is similar to Shestov in that they both placed the Individual at 
the centre of their thought, but because Berdyaev, according to Shestov, 
was a know ledge-seeker, Shestov refuses to acknow ledge the  
similarities between the two.
It is worthwhile, in trying to understand Shestov, to mention another
thinker whose ideas were very close to Shestov's but who expressed
himself positively, rather than critically. Miguel de Unam uno, the
Spanish philosopher, was born and died at almost exactly the same times 
as Shestov (the Spaniard lived from 1864-1936, Shestov from 1866- 
1938). In his book The Tragic Sense of Life, Unamuno repeats the same 
arguments as Shestov: that rational philosophy, in the ideas of Spinoza,
Kant and others, only distanced man from God. He even calls Spinoza an 
a t h e i s t , 1 ®4 which is largely what Shestov himself said. He quotes
Tertullian, Pascal and Kierkegaard in praise of the Absurd, and in his
most Shestovian sentence, he says: "What I wish to establish is that
uncertainty, doubt, perpetual wrestling with the mystery of our final 
destiny, mental despair, and the lack of any solid and stable dogmatic 
foundation, may be the basis of an e t h i c . " " * Neither thinker refers to the
other in his writings; it is not likely that they met, although Unamuno did
ad m ire  Shestov."*®® But the similarity in much of their thought is
striking, the main difference being that while Shestov's efforts go mainly 
toward hacking away at the monolith of knowledge, Unamuno tries to
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erect a structure in which a man of faith can live. Unamuno ends his book 
with the words, "And may God deny you peace, but give you glory!" This is 
a sentiment that Shestov fights for in many of his writings.
Inward struggle meant everything to Shestov. He preached  
groundlessness, and he was orientated away from knowledge and toward 
despair, that is, towards the individual. Shestov may have been tempted 
by rationalism, but he never gave way to it. Nietzsche's godlessness, 
Dostoevsky's Underground, Abraham's faith, Kierkegaard's Absurd - each 
of these examples involves a supreme struggle and supreme isolation, and 
Shestov responded to each with fervour. His development was unusual, 
because it didn't change his thought, but deepened it; he went from 
hopelessness to faith without ever abandoning the solitary person. He 
never tries to console man, rather, he embraces those thinkers who 
reject any panacea and accept internal struggle and isolation. His 
individual could be described in the way that Zenkovsky describes  
Shestov: "He sacrificed everything, turning his back on what were to him
the most fundamental and precious gifts of culture, in order to 'find
God'".io7
Shestov in this present thesis represents religious individualism at its 
fiercest and most isolated, and this is clearly at odds with Solovyov, who 
was no advocate of isolation. We might put it in a simple form by saying 
that Solovyov argued for religious principles throughout his mature life - 
however these principles altered - and Shestov argued for the individual 
throughout his life - however much he shifted his focus. But Solovyov's 
Godmanhood in particular does indicate a role for the individual, and 
Shestov's individual does eventually become a knight of faith. W e shall 
see in our discussion of Frank and Berdyaev how both of these positions 
are advanced.
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Chapter Four
Semyon Frank 
I
Lev Shestov and Semyon Frank were near contemporaries. They 
were both Jewish, religious, both members of the Russian 
intelligentsia at the turn of this century, and both were one-time 
Marxists who had left the movement in disillusionment. They were 
raised on the same ideas, and yet each developed in his own way; 
while Shestov seeks out his own radical interpretation of the 
individual, Frank, we shall see, is a student of the religious 
movement that traced its roots back to the Slavophiles. His beliefs 
centre upon idealism and traditional Christianity, and he was much 
less interested in Nietzscheanism, ’cruel Christianity', or any other 
type of ind iv idualism  which in formed Shestov 's thought. 
Nonetheless, the individual does have a part to play in his religious 
system.
Of all Russians, the thinker whom Frank bears the closest 
resemblance to is Vladimir Solovyov. Although Frank claims that 
this is partly accidental, he nevertheless declares his affinity with 
the older philosopher. Solovyov was, as described earlier, primarily 
interested in all-unity, and Frank is no different in this respect. 
But while Solovyov's concept of this issued in part from 
Godmanhood, but also from notions like Sophia and ecclesiastically- 
related forces (Russian Orthodoxy, Catholicism, the combination of 
the two), Frank's was rooted in an idealism which went back to Plato 
and in a universal Christian belief which did not involve specific 
church movements (even though he was a Russian Orthodox). On the 
whole, Frank is less of a prophet and more of an analyst than is
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Solovyov, even though both of them held out great hopes for the 
spiritual future of mankind.
If we admit from the first that there are strong similarities 
between the beliefs of these two thinkers, then we can also suspect 
that Frank, in formulating his concept of the individual, will 
encounter obstacles similar to Solovyov. Zenkovsky calls Frank's 
philosophy "the most significant and profound system in the history 
of Russian philosophy"'*, which may in one sense give us cause for 
some concern, as systems of thought often tend towards diminishing 
the responsibility of the individual. Whether or not the barriers are 
insurmountable remains to be seen, but we can from the start locate 
the sphere in which Frank assigned the most meaning to man, and 
this sphere is in the ideal. Frank, it must be said, replaces the term 
"ideal" with many terms of his own, such as "reality", the "light in 
darkness", "living knowledge" and even "Christianity". But regardless 
of the language employed, his system focusses on the ideal, and he 
insists that this and no other place is where the individual's 
significance lies.
In addition to examining Frank’s philosophical and religious views, 
it is important to look at his social and political ideas. Frank had 
the distinction of becoming an exile twice, first when he was 
thrown out of Communist Russia, and later when he was thrown out 
of Nazi Germany. As early as 1909 he foresaw the crisis that 
Bolshevism would create, and throughout his life he argued for 
political solutions which insisted on granting to each citizen of any 
oppressed country the freedom of personality. Because Frank, unlike 
Shestov, is not merely concerned with the isolated individual, but 
with persons in the community, his views on society and political 
trends fit into his whole philosophical outlook.
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Semyon Ludvigovich Frank was born in Moscow in 1877. He was 
raised in at least some of the traditions of Judaism: his grandfather
taught him Hebrew and took him to the synagogue, where he received 
the first of his religious i m p r e s s i o n s . 2 But his Jewish roots never 
took hold; as a young man he drifted into socialist circles, and for a 
time this replaced any religious activity. He said later of his 
socialist youth: "The influence on me of these ideas was not great,"®
but he was sufficiently involved with the movement to be expelled 
from his university for two years because of his supposedly 
subversive activities.
Yet however interested he may have been in social problems, the 
atmosphere in socialist-Marxist circles began to stifle him, and he 
started to search for other means of expression. The opportunity 
arose upon reading Nietzsche. "From that moment I felt the reality 
of the spirit, the reality of depth in my own soul - and without any 
special decision my internal fate was defined."4 It is curious that a 
study of Nietzsche would lead to the formation of a philosophical 
system, but in him Frank seemed to discover an internal life, one 
which he would eventually develop in his own way. (Although the 
German thinker was an initial guide for Frank into the world of 
spirit, he would later be highly critical of Nietzsche's form of 
ind iv idualism .)
As his religious and philosophical beliefs developed, he formed a 
friendship with Peter Struve, a fellow socialist who helped him to 
turn away from what he saw as destructive, nihilistic aspects of the 
revolutionary movement in Russia. In 1912 Frank became a Christian 
and joined the Russian Orthodox Church, and in 1915 his first work 
appeared, a master's thesis entitled "The Object of Knowledge". Over 
the next few years he held chairs of philosophy at the universities in
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Saratov and Moscow and published his doctoral thesis, "The Soul of 
Man". But in 1922 he was forced to leave Russia in the general 
deportation of dissident intellectuals. He lived in Berlin for 15 
years, but with the arrival of the Nazis he lost any hope of earning a 
living, and eventually emigrated to France. During the war he was 
separated from his children, who were in England, and he was in 
perpetual danger, but nevertheless noted in his journal, "In the most 
terrible war, in the chaos and inhumanity which now rule in the 
world, he will be victorious who in the last analysis will be the 
first to forgive. This means - God will be victorious."® After the 
war Frank moved to London with his family, and there he died in 
1950.
Although he lived through enormous upheaval and destruction in 
Europe, and although he was highly interested in social questions, 
after his early days Frank was not a political activist, unlike his 
friend Struve. In this way he is something like Shestov, who as we 
have seen evinced precious little interest in politics, even though 
Frank did respond to political crisis when it arose. Ejected from 
Russia and Germany, he had not been a revolutionary; in fact the 
various personal impressions of him depict a calm, inwardly- 
orientated man. But it is apparent that the reason he would have 
been so unacceptable a citizen in a Communist or a Nazi state is that 
his teachings declare the primacy of a religious spirit, which cannot 
be made subservient to any external authority. In his writings the 
idea of spirit remains consistent throughout (even though the terms 
used to describe spirit change), and it is this idea, the primacy of 
the world of spirit, which will lead us to a definition of his 
religious individualism.
Let us explore his rationalism first, by looking at the different
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ways that he defines knowledge.
11
Idealism
Since Shestov argued so passionately against knowledge, it 
behoves us to examine the emphasis that Frank accorded to it (if 
only for Shestov's sake!). What, first of all, does Frank mean by 
knowledge? Georgy Florovsky claims that indeed Frank regarded 
abstract and traditional theology with distrust;® he makes no 
serious effort to "know" God in terms of God's characteristics, or in 
terms of features which could describe him. Simply put, Frank 
distinguishes three kinds of knowledge in the world: empirical,
rational and intuitive.7 in the empirical world we know all that is 
forced upon us from without.® This "without" includes the world at 
large, but also includes the mind when it is invaded by mood, 
impression, etc. He says, "That which is not sensuously given as a 
part of the spatial part of the world, that which we can neither see 
nor hear nor touch, and which we call 'mental', is given no less 
directly and objectively than events of the material w o r l d . T h i s  
means that even part of man's mental life belongs to the world "out 
there". Thus, an individual is not simply a discrete, isolated unit in 
the world, but at least on one important plane he is part of the 
world, with thought and impression happening to him, rather than he 
actively creating them. The second type of knowledge is that which 
is concerned with conceptual knowledge. More accurately, it 
concerns the Platonic notion of Ideas. As Frank says, "The sphere of 
'thought' or 'spirit' to which the 'world of ideas' or super-temporal 
being belongs is not a psychological process with all that is 
inevitably 'subjective' in it: it is the universal element of thought
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or ideality as such, free from all s u b j e c t i v i t y . ®  (Is this 
Solovyov's Sophia, garbed in less mystical clothing?) The third type 
of knowledge is the one which our discussion of Frank revolves 
around, and it is what he calls 'living knowledge'. It is, he says, a
kind of knowledge which merges with our very life."’
Living knowledge takes place in the ideal world. "Ideal being is a 
kind of reality different from concretely existing things localized in 
space and time, and has the form of super-spatial and super­
temporal unity . . . . " ^ 2  For Frank, the only way to escape from the
possible delusions and varied interpretations of subjectivity, and 
acknowledge this ideal world, is through knowledge. Even belief in 
God must be knowledge of God, so as to avoid taking belief on trust, 
or hearsay, or authority. "Faith in its primary essence is not blind 
confidence, but immediate certainty, direct and immediate insight
into the truth of that which is bel i eved. ® In order for Frank to 
claim that there is an ideal world, he feels the need to insist that 
we come to be acquainted with it through 'living' knowledge. Such a 
defence is perhaps a reaction against the nihilists who claim that 
faith in God is nothing more than "pie in the sky", and against the 
authoritarians of the Church who themselves can, he believes, 
violate a true Christian world.
Why, if Frank claims to be a Christian, does he insist on the 
importance of knowledge when, according to Christ, this is not
required of man? One response to this question is that Frank, in his 
belief that living knowledge is accessible to all men, does not put 
the same emphasis on subjectivity that Shestov places on it.
Rather, he requires something which he claims transcends the
subject's own moods, that is, he requires a living knowledge of a 
transcendent world.
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So Frank, as we can see, bases his "higher world" not on 
groundlessness, as does Shestov, but on certainty, or knowledge. But 
what does he mean by a higher world? It is important to understand 
that Frank's comprehensive system evolved from Platonism: his 
Christian-based all-unity has less to do with Christ than it does
with Platonism. We can get a glimpse of the Platonic notion of Idea
in Socrates' words in the Phaedo :
Nothing makes a thing beautiful but the presence and 
participation of beauty in whatever way or manner obtained; 
for as to the manner I am uncertain, but I stoutly contend 
that by beauty all beautiful things become beautiful."14
Thus an invisible sphere of the world is posited. It was this type of
sphere that Frank called the "real" one, in contradistinction to the
purely empirical world. But Frank was less in tune with Plato's
thought than he was with another Idealist, Plotinus. (He often says 
that Plotinus and Nicholas of Cusa were his greatest teachers.) 
Plotinus in part taught that there is a non-material aspect of the 
world, and claimed that it was united by the One. Everything derived 
from the One: the intellect and the soul included. In fact the One
transcends all things yet is present in them as well.
For since the nature of the One is generative of all things it 
is not any one of them. It is not therefore some thing or 
qualified or quantitative or intellect or soul: it is not in
movement or at rest, not in place not in time, but 'itself by
itself of single form...' ®
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Frank took his own conceptions of Platonism from this idea of a 
presence which was both transcendent and immanent, but at the 
same time all-uniting. He claims that reality is unlimited, infinite; 
it is impossible to describe it because that would then limit it. 
"Reality as having everything within itself can be defined only as 
'this and the other.' "1 ® Since we cannot define it, it would seem 
that we cannot know it, either. But Frank gets around this obstacle 
by alluding to Nicholas of Cusa's formula of docta ignorantia - wise 
i g n o r a n c e . 17 Reality is super-logical, but can be intellectually 
attained through concepts which suggest what it is, while remaining 
in its essence known only through ignorance. Such ignorance calls to 
mind the Absurd, which Shestov valued so highly in Kierkegaard, but 
by its very claim to be grounded in knowledge it diverges from the 
Absurd, and remains a kind of certainty albeit through ignorance.
In Reality and Man, Frank refers to Plotinus' metaphor of man being 
a leaf on a tree - he is united to other men organically, through the 
branches and the tree trunk.1® The tree itself, Frank suggests, is 
greater than all of the leaves but includes them within it. In 
affirming Plotinus' image, he is going much farther than simply 
saying that each of us has a sense of humanity. He first of all wants 
to divorce the body from the soul; while the body exists in time and 
space, the "inner life" can fly to the past or the future, visit distant 
places, etc. There are no grounds, he claims, for localizing the inner 
life, and he is critical of thinkers like Heidegger who try to keep the 
soul within the boundaries of the body, and of Liebnitz, whose 
monadology splits up reality into a multiplicity of independent 
units, having no relation one to the other.19 Once he establishes the 
infinitude of the soul, he makes the leap of uniting one soul to all 
souls (or to the One Soul). "The essential meaning of this
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transcendence is that I cannot have 'my own being' except as a part 
of being in general, which transcends mine."20 Here Frank's all-unity 
reveals itself in its starkest terms; one might interpret it by saying 
that we don't really exist as individuals, but are swallowed up by 
the behemoth which Frank calls reality. We remember that Shestov 
inveighed against trying to unite Athens and Jerusalem, and here 
Frank seems to be doing just that. His ideal world is also a 
Christian one.
Al l - Un i t y
All-unity is the starting point of Frank's system. He says, 
"Nothing exists or is conceivable in the world that could exist in
itself. Being is an all-unity, in which everything particular exists 
and is conceivable only in its relation to something else ."21 Even the 
concept of God, claims Frank, is not an exception to this rule, since 
as the Creator of this world he in inconceivable apart from his
creation. We can imagine how strongly Shestov would have reacted 
against such a claim. However this all-unity is not something which 
can be apprehended rationally; as Frank says, it must be bound 
together by a metalogical form .22 This form leads us into the realm 
of the unfathomable, of living knowledge, of reality.
Of course Frank intends this reality to be emancipatory and not 
oppressive. It helps to keep in mind Solovyov's idea that evil
consists in a breaking up of the whole into separate units; man 
isolated in the empirical world of fact has no meaning, while if he is 
united by the tree of real life he acquires his true significance. 
Although Frank does not provide a thorough explanation for evil, his 
own system is as condemnatory of this type of isolation as is
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Solovyov's. (Indeed Zenkovsky claims that Frank's philosophy is a 
Sophiological one, even if Frank does not use the term.)23
Frank's analysis of what he sees as the flaws of individualism 
goes back to the classical and early-Christian epochs. He is critical, 
for example, of Pelagianism, the Christian sect which declared that 
man's will is his own and that by himself he can attain salvation. 
Consistent Pelagianism, Frank declared, was fatal, because by 
basing existence on one's own will, man is led to a destruction of his 
spiritual b e i n g . 24 in the same way he is critical of Feuerbach, and a 
disciple of Feuerbach's, Stirner, who taught that man's true essence 
is to be found only in the inmost depths of his personal spirit, 
detached and isolated from the w o r ld .25 But he was most critical of 
Nietzsche, who had once opened up for Frank the world of the spirit. 
Frank doesn't deny, even later, the power of Nietzsche’s thought, but 
claims that in glorifying man over God, man is actually destroyed. 
He says, "Nietzsche's dream of the man-god leads to the sinking of 
the spiritual human personality in the animal m a n . "26 Frank's 
system can only work if there is a general spirit; Nietzsche's denial 
of this, and of a transcendent God, is incompatible with a reality 
which unites rather than separates.
In acknowledging Frank's emphasis on all-unity, it is possible to 
see why religious individualism was of secondary interest to him. 
While he admired Kierkegaard, and Pascal before him, he was deeply 
critical of the modern existentialism practiced by Sartre among 
others, which believed in what he called "sorrowful unbe l ie f" .27 Like 
Solovyov, Frank's thought was imbued with the notion of all-unity; 
those who attempted to isolate (Feuerbach, Stirner, Sartre, 
Nietzsche) were denying the spirit which united all human beings.
In his article on Frank's doctoral dissertation, "The Theory of
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Knowledge", Berdyaev raises the problem of the static nature of 
Frank’s Idealism. Berdyaev is writing from a Christian standpoint, 
and he claims that Christianity is dynamic (as it moves from unity 
to plurality and movement), while Platonism, (the world of eternal 
ideas and the forms of being), is a motionless world. Frank himself 
was a Christian, but he aligns himself more with "reality" (his 
version of Platonism) than with Berdyaev's persona lis t ic  
Christianity. Berdyaev says, "Absolute, divine being is revealed to 
Frank not as a creative essence...not as a drama of dynamic pluralism 
in unity, but above all as all-unity, which goes beyond any plurality 
and beyond any movement."28 Berdyaev claims that with Frank man 
merges with the absolute, and he accuses him of giving no sense of 
dynamism to man, to his knowledge or to his creative activity.2® 
This merging of man with the absolute, which Frank seems to argue 
for, raises the question of whether man as an individual can have any 
meaning, or is just a drop in the vast sea of "reality".
However Frank is far from being stranded with concepts which 
bear no relation to man as an individual. Since Berdyaev accuses 
Frank of robbing man of the possibility of being dynamic, it is 
necessary to examine how this seemingly faceless "reality" is 
concerned with the individual's personal life. The primary point that 
can be made about Frank's definition of reality is that not only is it 
accessible to man, but man is the agent through which it manifests 
itself. This may seem self-evident, but the whole purpose of Frank's 
system is not merely to explain the world, but to assign man 
meaning in it. As has been said, Frank distinguishes between the 
natural world, which is all that animals have, and the real world, but 
both take place in man. "Conscious and de libe ra te  
cognition...presupposes a subject-object relation which already is
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‘above’ nature."®® Thus reality in its most basic state is simply one 
aspect of man's dual nature; with this definition there is almost a 
quantitative rather than a qualitative distinction between the
"natural" and the "real" worlds. But once this world of reality has
been established, then Frank can inject it with meaning. It is 
through reality that man encounters beauty, his own personality and
that of others, and, ultimately, God.
IV
Living Knowledge 
Earlier we saw how Frank distinguished between three types of 
knowledge, the third of which he called "living knowledge", that 
which each man encounters personally. It is through this living 
knowledge that Frank approaches the relationship between man and 
reality. He says, "That which we experience as life reveals itself to 
us - to our thought, which is inseparably present in the life."® i 
Frank insists that what we know we know through our life- 
experience, but he is equally insistent that this knowledge, if it is 
true living knowledge, is not only a part of our subjective being, but 
belongs to the universal, i.e. belongs to reality.
One example of living knowledge which bears witness to the world 
of reality is in the categorical imperative, formulated by Kant. 
Indeed Frank calls Kant's discovery "an immortal achievement".®2 
This imperative is the ough t  which is commanded to the subject, 
and unconditionally, without reference to relative values. Frank 
says, "The command issues not from some external authority or 
power, for, in virtue of my freedom, I could refuse to fulfill such a 
command; no...I know from my inner experience that I ought to do
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something...."®® In this sense reality appears as an authority, but is 
not external to the subject; in Frank's terms this means that reality 
is asserting itself. But because a command issues from reality it 
would be a mistake, he claims, to define it in authoritative terms. 
The moral command is not given from an impersonal, autocratic god; 
rather, it issues from reality, and acts on man. Reality is not above, 
but inside, man.
In the same way as Frank sees the categorical imperative being 
expressed through reality, he sees beauty, or the aesthetic 
experience, revealing itself. This conception is close to Plato's 
notion of the Idea in beauty. Beauty exists against the background of 
the objective world; behind daubs of paint or a mountain formation 
stand out facts of a different order, which attract us in our inmost 
heart. Frank says: "The beautiful is that which by means of
sensuous experience gives us a direct perception of reality."®^ 
Again, it is wrong to claim that aesthetic experience is merely a 
transferral of our own subjective feeling to the object. Beauty 
affects us as subjects, but takes root in the being-in-general of 
reality. "In aesthetic experience there is clearly revealed to us a 
certain reality which lies as it were behind the sense data, and is, 
as we say, 'expressed' by them."®® Thus both with beauty and the 
categorical imperative there is reality expressing itself in man, but 
with no external authority or internal sub jective delusion 
influencing it. (It is worth mentioning that one of Frank's main 
attacks on the intelligentsia in Russia was based on his assertion 
that it had no appreciation of the aesthetic - or the cultural in 
general - but was grounded firmly in the utilitarian.)
Another aspect of the way in which living knowledge manifests 
itself is through communion. According to Frank, human beings often
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view other human beings as objects: passersby on the street,
enemies on the battlefield, etc. The people we encounter in this way 
are part of the empirical world of fact for us, wholly included in the 
world of objects.®® But one person can also recognize another, not in 
the objective sense, but rather through a spiritual meeting. Such 
meeting is not preceded by thought or judgement: "It takes place
directly and without any mediation, in and through mutual 
contact."®7
Such meeting is accessible only through docta ignorantia\^^ it does 
not lend itself to rational explanation, but is no less real to man for 
that. Frank uses the image of two pairs of eyes meeting; one reality 
sends a message to another and the other answers, although the 
answer is essentially hidden. But because the meeting does, and can 
only, take place between human beings, the encounter is not like two 
billiard balls colliding, i.e. two objects in the empirical world 
coming into contact, but is a meeting in the spiritual world, between 
two members of that world.®®
This communion also takes place between God and man. Frank's 
"proofs" of God's existence never involve purely rational constructs, 
but are always predicated on man’s personal knowledge of him. Man 
comes to know God through standing in relation to him - through 
living knowledge. "We learn of the existence of God because in the 
depths of our heart we 'hear his voice' and have the unutterable 
experience which we call communion with God."4® In this sense of 
knowledge Frank is not so far from Shestov as might originally have 
seemed. Shestov mocked the rational, cold, even mathematical ways 
in which philosophers 'found' God, and he appealed to the power of 
revelation. Frank is intent on using knowledge not as proof of God's 
existence, but as a means to draw him towards communion, beauty,
1 3 0
his own conscience. Living knowledge is personal, leading us to the 
individual when it seemed that all-unity might be incapable of doing 
so, just as Solovyov's notions of Godmanhood and of divine 
relationship pointed the individual in a more personal direction than 
his world spirit (Sophia) might have allowed for.
V
Evil
Frank's system insists that man can perceive the meaning of life 
only through living knowledge. God and a spiritual world are not 
delusions or fantasies, precisely because they are knowable and 
reveal themselves to man in his depths. Each man has spiritual 
depth in him, according to Frank, but what of the darker side of this 
depth, of the forces which do not only open up a world of spiritual 
harmony but lead to evil? We pointed out earlier in our chapter on 
Solovyov that the Russian philosopher seemed to lack the 
psychological insight into man's darker side, which Dostoevsky's 
Underground man revealed, and it would seem that Frank too, in 
positing his ideal world, places too little emphasis on man as a 
creature who does not strive only for the good, but may even will 
destruction. He certainly does not deny the presence of evil in the 
world, nor does he claim, as does Solovyov, that the world's 
historical movement is heading towards a realization of the Kingdom 
of God on earth. In his book Light in the Darkness he says, "The 
forces of evil and destruction triumph over the forces of good...the 
blind game of irrational forces - either in personal or historical life 
- places a barrier before all the hopes of the human heart."4i
A survivor of two world wars, Frank saw evil in its starkest 
terms. However, this does not keep him from saying: "To explain
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evil would be to give a 'reason' for it and thus to justify it",42 a n d  
elsewhere that "sin itself has no definite place within reality."^® 
Reality is all-encompassing, as Frank spends so much time 
explaining, but it is also positive, and he is unable to find a place for 
evil in his system. This comes under attack from various quarters. 
Berdyaev, for instance, suggests that all-unity has to include even 
evil, and he accuses Frank of excluding it from his system and 
tending towards an optimistic evaluation of reality where duty and 
value c o i n c i d e .44 We can see that in Frank's system the categorical 
imperative tells man what he ought to do, but there is no demonic 
force leading man towards what he ought not to do.
S. A. Levitsky, in his essay on the ethics of Frank, also claims that 
there is no place for evil in Frank's all-unity. According to Levitsky, 
Frank did not claim that God was indifferent to good and evil, but 
that evil remained irrational, and he said of Frank that evil was, for 
him, "a dark mystery."45 it is significant that Frank not only does 
not give characteristic features to evil, but he also avoids giving 
characteristic features to God. Florovsky said that Frank distrusted 
abstract theology and so would never give God any limiting 
description. (Witness his adherence to docta ignorantia ; even the 
title of one of his books, about God and reality, is T h e
Unfathomable.) In much the same way he refuses to be drawn into an
explanation of evil. The difference, though, between God and evil in 
this sense, is that while God is within reality, evil is not.
Zenkovsky's reaction to Frank's attitude to evil is much the same 
as Berdyaev's and Levitsky's. He realizes that a system of all-unity 
simply cannot find a place for evil within it without falling into
contradictions. Frank says, "Evil is generated in an unutterable
abyss which lies, as it were, on the threshold between God and 'not-
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God'."46 But the abyss is not a part of Frank's system and so is not a 
real explanation; as Zenkovsky says, one can give an explanation of 
evil without justifying it,47 but this Frank refuses to do.
It is clear that Frank knew deeply the presence of evil in the 
world, but was unable either to fit it into his system or to explain it 
in any way. This appears to be a serious defect; no individual can 
have a whole personality without coming to terms with good a n d  
evil. However, Frank does respond in some way to the problem of 
evil, in his discussion on sin and freedom in Reality and Man. 
Essentially, Frank does not see freedom originating in free will, i.e. 
in freedom of choice. The traditional attitude toward free will is 
that man can choose for himself either good or evil. But, says Frank, 
"Deliberate willing of evil testifies to the absence of freedom as 
se lf-de te rm ina tion ...."48 So, if a man chooses the path of evil, one 
cannot say of him that he has acted in freedom. This is because, 
according to Frank, sin is a wrong state of the soul. Sin is being cut 
off from reality, the source of all man's meaning, and being thrown 
to the forces of the empirical world:
Groundless self-will is not freedom, but slavery...when the 
depth that unites the soul with the primary source of reality 
is locked out, chaotic forces of reality burst the dam 
of personality, invade it, and man becomes the plaything of 
his lusts and passions - the slave of demonic forces."4®
Original sin, says Frank, is self-assertion. Shestov, too, believed 
this, but he meant by self-assertion mainly the search for 
knowledge in the world, while Frank meant by self-assertion 
basically what Solovyov had meant, that is, cutting oneself off
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through one's will.
Freedom takes place in reality. For man to "choose" sin is not 
freedom, but for him to be aware of himself in his inmost depths 
(i.e. to embrace reality) is freedom. Reality, claims Frank, is 
emancipatory, since it is the world of the spirit, and thus man is 
free only  when he chooses reality. In a certain sense, Frank admits 
that freedom is not f r e e . T h i s  definition of both evil and freedom 
justifies the criticism of Berdyaev, Zenkovsky and Levitsky. Frank 
is willing to include freedom within his system of reality; he 
recognizes that man at his most spiritual is also at his most free. 
But sin is still kept out of the system; it takes place in chaos, the 
abyss, in isolation from reality, but he still does not tell us how sin 
arose, as Shestov did so frequently. He suggests that it lies in self- 
assertion (like the Solovyovian equating of evil and isolation), but he 
essentially passes up any real opportunity to understand it. "If 
sin...followed with necessity from the structure of reality...it would 
be 'normal' and ontologically justified, and therefore would no longer 
be sin."51
VI
Personality
Before examining more closely Frank's religious and particularly 
Christian views, one final aspect of the system of reality remains to 
be looked at, and that is the emphasis he places on personality. It is 
sometimes easy to lose sight of the role of man amidst the 
distinctions between different types of knowledge and the difficult 
concept of all-unity, which seems both to embrace all life and yet to 
exclude sin and evil. But Frank continually makes the point that 
intellectual apprehension alone does not capture the essence of life.
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Rather, the system itself is meaningless without man's "living" 
participation in it. Plotinus' metaphor which has already been cited, 
of man being a leaf on the tree of reality, finds meaning not in the 
leaf's external movement, which sways only with the wind, but in 
internal dynamism as the sap nourishes all the l e a v e s . Yet Frank's 
point is that man's personality , while united with other 
personalit ies, is nevertheless formed not through enforced 
communion, or through utilitarianism, but through life itself. He 
says: "The more individually and spiritually deep a person is (e.g. a
man of genius), the more 'universally human' he is, the more he 
expresses that which is the common property and the common 
essence of a l l . "5® Thus man, in experiencing the depths of his being, 
belongs to the sphere of reality (even if he is isolated physically), 
much more so than persons who are gathered together but who view 
each other superficially, or as objects.
It was suggested in the chapter on Solovyov that his system was 
founded upon relationships; between human beings, between man and 
God. This is essentially true of Frank's system also. Man's 
personality is realised not in the chaos of the empirical world, but 
in connection with other types of life in the world of reality. 
Berdyaev's claim that Frank's system is static rather than dynamic 
does have some justification, because Frank's emphasis is on 
establishing the all-unity of reality; however, from his attitudes 
towards aesthetics, communion and freedom, it is clear that he saw 
man's personality flowering in these spheres rather than being 
hindered by them.
One of Frank's criticisms of Greek philosophers is that the idea of 
man as a p e rs o n a l i ty  remained foreign to them. It was only on 
Christian soil, he claims, that the idea of personality was grasped
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with all its depth and significance. Having established the 
fundamental principles of Frank's system, let us now look at how 
Christianity fits into it, and see whether the two can co-exist.
Vl l
C h r is t ia n ity
In 1912, Frank became a member of the Russian Orthodox Church, 
and he remained in the Church for the rest of his life. Thus his 
whole philosophy was worked out when he was a Christian; while 
this may seem irrelevant, it helps us to understand the dual nature 
of his thought. Frank was born a Jew, and after an unreligious period 
he converted to Orthodoxy; that is to say, he was a Christian by 
choice, rather than simply growing up in the Church. His writings 
indicate a deep belief both in God and in Jesus Christ, and yet he was 
not de terred by this f rom his ph iloso ph ica lly -an a ly t ica l 
investigations; he was quite happy to unite Jerusalem and Athens. 
As was suggested above, though, Frank saw Christianity not in
purely rationalistic terms but as the manifestation of personality in 
the world. It follows to see how he arrived at this belief, and to 
decide if he is successful in combining philosophy and religion in 
such a way that man's own individuality is not swallowed up (as 
Shestov would have argued).
As a 14-year old boy, Semyon Frank was asked by his grandfather
on his death bed to continue studying Hebrew and the Jewish
religion. About this request Frank later wrote: "In a literal sense 1 
did not fulfill it. However, 1 think that in a general sense, having 
turned towards Christianity and having lost my link with Judaism, I 
still remained loyal to those religious foundations which he had laid 
for m e . " ® 4  As an adult Frank may have felt that he carried forward
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the general spirit of his grandfather’s faith, but in any real sense he 
rejected the beliefs of his forefathers. The main problem for Frank 
with Judaism consisted in the relationship between man and God. In 
its most primitive form Judaism regards God as having unlimited, 
overwhelming power. Although in Genesis we read that God made 
man in his own image and likeness, Frank claims that this "likeness" 
was seen in the Old Testament as being only partially true.®® There 
was no immanent connection between God and man, he says, and the 
difference between the Creator and the life he created was just as
great as the difference between a potter and a pot. The functions of
the Old Testament, according to Frank, were to provide objective 
moral principles of goodness and justice, and to act as a master who 
loves his slaves or as the father of his people.®® Frank does allow 
that by the time of the Old Testament prophets, such as Isaiah, this 
concept is modified, and religious consciousness becomes more 
enlightened. But his basic attitude to the early Jews is that they 
were a people who had a transcendent and all-powerful God, but 
were unable to have a personal, inner relationship with him. 
(Shestov, we can imagine, would have pointed to Job and Abraham as
contradictions of this claim. The central figure in Frank's Old
Testament, however, would have been Moses, he who received the 
laws. Frank in fact did consider the Book of Job to be a work of 
genius,®7 but he saw the Old Testament in its general direction as 
remaining separated from the immanence of God in man.)
Frank thinks the early Jews were right when, in exalting God, they 
saw themselves as impotent creatures, aware of the instability of 
their own existence; but he is critical of any faith which puts up 
barriers between man and God, and he sees this attitude carrying 
over into Christianity. While he is critical of Christian sects which
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asserts the ultimate rights of man (Pelagianism), he is no less 
critical of the opposite tendency, namely the debasing of man 
himself for the glory of God. He sees this trend in St. Augustine 
who, he says, in combatting the waywardness of Pelagianism went 
too far and made man seem worthless. Frank considers St. Augustine 
highly significant in the development of Christianity, but sees this 
tendency to separate man and God as an unhealthy one. In The  
Confessions we read of St. Augustine's humility: "Truly, Lord, you
are eternal, and you are not angry with us forever, for you take pity 
on us who are dust and ashes. You looked me over and were pleased 
to shape what was misshapen in me."®® Humility is one thing, Frank 
thinks, but rendering man so insignificant does not draw man close 
to God. Yet while Augustine might have gone too far in his humility, 
at least according to Frank, he felt that other schools of Christian 
thought manifested the idea of God's transcendence in ways not 
sufficiently humble. Calvinism, for instance, tended to sever the 
intimate bond between man and God, and Jesuitism demanded slavish 
obedience to God. The result of glorifying God at the expense of man 
is that, as Frank says, "every religious tendency to affirm God's 
absolute transcendence over and heterogeneity to man conceals a 
danger to human personality - the danger of inhumanity."®® Thus we 
can see that, if taken too far, the idea of God's transcendence 
expressed in the Old Testament and in traditional Christian theology 
may do harm to man's own personality. In addition it is contrary to 
Frank's "living knowledge", which is central to his system of reality: 
if one is to know  God, then God cannot be so far away that God is 
unreachable. There is no essential difference between this attitude 
to God and Solovyov's: it is the relationship between man and God
that matters, the in ternal closeness between the two.
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Frank, unconvinced by a transcendent God, also rejected the gods
of the ancient Greeks, with whom it was impossible to have an inner
relationship. As he points out, in Greek legends and poetry gods and 
men are often very similar, and heroes are sometimes thought of as 
demi-gods; in short, he says, gods and men were conceived
somewhat like a higher and lower race of the same genus.®® This 
solves the problem of God's too powerful transcendence, but it 
creates another problem: the relationship between the gods and men.
While a great sense of humanism developed during this time, 
nevertheless there was not an inner bond between the two races; 
sometimes certain gods disappeared to make way for other ones, 
sometimes distrust and estrangement towards the gods were
mingled with reverence and respect. "People prayed, so to speak, on 
the off-chance - believing that, on the whole, gods were more likely 
to harm than to help. Religion implied the belief that the tragedies, 
sorrows and wrongs of human life also came from the gods."®i
Whether or not it is true that Judaism, various Christian sects and
Greek mythology gave little scope for developing an inner bond with
God or gods cannot be decided here. Certainly the rule did not 
always hold. What can be established, though, is that Frank did not 
think that either of these cultures satisfied man’s yearning for that 
essential inner bond with God.
It was in Christianity, then, as expressed in its most personal 
form, that he found a religion which could establish a direct,
immediate relationship between man and God. If we recall Frank's
theory of knowledge, in which the most meaningful form is "living" 
knowledge, we can see how this corresponds with Frank’s belief that 
Christianity is a "living" religion. In his book written during World 
War 11, God With Us , he writes:
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Faith in the existence of a personal God - God as a loving 
Father - acquires a living significance and vital importance 
only in so far as it makes the 'Kingdom of God' real to us or 
to put it another way, only as the source of the divine power 
of love, illumining and transfiguring our earthly existence.®2
In this passage can be seen Frank's idea of reality: of another world 
beyond our own, but one which touches us directly.
Frank saw reality not as oppressive, but as emancipatory; through 
this sphere man is freed, and thus he comes into his personality, 
which he discovers through aesthetics, communion, faith. Keeping in 
mind the relationship between reality and personality, one can 
affirm that the re lig ion  of personality for him was Christianity. It 
is through this religion, he says, that man finds himself; it goes 
beyond the laws and reaches into man's very being. It is so personal, 
he says, that it rejoices more over the repentance of one sinner than 
it does over ninety nine righteous men.®® Thus man's highest 
achievement is not through external approval, or through being 
judged worthy by other men, but is related solely to his own, 
personal relationship with God, made possible by Christianity. (It 
should always be remembered with Frank that the personal implies
the universal, and vice versa. Religious individualism never becomes
so narrow for him that it cannot be applied to the world of spirit, in
which all men can take part. Frank and Solovyov continually go back
and forth between the universal and the individual, not juxtaposing 
the two notions as contradictory, but showing how each fulfills the 
other.)
In large part, thinks Frank, Christianity is the only possible
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religion because of Christ's own example through his life and 
teachings. The example of Mohammed falls short of Christ's, 
because he was known to have married a rich widow and dealt in 
political and business affairs; Moses commanded the Jews to kill 
heathens and foreigners; but it was Christ, he says, whose example 
approached nearest to God with his self-sacrificing l o v e .® 4  is this 
only another way for Frank to say that Christ approached, more than 
any other prophet, Frank's own conception of reality? In his essay 
entitled "The Religious Metaphysics of S. L. Frank", Florovsky claims 
that Frank in his writings about Christ hardly ever says a word about 
the Cross.®® This is not an accidental omission; Christianity is 
above all for Frank "the Good News"; it is not the "cruel Christianity" 
which we see Shestov embracing, but rather the source of all man's 
peace, hope, etc., i.e. the source of reality.
If Christianity is to bring peace and bliss, it must first be 
something stable and firm, not the apotheosis of groundlessness. 
Indeed, God is stability.®® (Frank's claim for the existence of God in 
man's life rests on the need that man has to find shelter and perfect 
contentment amidst the calamities of the world. This, he says, is 
the only real way that God can have meaning in our lives, for a God 
viewed as omnipotent or as Creator and Ruler concerns God only in 
the empirical world.)®7 God is the bearer of Truth, and Truth is not 
tragedy or suffering, but love. God is "a father who loves his 
children and cares for their welfare, who joyfully and lovingly 
welcomes all alike, who makes the sun to shine on the evil and on 
the good and sends rain on the just and on the unjust."®® Reading 
these words we can see why Florovsky is critical of Frank for never 
mentioning the Cross. Frank was not, however, simply a good- 
natured optimist who was convinced that God shined his love
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everywhere in the world; rather, he assigned to God these qualities 
only in the sphere of the non-empirical, in Christianity, or reality. 
In Light in the Darkness he says, "The spirit of hatred, cynicism, 
contempt for human life are much more widely dispersed than any 
o th e r d o c t r in e . "6® These two statements of his are not 
contradictory, because Frank never says that God's love is dominant 
in the empirical world, but it is apparent that he interprets the 
closeness of God as that which brings stability, g ro u n d fu ln e ss  (in 
contradistinction to Shestov's groundlessness) and joy.
The fact that Frank calls God a loving father who shelters us 
seems to turn man into a pitiful and weak character who can do 
little more than flee to God's side in times of chaos. But Frank does 
say that man must himself undergo sacrifice in order to meet God. 
Man does not create a world that is all sweetness and light; he is a 
being who sins (or who is guilty), but who is capable of judging 
himself and redeems his sin through self-sacrifice. However, Frank 
sees this "way of the Cross" as essentially a means to an end; man 
suffers to expiate his sin, and he may indeed endure great pain in 
doing so, but "the hopeless torments of remorse become, as it were, 
dissolved in the balm of the forgiving and reconciling divine love; 
they gradually change into serene gentle sadness and heartfelt 
blessed joy."70 Frank concentrates on the meekness of Christ and 
thus the need for man to be meek; he defines meekness as a loving 
attitude to others and an absence of se lf-assertion.71 It is 
noteworthy that in his own life he was often described as meek and 
inwardly calm. It is impossible for him, as a faithful Christian, to 
avoid the importance of suffering and self-sacrifice, but unlike 
Shestov, the sense of suffering is not the final meaning, but that 
which paves the way for blessed joy. Hardship must be endured, but
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the reward for hardship is "the treasure in heaven"; goodness, Truth, 
peace.
For Frank "light" in the darkness is obviously desirable, but this 
exposes him to the same accusation as Solovyov was exposed to, 
namely that of being of strong believer but a bad psychologist. Is 
light in the darkness what every sane person desires? Not according 
to Shestov: "In our youth, when we had just entered life...light
brought us such happiness and joy...Now we search for the words and 
sounds to sing the praises of our recent enemy. Night, dark, dense, 
impenetrable, night which is filled with terrors, does it not seem to 
you at times to be infinitely excellent?"72 Shestov was not a 
nihilist or a cynic, he too searched for God, but he recognized better 
than Frank that man is capable of tormenting himself in such a way 
that he rejects even goodness, Truth and peace.
It is not necessary to offer biblical exegesis or to select random 
quotes from the Gospels to suggest that Jesus' teachings did not 
lead only towards blessed peace and joy. If we can question Frank's 
interpretation of the Gospels, can we also suggest that in his 
interpretation Frank had more in mind than just the Gospels? That 
is, did he view Jesus' teachings from the standpoint of his own 
philosophical constructs?
Before answering this question, one more point needs to be made 
about Frank's notion of Christianity. In his discussion of religion in 
God With Us he often includes within Christianity those persons who 
can not be literally called Christians, but whose life-example 
nonetheless allows them to be called such. One of the greatest 
attractions of Christianity for Frank is that it has the potential to 
be a universal religion, embracing all mankind. In other words it has 
the potential to be all-unifying. Clearly not all of mankind has
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accepted Christianity, and yet there are many outside the faith 
whose spirit, sacrifice, goodness, etc. would enable them to be 
included in an "ideal" world. On these people Frank is willing to 
confer the title "Christian": "All those who seek truth and yearn for
it seek Christ and yearn for him, for Christ is the Truth (pravda) ]  
indeed, they already have Christ in their hearts though they know it 
not."73 Thus the very definition of Christianity is widened to include 
all those who participate in a spiritual world, i.e. in reality. Frank 
makes the same mistake as Solovyov, who asserted that Jews and 
other non-Christians would be set right once they acknowledged the 
truth of the G o s p e l s . 74 Frank allows for man to be living in truth 
without being a Christian by name, but he does not allow for man to 
be living in truth without being a Christian in spirit. He says, "All
moral achievements of the human spirit are the result, conscious or 
unconscious, of the Christian fa ith ...."7® Either Frank is insisting 
that all men of moral achievement are Christians, even against their 
will, or by Christianity Frank means something which is closer to 
Platonism than to the person of Jesus himself.
VI I I
Philosophy and Christianity 
Georgy Florovsky says, "Essentially Frank issues not from the 
Gospels, but from Platonist teaching, and he apprehends the Gospels 
within the categories of Platonism; that is, he apprehends them, so 
to speak, 'selectively', paying no attention to whatever is not 
included within the peripheries of Platonism."76 It should be
emphasized that Frank's conception of reality does not mean that
man has to flee from this world into the world of spirit, as Plato
himself believed. Nevertheless, Florovsky's assertion helps to
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clarify the essence of Frank's thought: if there is a tug-of-war
between reality and Christianity in Frank, reality will be victorious 
(even if Christianity protests that they are both on the same side). 
Frank understood the uniquely personal element in Christianity, and 
this element was in accord with the personal element in his own 
"living knowledge", but based on the priority he gives to the "blessed 
joy" of Christianity over all other aspects of it, and to his 
insistence that anyone who is morally good can be called a Christian, 
he seems to incline more towards his own philosophical insights 
than towards biblical Christianity.
Frank identified Christianity as the religion of personality. 
However, by suggesting that he is closer to Platonism than 
Christianity one need not necessarily conclude that his philosophy 
is, as Berdyaev claimed, static rather than dynamic. In trying to 
discover what the role of the individual is in his philosophy we may 
be able to find a dynamism which is not always present in the 
concepts of Plato, Plotinus and other idealists.
In the chapter on Shestov it was suggested that his tyrants lived 
in his i n t e r n a l  world, and were associated primarily with 
knowledge. If we apply the same criteria for tyranny to a thinker 
like Frank, then he is bound to be guilty of setting up all-powerful 
rulers who immobilize the individual (such as morality). But while 
Shestov makes very little distinction between types of knowledge, 
Frank insists that one type, "living knowledge", affects man directly 
and personally. Shestov would likely have agreed with Frank's 
statement that "The living fullness of the religious is...always 
richer, more concrete and more varied than its expression in a 
dogma, i.e. in a judgment abstracted from our e x p e r i e n c e . "77 Frank 
was also concerned with freeing man from the chains of abstract
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thought, but he did so through knowledge rather than apart from it.
Through "living knowledge" man comes into contact with reality. 
This is the focal point of Frank's religious individualism In 
associating it with the One of Plotinus' system, or the general 
beliefs of Platonism, Frank's system may seem constricting to the 
spirit. But he labours to show that man is actually freed in this 
sphere, he is freed to create, to love, to worship God, to be his most 
individual self while also participating most fully in all-unity. In 
fact it is only because of this all-unity that man has a spiritual life: 
"Moral strength is drawn not from inevitably unre liab le  
illusions...but from the truly inexhaustable eternal source of world- 
transcending Truth.""^ 8 Thus man is both bound by Truth and freed by 
it. Such a claim does not satisfy Shestov's definition of freedom; he 
would say that Frank loses the individual as he tries to force him to 
obey truth and morality. But it certainly satisfies Solovyov's 
criteria; man is freed not by self-assertion but by moral union on a 
higher, ideal plane. Man does  have his own, unique personality, 
which is revealed through 'reality'.
However, it cannot be denied that on purely individualistic terms, 
Frank's system fails to take into account a couple of factors. The 
first is the problem of evil, which he recognizes as an overwhelming 
presence in the world, but which he is unable to explain, doing little 
more than excluding it from his system. Frank's real interest is in a 
spiritual world which is immanent in and transcendent over man, and 
which determines his "real" nature, but he gives scant attention to 
the source of evil which so rules man. The second problem concerns 
his attitude to Christianity. He declares its great power to heal the 
spirit and lead man to a state of blessedness, but it takes little 
notice of its "cruel" aspect, its element of suffering which is not
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simply the means to the end. He tends to make this mistake because, 
as Florovsky points out, his Christianity is rooted more in Plato than 
in Jesus. But this does not detract from the primary quality he 
gleaned  from C hristianity, nam ely that it is a religion of 
personality. (Or in other words, the religion of "living knowledge"; 
and as personality is intimately connected by Frank with reality, we 
can see how the philosophical and religious terms become almost 
in terchangeable.)
To clarify Frank's concept of the individual, it is worthwhile to 
look at his social and political views; he lived in Russia during great 
change, and his analysis of the political situation at the start of the 
twentieth century proved to be a prophetic one. But in summing up 
his systematic thought, one can say that the Individual became real 
for Frank only in the realm of the religious spirit. By making each 
personal spirit a part of all-unity, he sometimes seem s to be 
limiting man. But it is important to remember that, in describing 
the sphere of the spirit, he does not define it; that is to say, reality 
in Its essence always remains "The Unfathomable". W e can only 
know it through docta ignorantia. By approaching the unfathomable, 
man is released from the chaos of the world-as-fact, and given 
stability in the world of reality.
IX
S ocialism
Frank's political writings do not constitute a part of his 
systematic thought. Unlike Solovyov, whose kingdom of Heaven  
could not be achieved, it sometimes seems, without the union of the 
Churches and the submission of political powers to the regeneration 
of mankind, Frank's philosophy does not require any historical
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developments or ecclesiastical treaties. And yet it is worthwhile to 
examine his political views in light of his religious individualism, 
because Frank (among others) believed that both religion and the 
individual were greatly threatened by the advance of the 
revolutionary movement, and he set himself the task, through 
various essays, of trying to expose the movement as one inimical to 
the world of religious spirit.
In discussing Frank's attitude towards the Russian intelligentsia 
of his time it is useful to mention Frank's friend, Peter Struve. Both 
of these men were involved with the Marxist-socialist movement in 
the 1890's, but it was largely as a result of Struve that Frank parted 
with the movement and began to develop his highly critical views of 
Russian revolutionary philosophy. Peter Struve was a 28-year old 
Marxist when he met the 21-year old Frank, also a Marxist, in 
Moscow. They soon formed a fast friendship, and Frank thought of 
the older Struve as his mentor. Essentially, Struve was 
disillusioned with the intelligentsia, which he saw as being capable 
only of criticizing authority, awakening the mood of opposition, and 
secretly preparing for revolution, while putting nothing positive in 
its place.79 But according to Frank, Struve introduced a completely 
different type of thought, one which was responsible and creative, 
and he says; "While still a radical and even a socialist, he was not 
an insurgent, but saw himself as an activist for the State, as if only 
temporarily and accidentally finding himself in o p p o s i t i o n . i n  
terms of their philosophical outlooks, Frank claimed that they had 
little in common, but as we can see from Frank's political writings, 
Struve's influence on his social and political views was great.
In 1909 a group of writers, including Berdyaev, Struve and Frank, 
published a series of essays which they entitled Vekhi (Signposts).
1 4 8
The collection aroused great interest as well as animosity in the 
intelligentsia, for it was an attack on their whole philosophy. 
Frank's essay was called "The Ethics of Nihilism", and it was his 
first major statement against the revolutionary movement. Like 
almost all intellectuals of his time, Frank did not support the fast- 
fading tsarist regime, but he was strongly opposed to the 
revolutionary philosophy which wanted to overthrow the regime. 
Frank characterizes this philosophy as mainly one of nihilism, and he 
questions how it is that a movement which wants to overturn the 
existing order can flourish while having no real values. He first of 
all accuses the socialists of lacking any cultural or religious 
interests other than those which will promote their cause:
Culture, as it is usually understood with us,
is wholly stamped with the mark of utilitarianism.
When they speak of culture here, they usually have
in mind railways, plumbing and carriageways...^i
If we keep in mind his later writings on the value of aesthetics and 
on the whole system of reality, it becomes apparent how flawed he 
would have found the nihilists' position. Basically they were 
denying any sort of spiritual world, at best turning cultural values 
into utilitarian ones, while Frank's whole philosophical argument 
rested on the primacy of this spiritual world. He writes, "If there 
are no generally-binding values and everything is relative and 
conditional, everything is defined by human needs, by the human 
thirst for happiness and pleasure, then in the name of what must I 
reject my own subjective d e m a n d s ? " ^ ^  We can glean the spirit of 
all-unity in this statement, even though it does not necessarily rest
1 49
on his philosophical premise. As he explains, the revolutionaries 
claimed to be interested above all in "the people", but what that 
translated into was a suspicion of anyone who loves truth or beauty 
for itself, since that must indicate an indifference to the good of 
the people.
Frank termed the seemingly positive philosophy of the nihilists 
"moralism". This meant for Frank a system of values that, in 
occupying the first rank in their thought and possessing unlimited 
power over their consciousness, was deprived of belief in any 
absolute v a l u e . T h i s  moralism devoted itself to the good of the 
people, yet paradoxically such love for mankind gave rise to 
destructive tendencies. Likewise, the intelligentsia approved of the 
idea of distributed wealth, but hated wealth itself; it loved the 
people as a mass but nevertheless hatred played a vital role in its 
a tt itudes.84 in other words, moralism did not offer any constructive 
or creative solution, but rather was the pretense of the nihilist to 
some positive outlook.
Of course, Shestov too was disdainful of moralism, but we must 
remember that for him this disdain was central to his philosophical 
outlook, while Frank's system of all-unity was most mindful of the 
moral element; it was nihilistic moralism that Frank derided. But 
Frank and Shestov would have been in agreement that the 
revolutionary philosophy was deprived of any religious spirit, a 
spirit which was vital to both thinkers.
Many of Frank's arguments against nihilism might well have been 
offered by supporters of the old regime, but his attack on the 
intelligentsia was also an attack on its hypocrisy toward love. He 
admired the intellectual who, inspired by his ideals, went "to the 
people", to help the peasant directly. (This movement was called
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Populism; the intellectuals went to village communes hoping to help 
educate the peasants. Unfortunately, they were often met with 
hostility and distrust by the peasants, and the movement failed.) As 
Frank says, such an idealist may have been naive or mistaken 
theoretically and even morally, but he nevertheless had a true "love 
for his n e i g h b o u r . "85 But the nihilist "loved from afar", he preached 
the "religion of the absolute realization of the people’s h a p p i n e s s , "86 
without involving himself in any of the dirty work of real love. In a 
paradoxical sense, the nihilist was an idealist, but one whose ideals 
were empty of content. Frank, himself an idealist, recognized this, 
and hoped to replace nihilistic tendencies with "a creative, religious 
h u m a n i s m . "87 W e've seen that Frank's religious ideas call for an 
intimate relationship between man and God, and to love from afar, as 
he accused the nihilists of doing, was to remove love.
W hen the Russian revolution did take place, the nihilistic 
character of the intelligentsia was in the ascendant, and Frank, who 
lived through the early years of the new Soviet Union, was able to 
analyze the dynamics of the revolution from up close. He was in no 
doubt that the overthrow of the governm ent was in itself an 
expression of nihilism, and that it was deprived of any kind of 
spiritual substance.88 The reason for this is examined by Frank In an 
essay he wrote in 1924 called "The Religious-Historical Sense of the 
Russian Revolution", in which he surveys the revolutionary and 
em ancipatory movements of Europe over the last four centuries. 
Russia, as Frank explains, was more or less excluded from the 
Renaissance and the Reformation in Europe. These developments 
were worked out over many years in the West, and although both 
m ovem ents transform ed the political situation in Europe, the  
process did not have a genuinely destructive character; in the end,
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says Frank, Europe was saved from anarchy by her conservatism and 
by her belief in sacred pr inc ip les .89 But Russia had had neither a 
Renaissaince nor a Reformation; the great spiritual energy of the 
Russian Orthodox Church was concerned only with the depths of the 
spirit, but did not enter into the world. Therefore, he says, in 
Russia, "the gap between the religious spirit and the vital empirical 
sphere of law and morals, which in the West was so firmly 
cultivated by a theocratic upbringing, remained undeveloped and 
u n f o r t i f i e d . The revolutionary movement in Russia started too 
late, he thinks, in the sense that it did not participate in the 
richness of the Renaissance or Reformation, but was faced with the 
latest trend in European thought - namely socialism (which Frank 
calls "both the completion and the overthrow of liberal 
democracy").91
It is not too difficult to imagine what conclusions Frank draws 
from the Russian revolution: the nihilist, completely divorced from 
any spiritual movement, and thus unable to express himself 
religiously, aesthetically, etc., (as was the case in post-medieval 
Europe), did not, once he took over in Russia, replace old spiritual 
values with new ones, but instead replaced the old values with 
destructive tendencies. "The fundamental mistake of recent times 
consists in the fact that freedom was identified with r e b e l l i o n . " 9 2  
Again, we can see how this is connected with Frank's philosophy: 
without a spiritual basis the world becomes chaotic, and in the case 
of the Russian revolution precisely this has happened, he thinks. The 
empirical and the spiritual worlds remained isolated one from the 
other, and thus nihilism plunged Russia into chaos.
Although Frank was an idealist, his political outlook, perhaps 
largely based on the Russian experience, was critical of idealism.
1 52
We have discussed how Frank saw reality as being accessible 
through the depths of man's personality; the ideal world according to 
him was found internally, not externally. Thus, he thought, any 
attempt to "force" the ideal in the external world could only result 
in a negation of the original utopian hopes. This was true not only of 
Russia's revolution, but of France's as well, as Robespierre's Terror 
had proved. No criminal, he said, has created as much evil in the 
world, has spilled as much human blood, as those people who wanted 
to be the saviours of the w o r l d . 9 3  From Russian socialism he points 
to the example of Belinsky, the nineteenth century critic, who in his 
passion for creating a society based on equality had said, "If, for the 
affirmation of socialism, a thousand heads are needed - I demand a 
thousand h e a d s . " 9 4  Solovyov and Frank are in agreement that if the 
world is to be redeemed, it cannot be through a policy of violence, 
however great the need may be to put an end to injustice. It is 
worth noting that Frank himself was not politically active after his 
early years; in his efforts to find an ideal world he looked inward, 
and thus his political attitudes are determined by what external 
factors will make the "real" world most accessible. He is certain 
that political idealism is not the answer, saying, "One can most 
accurately define the heresy of utopianism as a distortion of the 
Christian idea of the salvation of the world, through a plan to 
realize this salvation by the strong arm of the l a w . " 9 5  He was much 
more realistic than Solovyov, who believed in the power of the 
spiritual world to transform even political life. Frank too hoped 
that the world could be spiritualized, but knew well the force of 
political power which was at complete odds with the spiritual 
regeneration of the world.
So having attacked the nihilism of the Russian intelligentsia and
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the utopianism of idealists everywhere, what political solution does 
Frank believe to be most akin to his world of reality? First of all, 
he believed that the answer to this lies "beyond the right and the 
left"; that is, in decrying socialism he is not therefore an ardent 
supporter of capitalism and market forces. Rather, as he points out, 
both right and left have forfeited their claim to be on the side of 
emancipation. Before the Russian revolution the right was 
considered to be the reactionary party, the oppressors of the people, 
of free thought and free speech, while the left was the liberating 
force “ the left stood for good. But once the left acquired power in 
Russia, the same terms once applied to the right were now attached 
to the left, while the right took on the burden of emancipation. In a 
word, the terms became meaningless: "Both of these concepts are
void of internal unity, and cannot be defined on the basis of any one 
idea which is central for both of them."96
Frank's system of reality relies on a level of spirituality which 
involves all men, since it is based on all-unity rather than on 
isolation, and thus the structure itself of community becomes vital. 
Because of this, Frank is not dismissive of politics even if its 
relation to reality is an indirect one, but he rejects the supposedly 
humane way of the left, namely socialism, claiming that it has 
abused power as badly as the right has. Flaving thrown out the terms 
"left" and "right", he declares that the real political division lies 
between, on the one side - "unlimited state despotism, the rule of 
the lower classes over the cultured classes; and on the other side - 
the right of traditionalism and religious beliefs, the principal of law 
and freedom of the personality, the defense of the interests of 
culture and education..."97
Such a statement, however, could be used as little more than the
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so-called "right's" claim to rule, and Frank is well aware of this. By 
an unfortunate fate Frank, a socialist in his early days, became a 
victim of the socialists, but because of this he did not adopt a belief 
in tsarism; rather, his solution to political misrule (found in his 
essay "The Problem of Christian Socialism") avoids either pure 
conservatism or liberalism, and instead is drawn mainly from his 
philosophical and religious beliefs.
X
Christian Socialism 
Political solutions, thinks Frank, are to be found in Christianity, 
but he is the first to admit that traditional Christianity's response 
to the poor and needy has often been neglectful at best. In fact 
historically, he claims, it has been up to non-believers to care for 
the n e e d y , 9 8  But the Christian is in the best position to show love 
for his neighbour, since this is one of Christ's commandments, and 
thus he must consider himself a Christian socialist, but only insofar 
as such socialism cares for those in need. The Christian will, Frank 
says, "strive toward the virtue of true, active love - he will to the 
best of his ability attempt to realize the commandment of Christ's - 
to share the last thing he has with a brother in n e e d . " 9 9  Of course, 
this would be a naive view if Frank thought that a lot of love would 
turn everyone into Christian socialists; he recognizes that law must 
be established to defend those who need protection. But he rejects 
the socialism which is cut off from any spiritual base, and declares 
that real Christian socialism can flourish only in "bourgeois" 
countries such as France and England, where there is freedom of 
relig ion.
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The socialist structure which deprives the person free reign 
over his property and which realizes social justice 
through compulsion, similarly deprives the Christian of 
the opportunity freely to express the precept of Christian 
lo ve .100
Thus, paradoxically, socialism is in the worst position to promote 
social responsibility, since its methods involve compulsion rather 
than love. The Christian, Frank believes, is in a unique position to 
create a socialism based on love, because he has access to a
"Heavenly kingdom", rather than the purely earthly kingdom of the 
m a te ria lis ts .
As suggested earlier, Frank's conception of Christianity is
essentially little more than a restatem ent of his conception of 
reality. Therefore he is not trying to prove, for instance, that only 
the Church can guide political life, or that a community must be a 
Christian one to realize justice within it. If we equate Christianity 
with other terms of Frank's - "reality", "light in the darkness", etc., 
and if all these terms are meant in part to represent a sphere in 
which brotherly love is most evident, then Frank is basically arguing 
for the political conditions which make such a sphere most
accessible. "Bourgeois" democracy, then, is best not because it 
gives free reign to market forces, but because through it man has 
the freedom to help his brother. Ultimately, he is arguing for a 
political system which allows man "to believe In the all-conquering 
strength of sacrificial brotherly love for people, and the preaching
of this love."101
Having equated Christianity with other spheres of the ideal world 
in Frank's thought, and having suggested that his idea of a Christian
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society has more to do with common humanity than with Church 
hierarchy, we can nonetheless say that Frank was a firm supporter 
of the Church as an institution. This support in part stems from his 
belief that man needs to be guided spiritually, and that dogma (the 
Greek root of which, he points, out means "teaching") and even 
symbols such as icons and incense can further one's ability to 
w o r s h i p . 102 But along with the particular customs of the Church, 
used not as tired ritual but as symbols having spiritual significance, 
Frank values the community which the Church offers. "Knowledge is 
essentially communal [soborno] and can be possessed by mankind
only as a collective whole, and every individual participates in this
co llec tive  k n o w l e d g e . "1 os por Frank the Church provides the 
opportunity to manifest reality, and thus he supports not just 
Christian humaneness, but active Christian worship.
Frank addresses the role of the individual in society in his essay, 
"Personal Life and the Socialist Structure". Any plan for society 
aims to make the person within the society happy, Frank believes, 
but for this to be possible man must be free. A society which is 
mainly concerned with external "togetherness", by means in part of 
technical achievements, and is willing to sacrifice the happiness 
and lives of today's generation so that tomorrow's can have 
happiness, is denying the internal life which each person must have. 
He says that "any true belief - not only religious belief in the 
specific sense of the word, but moral belief, as a source of 
communal activity - is possible only on the basis of a free, personal, 
spiritual life..."i 04 From this we can see that Frank wants the
individual to be a truly free creature in society. There are
s im ila r it ies  between Frank's own social beliefs and the 
utilitarianism of Mill or the Social Contract of Rousseau, both of
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which were based on moral but not religious grounds. But most 
important to remember is that Frank values the individual spirit in 
society more than he does the "group spirit" if it threatens to coerce 
the individual.
Frank does not indicate that the forces of love will eventually 
conquer all, but he does claim that there are social conditions which 
make spiritual life most accessible to man. When we looked at 
Frank's philosophical system it sometimes seem ed as if it were  
constricting rather than freeing man (especially in light of Shestov). 
But if we apply his system to the political world, then we get a 
clearer picture of the emancipating role of reality (or Christianity). 
Freedom of personality and solicitude towards one's fellow man are 
essential ingredients in Frank's system; as with Solovyov, Frank's 
spiritual world was not an abstract one, definable only in technical 
language, but was concerned with man's role in the transformation 
of this world. Frank brought Solovyov's all-unity into the twentieth 
century; this all-unity still struggled with the problem of static 
monism, and the problem of evil, but it also continued to develop the 
idea of the individual on a religious plane, finding for him ever-new  
significance in his personal and communal life.
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Chapter Five
Nikolai Berdyaev 
I
In our discussion of the religious individual up to this point we can 
identify two distinct directions; the first, developed by Solovyov and 
Frank, tries to find a meaningful role for the individual in a system which 
has spiritual all-unity at its root; the second direction, Shestov's, 
regards the individual as primary, as more important than any system, 
any unity, any world-spirituality. At times it may seem that there is 
little that would reconcile these views, but in the figure of Nikolai 
Berdyaev, we find a thinker in whom the two paths seem to cross: fierce
individuality and spiritual all-unity.
Let us begin our study of Berdyaev with a quote of his which indicates 
this dual nature. "Personality is the  moral principle, and our relation to 
all other values is determined by reference to it. Hence, the idea of 
personality lies at the basis of e t h i c s . T h i s  statement of Nikolai 
Berdyaev's is central to his thought; its idea runs through almost all his 
writings, be they on faith, politics or society. Berdyaev refers to his own 
philosophy variously, as existentialistic, or personalistic, or as founded 
on the notion of freedom, but throughout his development as a thinker he 
never abandons the claim that the personality {lichnost') is at the centre 
of his thought. In our discussion of Berdyaev we shall see if this focus on 
personality is closer to the religious individualism of Solovyov and Frank, 
or of Shestov.
Based on our examination of the previous three thinkers, it should be 
clear that while Shestov derided any attempt at system-building in order 
to protect the individual, Solovyov and Frank placed the individual within 
their particular systems. A personalist philosophy such as Berdyaev's
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would seem to be at odds with systematic philosophy, and yet Berdyaev 
often seems more disposed to the ideas of the system-builder Solovyov 
than to those of the system-destroyer Shestov. Notions of the Godman 
and of spiritual togetherness {sobornosV) are close to Berdyaev as they 
were to Solovyov and Frank, and yet according to Shestov, the individual 
disappears in any attem pt to formulate "truths", such as that of a 
Godman. It should be mentioned straightaway that, unlike Shestov, 
Berdyaev accepted the legitimacy of knowledge as a means to find truth. 
In exalting the personality he did not reject all attempts to u n d e rs ta n d  
man and the world, which attempts were anathema to Shestov. (Indeed 
Berdyaev declares that the definition of knowledge provides the main 
difference between himself and Shestov.2) Berdyaev is a self-proclaimed 
champion of the personality, one might say a revolutionary fighting for 
the personality, but it cannot be said that he rejects knowledge within 
philosophy outright, as does Shestov.
The idea of the revolutionary is one which Berdyaev had an intimate 
relationship with throughout his life. As a young aristocrat in Kiev (he 
was born in 1874), he participated in student revolutionary movements; 
like Frank he was arrested for such activities and then exiled for two 
years to Vologda, where he began his writing career. But although he 
passed through a Marxist phase, as did Frank and Shestov, he claimed that 
he was not a revolutionary in the political sense, but one whose 
conception of revolution stemmed from the personality, and not from 
s o c ie ty .8 He claimed that he was not entirely certain why he became a 
Marxist; he did, however, want to be more than an abstract thinker 
feeling the demand to realize his ideas in his life - and he valued the 
Marxist criticism of capitalism .4 But he was never a loyal adherent to 
the cause; his break with the movement was not nearly so radical as 
Solovyov's adolescent conversion from socialism  to Christianity.
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Berdyaev joined in a movement which was striving for change, but said 
that he desired change that was different from that of the movement’s. 
He declared that he had a revolutionary spirit, and yet he was fiercely 
opposed to the forces which were trying to overthrow the monarchy. He 
did not welcome the Bolsheviks when they took power, and he was 
eventually exiled from his country by them. This young member of the 
aristocracy followed the "traditional" path of many young Russian 
intellectuals at the end of the century: socialistic activity, arrest and
exile .
Although he came from a wealthy background, he did not hesitate to 
join the anti-aristocratic movement. When he grew disillusioned with 
that movement he attacked it, partly in the form of essays written in 
Vekhi and Iz glubiny, both anti-revolutionary com pendia, and such 
disillusionment led to his exile from the USSR. And yet before his exile 
he was also sharply critical of the Russian Orthodox Church, and declared 
that he had no sympathy with the anti-Communist movement, claiming 
that it lived in the past and was deprived of any significance.^ In the 
philosophy of his youth he had abandoned the socialism of the 
m aterialists, being attracted to German idealism, but before long he 
advanced from this to find a more personalistic, explicitly religious 
outlook. From these facts alone one can imagine that Berdyaev was a 
revolutionary in the most personal sense, because he never remained 
content for long with one social group or one school of thought, but 
tended above all towards an individualistic perspective.
C h ris tia n ity
Unlike with Solovyov and Frank, we cannot begin by trying to understand 
any philosophical system that Berdyaev might have constructed; he
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simply did not have one. However, the prime mover of his personalist 
philosophy we can identify as Christianity. Of the four thinkers 
examined in this paper, it is Berdyaev who most often refers to Christ, 
not as a part of a world-design, but as the primary source of spirit in the
world. This is not to insist that Berdyaev was a better or more pure
Christian than the others, but as a critic of organized religion, and as a 
philosopher who did not attach Christianity to any system, his attitude to 
Jesus as an individual is central to his thought. To begin to understand 
Berdyaev's philosophy it is essential to understand his relationship with 
C h ris tian ity .
His path to religion was not, he claims, a dramatic one. There was no 
sudden conversion or transition from complete darkness to complete 
l ig h t .6 He had arrived at his Christian beliefs through the route of
idealism; his first book, Subjectivism and Individualism in Social  
Philosophy, was not so much a defence of religion as an interpretation of 
the individual. "I wanted a new world, but based not on a necessary 
social process, rather on freedom and the creative act of man."7 By the 
time this book had emerged the Marxists had begun to think of Berdyaev 
as a traitor, and he became one of the main exponents of the movement 
from Marxism to idealism. As he himself says, he was one of a new type 
of thinker in Russia (along with Semyon Frank, Sergey Bulgakov and
others), which recognized the rights of the spirit and rejected the 
anarchism and nihilism of the revolutionary thought in Russia at the 
tim e .8
Berdyaev's initial attraction to Christianity originated with the help of 
Dostoevsky. In his reading of "The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor" in The  
Brothers Karamazov, such an impression was made on his young mind 
that, he says, "when I turned to Jesus Christ for the first time I saw him 
under the appearance that he bears in the Legend."9 This story is told by
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the atheistic Ivan Karamazov; in it the Grand Inquisitor, an old cardinal 
from the medieval Church, berates Christ for being so perfect that he is 
out of the reach of the ordinary man. Christ has come down to earth to 
offer man freedom, and asks that in return man be willing to accept the 
burden of the Cross and follow him. But, says the Grand Inquisitor, 
ordinary man wants nothing less than the horrifying prospect of freedom, 
and he is glad to hand it over to an earthly authority such as the Church, 
which will guide man, forgive him, and ask in return obedience to it, to
the Church, rather than to Christ. He tells Jesus:
Instead of taking away man's freedom thou didst increase it.
Didst thou forget that man prefers peace and even death
to freedom of choice of good or evil?...And thou, instead of giving 
clear-cut rules that would have set man's conscience at rest 
once for all, thou didst put forward things that are unfamiliar, 
puzzling and uncertain.1 o
The Legend portrays a Christ who offers freedom and suffering to man, 
both of which are repulsive to the common man, the herd man, but to 
Berdyaev this vision of Jesus was immensely appealing. The Christ of the 
Legend did not promise happiness or worldly satisfaction, but only 
freedom. Berdyaev says of Dostoevsky, "No one before him so strongly 
identified the image of Christ with a freedom of spirit that only a few  
can attain."! ■> Often Berdyaev maintains that he is an aristocrat, not by 
birth (which he was in fact) but in the spiritual sense. His aristocratism 
is accessible to all, but only a few are capable of accepting the burden of 
it, just as only a few are capable of following the Christ of Dostoevsky's 
Legend.
It is typical of Berdyaev's thought that Christ's appeal should mainly
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stem from the notion of freedom, a notion we shall often return to in his 
thought. Solovyov's Christ stands at the crossroads of history, Frank's 
Christ brings peace, love, it rewards the meek; Berdyaev thinks that 
Christ brings freedom.
"In Praise of Folly", an essay by Shestov, attacks Berdyaev's views of 
this early period. Shestov criticizes his friend's efforts to find a 
definite set of beliefs, saying that over several years he had changed his 
views many times, and that he had become a Christian "even before he had 
learned how to express clearly all the words of the c r e e d . " !2 There may 
be some truth in this; it is notable that Berdyaev, the spiritual
revolutionary, became a Christian at roughly the same time as did Frank, 
Bulgakov, and other members of the movement from Marxism through 
idealism to Christianity. Also, his Christianity at first is taken more 
directly from Dostoevsky's interpretation of the Gospels than from the 
Gospels themselves.
Shestov's essay takes the form of a review of Berdyaev's collection of 
essay's entitled Sub Specie Aeternitatis, and in these essays Berdyaev 
reveals his development as a thinker. The first essay is in support of 
idealism; in the book he praises "Great Reason", truth (p ra v d a ),  and
eventually, Christianity. Shestov sees in the early Berdyaev the triumph 
of Good and of Reason, and claims that his allegiance to Dostoevsky is 
bewildering; "It in no way follows, from the fact that because
Dostoevsky under torment rejected sweetness, Berdyaev...has a right to
drink vinegar mixed with gall."!8 Shestov is harsh on Berdyaev's adoption 
of new ideas and new creeds, and wishes that his friend indulged more in 
"folly" than in "Great Reason".
However, once Berdyaev arrived at Christianity he never abandoned his 
faith, or even the original inspiration for it. At the end of his life he 
writes, "The Christ in the 'Legend of the Grand Inquisitor' entered into my
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heart, I accepted the Christ of the Legend. For me Christ was always 
connected with the freedom  of the spirit."!  ^ if Berdyaev came to 
Christianity gradually, through his belief in idealism and individual 
freedom, once he accepted this religion all his future writings, directly 
or indirectly, bear witness to his faith.
The Church in the Legend is directly opposed to Christ, and often 
Berdyaev's expositions on Christianity betray an antipathy towards 
organized religion. For him Christianity is not the idea of good for all 
men, or humanity in general, but rather it represents the victory of the 
personality. God came down to earth to share the destiny of man and to 
redeem him.
Christianity is founded not upon the abstract and impotent 
idea of the good...but upon a living Being, a Personality, and 
on man's personal relation to God and to his neighbours.
Christianity has placed man above the idea of the good and 
thereby made the greatest revolution in history - a revolution 
which the Christians had not the strength to accept in its 
fu llness.! 5
The emphasis on personality, and on revolution, is characteristic of
Berdyaev. Each man has a relationship with God that does not heed 
attempts to organize this relationship, or to subsume it under an abstract
idea of the good. The Christians who did not have the strength to realize
Christ's message (i.e. many followers of the Church) failed because they 
were not revolutionaries of the spirit, and spiritual revolution can occur 
only in each particular person, not in a group en masse.
This idea of spiritual revolution is important to Berdyaev mainly
because he sees man as a creature who is living in a fallen world, and
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who is called to overthrow it. Our world is a product of the Fall, in which 
man chose freedom but lost paradise. It is only in the fallen world that 
man has acquired knowledge. "Knowledge was born out of the dark
recesses of the irrational. Man preferred death and the bitterness of 
discrimination to the blissful and innocent life of ignorance."!® This 
world is one which leads only to death. Consciousness has been 
introduced which leads to suffering and to good and evil, neither of which 
could have existed in paradise where no such moral distinction need be 
made. Our world has given us freedom but has inevitably made sinners 
out of each of us. To combat this fallen state man has introduced laws 
and norms, systems of ethics by which he can survive.
In any talk here about the Fall, we are recalled to Shestov; his attitude 
towards it is quite different from Berdyaev's, since Shestov sees the 
desire for knowledge as the cause of original sin. However, both agree 
that man - after the Fall - relies on norm, law, regulation, that these do 
not abet spirit but dull it.
For Berdyaev the only way in which man can live meaningfully in the 
world is through the spirit, which opposes the world and thus calls man 
to revolution. He says, "The whole of our moral life consists in acquiring 
spiritual power and conquering the weakness and darkness of the natural 
life. Christianity bids us to overcome the world and not to submit to 
it ." !7 To him Christianity is revolutionary because it turns the world's 
values upside down; in this faith it is the publicans and harlots who enter 
the kingdom of God before the Pharisees, before the self-proclaimed  
righteous. In the Gospels the last are first and the first last; 
conventional defin itions of w icked and righteous are rendered  
in s ig n ific an t.
And yet, paradoxically, because Christian morality is for the strong in 
spirit, Berdyaev believes that it is an aristocratic religion, one which
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requires strength and power, and not compliance to norm and duty. It is 
ennobling, not enslaving, and therefore is a spiritual aristocracy.!® Thus, 
the revolution against the fallen world can be enacted only by the few  
who belong to the spiritual world, i.e. by those who have the strength. He 
defines this type of aristocracy as "...a  question of man's personal 
dignity, of a re a l  rather than a symbolic dignity, inseparable from the 
personality's qualities and gifts."!® Berdyaev is critical of the Church 
because he sees it as an institution which too often embraces symbolic 
rather than real dignity. Thus it is neither revolutionary nor aristocratic 
in the real sense, while the personality can be both, and at the same time. 
This individualistic interpretation of Christianity differs greatly from  
Frank's and Solovyov's perspectives, since both of them felt that the 
Church was destined to play a leading role in man's redemption. As we 
shall see, though, Berdyaev, is far from scornful of communal spirit.
However, the strength and power which Christian aristocracy possesses 
is not demonic or N ietzschean in character; rather it summons the 
Christian to a sense of guilt and humility. (Berdyaev suggests that 
Nietzsche's rebellion against Christianity was an attack not on the spirit 
of the religion but on the categorical imperatives, or norms, imposed on 
it by Kant and others.)2o According to Berdyaev, Christian strength is not 
supposed to conquer the world, but to be capable of resisting it. 
Connected with guilt and humility is suffering, which he believes to be 
the fundamental law of life. Because Christianity does not try to deny 
the reality of suffering - indeed the meaning of the Cross validates it - 
this religion becomes man's necessary guide in life.
Suffering tracks our steps, even the happiest of us. There is 
only one way open to man, the way of light and regeneration - 
to accept suffering as the cross which every one must bear
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following the Crucified...Suffering is closely connected with 
freedom. To seek a life in which there will be no more suffering 
is to seek a life in which there will be no more freedom .21
In Frank's thought we saw a tendency to equate Christianity with "a 
light in the darkness", a joyful release from the chaos of the world, but 
Berdyaev’s message is basically the opposite, that accepting Christianity 
is perhaps the heaviest burden of all, since it demands real suffering, and 
yet is a necessary burden which brings a light of its own.
Freedom, suffering, the spirit are all associated by Berdyaev with 
Christianity. In addition to this, though, Is another aspect of the religion 
which calls to mind Solovyov. This is his identification of Christianity 
with the religion of the Godman. Berdyaev is a Christian not just because 
of his belief in God, but also because of his belief in man, and he sees in
Christ one who has united the two. For Berdyaev, God is not an
omnipotent ruler with the means to crush and destroy, nor is he a static 
Being who has created the world and then watched passively as man has 
wreaked havoc on it. It is essential to Berdyaev that the destinies of man 
and God be linked. "Man is the mediator between God and himself...The 
only way to God is through man. Man carries with him the divine 
principle, the word of G od . "22 For Berdyaev the whole notion of man’s 
personality, so vital a notion to him, is connected with God. (He often
makes the distinction between individualism, which may be limited to
the natural order, one of a species standing alone for no necessarily 
moral reason, and personalism - really religious individualism, - which is 
intim ately connected with the divine. "Personality is com pletely  
different from the individual, which is a biological and sociological 
ca teg o ry ..."23) For a man to have a personality means for him to have the 
divine spark in him. "Human personality as God’s idea and God’s image is
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the centre of moral consciousness, a supreme value. It is a value not 
because it is the bearer of a universally binding moral law, as with Kant, 
but just because it is God's image and idea, the bearer of the divine 
principle in l i f e . "24  Berdyaev sees Christ as the supreme manifestation 
of human personality and the divine, and thus the notion of a Godman is 
very important to him.
From this it is apparent that his respect for Solovyov is primarily 
connected to Solovyov's conception of Godmanhood. Berdyaev saw in the 
older philosopher's thought an insistence that man participate in the 
divine; Christ himself, according to both thinkers, is at the centre of this 
idea (although, as Shestov argued, Solovyov's system was more vital to 
him than was Christ in the formulation of the idea of Godmanhood), but 
each man is called to take part in spiritual life. Berdyaev says of 
Solovyov: "He sees the essence of Christianity in the free union of two
natures in Godmanhood, divine and human. Man is the connecting link 
between the divine and the natural w o r l d . "25 Clearly this is a belief close 
to Berdyaev; man is not only a natural creature, but in his freedom he can 
also have access to a divine world. Solovyov was admired both by Frank 
and Berdyaev, because of this emphasis he placed on the internal nature 
of the God-man relationship.
As is evident, Berdyaev was a strongly believing Christian (although the 
Russian Orthodox Church was harshly critical of him.) For Berdyaev the 
interaction between man and God occurred through Christianity, but so 
too did man's freedom, personality and suffering, all of which he saw in 
the figure of Christ. From his repudiation of Marxism and his journey 
through idealism he became, and remained, a Christian, but one who was 
strongly out of favour with the official Church in Russia. (He declared 
his aversion to official Christianity by writing an essay called "The 
Extinguishers of the Spirit", directed against a Church synod. For this he
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was put on trial, and claims that, had the trial not been interrupted by 
the Revolution, he would have ended up in S i b e r i a . ) 2 6  Unlike Frank, he was 
not attracted to Orthodoxy, but rather to a personal form of Christianity. 
This religious belief, and the personal nature of it, is essential for a 
study of any other aspect of Berdyaev’s Personalism.
Anthropology
While the source of Berdyaev's inspiration seems primarily to be 
Dostoevsky-inspired Christianity, nonetheless his reflections on the 
Godman place far greater emphasis on man than pn God. That is to say, he 
was little interested in defining God's attributes apart from man, and he 
was fairly dismissive of scholastic theology which forced man, so he 
claimed, to be a static part of a divine design. He considered himself to 
an extent to be a philosophical anthropologist, whose duty it was to 
approach the problem of man. God, for Berdyaev, could not be God without 
man (and vice versa), and it is the definition of the human being which 
most interested this philosopher.
Essentially, Berdyaev was dissatisfied with the definitions of man 
which psychology, biology and sociology offered. Each, he felt, provided 
only one piece of the puzzle and man could not be fitted into just one of 
these categories. This is not to say that he saw no worth in each of these 
pieces of the jigsaw. For instance, he believed that psychology, in 
revealing a subconscious aspect to man, has had enormous value in the 
study of the human creature. He claims that thinkers like Kierkegaard, 
Dostoevsky and Nietzsche have discovered that man is a creature who 
torments himself, and who can be false not only to others but to himself 
as well, while Freud was able to see an infinitude of sinful cravings in 
m a n . 2 7  Thus, to Berdyaev, the modern-day exposure of the psyche as a
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darker aspect of man is more valid than a Christian-inspired philosophy 
such as Thomas Aquinas', in which man is basically a healthy creature 
seeking bliss. In this respect we can see that while Berdyaev was 
attracted to idealism, he was not lured by this into accepting man as an 
essentially good creature who always desires the best for himself and 
the world.
Berdyaev was much more receptive to the insights of the philosophers 
and poets than he was to the professional psychologists who claimed to 
understand man's depths. He greatly valued, for instance, the examination 
of the psyche in Dostoevsky (who begins his Notes from Underground  
with the words "I am a sick man"), because the novelist attempted to 
show that bliss was not the chief desire of all mankind. In the same 
spirit Berdyaev chooses as an epigraph for his own book, The Destiny of 
Man, a quotation from Gogol's notebooks: "It is sad not to see any good in 
goodness." Although Shestov accuses the young Berdyaev of naively 
accepting the temptations of all-conquering good, the mature Berdyaev is 
harshly critical of hedonistic and optimistic philosophies which are blind 
to man's psychological disorders and which believe in the inevitable 
triumph of good. He does not insist that man is inevitably ruled by these 
subconscious, dark forces, but neither does he allow the validity of the 
"commonplace" conception of man as essentially good. "The greatest 
moral problem is to make the 'good' fiery, creative, capable of active 
spiritual struggle and to prevent it from becoming dull, flat and 
com m onplace. The most sinister m anifestation of sm ugness is 
com placent virtue; com placent vice is morally less terrib le ."28 We 
rem em ber how hostile Shestov was to ‘the good’, believing that it 
destroyed active spiritual struggle, but while he wishes to banish ‘the 
good’, Berdyaev wishes to transform it, equating good itself with 
spiritual struggle.
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Realizing that man does indeed have this dark side is vital to an 
understanding of human nature, but the problem with seeing man only as a 
psychological creature, and trying to cure him through exclusively
psycho-analytic means, is that it limits him infinitely, and misses the
ultimate truths. Berdyaev says, "Psycho-analysis treats man's mental 
life as though the soul did not exist. It...is a psychology without a soul. 
The image of God in man is completely darkened and concealed, it is 
invisible through the darkness of the unconscious and the falsehoods of 
consciousness."29
So we can see that Berdyaev is hostile to psychology (and to sociology
and biology) if it claims the sole rights of a definition of man, and yet he
is deeply appreciative of its services in uncovering the torments and 
sicknesses in the psyche. Man is a disturbed creature but he can also 
overcome this through spiritual means. However, his deeper, darker 
aspects may never be acknowledged by him, and he may live in complete 
ignorance of his depths and heights as a human being. This gives rise to 
another definition of Berdyaev's man, which is as a creature sunk in the 
commonplace. If one thinks of Berdyaev as a spiritual aristocrat, who 
believes in the fallenness of this world and the nobleness of the kingdom 
of God, one can conclude that while he allows for a spiritual world for 
all, he sees the vast bulk of mankind firmly established in this w o rld , 
each one in the collective bearing witness to the herd man. To him this 
herd man arises in the social accumulations of falsity - in the church, the 
family, the nation, etc. - which all claim to represent the truth. He says, 
"So-called 'public opinion' is based upon conventional falsity and uses 
lies as a means to impose itself on people. Every social fashion is a 
conventional lie ."3° Each group creates its own rules, beliefs and 
fashions to preserve and organize itself, but Berdyaev conceives that as 
nothing more than building on false foundations. This can be related to
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Ivan Karam azov's legend; Christ here is a figure which represents 
freedom and suffering, but he is rejected by almost all people, who prefer
to have their rules and beliefs decided for them by "authorities". The
Grand Inquisitor says of this mass of humankind, "We shall show them 
that they are weak, that they are only pitiful children, but that childlike 
happiness is the sweetest of all. They will become timid and will look to 
us and huddle close to us in fear, as chicks to the hen."S'* The herd man 
desires nothing more than to put his fate into the hands of so-called 
"spiritual" leaders on earth, and fears nothing so much as the freedom  
which the Legend's Christ represents.
For the herd man all potential life is transformed into a mechanical, 
meaningless process, claims Berdyaev. Love, for example, simply does 
not exist for the creature who belongs to the mass. In physical terms, 
sex is either rooted in immorality, or it takes place for the sake of
procreation and the continuance of the race. In social terms, sex
produces a family which is in accord with the organization of society. 
For Berdyaev, love is the only way to introduce the personal element into 
the family or the marriage. This is very difficult for the herd man, since 
he is concerned more with the organization of the family and society than 
with spiritual questions. "But the meaning of love, its idea and principle, 
is victory over the fallen life of sex, in which personality and the spirit 
have been made subservient to the genus...Love is the reinstatement of 
the personal elem ent in sex, not natural but spiritual."32 This idea, 
incidentally, is close to Solovyov, in his "The Meaning of Love”. Again, as 
usual, Berdyaev returns to the personal element in life as a means of 
finding the spirit. Official Christianity has failed to appreciate the 
personal aspect of love. The Church is mainly concerned with families - 
procreation and the indissoluble m arriage - but he says that the 
legitimacy of love between human beings is an area which is little
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touched upon by specifica lly  C hristian w r i t e r s . 33  To him such 
theologians merely reflect mass morality.
Another manifestation of the herd man is to be found in his attitude 
towards labour. The view of labour as a curse and a struggle for daily 
bread is what, more than anything, represses the personality. Berdyaev 
was deeply critical of what he saw as the exploitation of the working 
classes - the basis for Marx's thought - but he still believed that labour 
could be carried out freely and redemptively. Respect for work, he 
declares, is of Christian origin; after all, Jesus himself was a
carpenter.34
Clearly, Berdyaev has a negative view of the man who is a part of the 
mass. He did not believe, as did Solovyov, that humanity was progressing 
toward the kingdom of God on earth. How could that be, if the herd man is 
in the ascendant? Man does not have to be an isolated creature to be 
spiritual - on the contrary, communion with other men is essential to his 
spiritual life - but, he says, when the Ego is confronted with the mass, it 
impersonates a character imposed upon it by the mass, and adopts its 
instincts and passions, however unconsciously it may do this.35 Thus no 
institution is free from the clutches of the herd, which can turn virtue, 
good, God into fashionable, popular and meaningless terms.
IV
Creativeness
So the herd controls the mass of humanity, and even those who may be 
relatively free from it are still plagued by the torments of their 
psychological constitutions; it would seem that, according to Berdyaev, 
no one is exempt from being a degraded creature. And in a sense this is 
true, because he affirms that man is fallen, and is definitely not, as 
hedonistic philosophy would have it, a healthy, happy being who attains to
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bliss. In this he Is closer to Shestov than to Solovyov and Frank. And yet, 
Berdyaev is not a pessimist or a cynic, and if he believes man to be fallen 
this does not mean that man must therefore be living in permanent 
isolation from God. We have already seen that Christianity forms the 
core of Berdyaev’s beliefs, but it is insufficient for him that men simply 
accept the creed of Christianity, or the teachings and commands of the 
Church. He sees a great truth In the participation of God and  man in 
creation, and while God is the Creator, man no less than God is called to 
create, to fulfill his end of the divine human interaction. This is man's 
greatest attribute, to be creative, and Berdyaev insists that such activity 
is possible everywhere. Creative activity can take place anywhere and at 
any time; in a man's love for a woman, in a mother's love for her child; in 
the pursuit of righteousness.3® Berdyaev's main contention is that every 
single creative activity stems solely from the individual, and is his 
greatest means of expression. "Creation is the greatest mystery of life, 
the mystery of the appearance of something new that had never existed 
before and is not deduced from, or generated by, anything."37 This 
interpretation is far from one which equates creativity solely with 
artistic or aesthetic principles; indeed to Berdyaev a book or a statue or 
a picture is a necessary cooling down from the original fire of 
inspiration. The creative act does not have to be beautiful or universal, 
as one thinks of a work of art, but it must originate in the personality, 
which is eternal. Man is made in the image of God, and God is a Creator, 
therefore man himself is called to creative work.
Berdyaev sees man as capable of conceiving knowledge creatively, 
which puts him at Immediate odds with Shestov. Man is a creator who 
regards intellection from a subjective standpoint rather than from an 
objective one; that is, he seeks knowledge from the depths of his 
personality. According to this belief, "knowledge is both active and
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creative ...It can illuminate the objective world wherein m e a n in g  is 
revealed, the meaning of human existence and of the universe as part of 
the Divine B e i n g . "38 This is an almost exact definition of Frank's "living 
knowledge"; man uses the force of his being to arrive at knowledge- 
filled meaning in the world. Man is often hindered from approaching 
knowledge creatively, Berdyaev believes, because of the processes of 
objectification, in which the subject submits to the world, and hence
loses his power as a subject.89 Thus, knowledge is valid only when it is 
"living", i.e. a creative function of the individual. But to be able to know 
creatively, the subject must be free; creative activity in any realm
requires independence. "Knowledge would remain unintelligible unless 
the existential subject were endowed with a certain am ount of 
freedom ."40
If we look at Berdyaev's conception of knowledge we can see the same 
themes appearing here as are present in the other areas of his thought. 
Objectification represents the herd; knowledge conceived objectively,
outside of the personality, is wholly conformable to the conventions and 
rules of herd thought. Man can escape from this objectification only 
through creative activity, which takes place in freedom. Freedom is the 
essential quality of the Grand Inquisitor's Christ and it is essential in the 
process of intellection. Freedom provides man with an opportunity to 
flee from his degraded world, and it cannot come about without creative 
activity on the part of man himself.
It is not surprising, then, to see Berdyaev make the connection between 
Christianity and creativeness. His mainly hostile attitude towards the 
Church arises because he sees in the institution primarily a fear of
creativeness, and a tendency to a legalistic interpretation of the Gospels 
which distorts the original message. But his version of Christianity is 
one in which the ethics of creativeness are redeemed, and man is placed
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above the Sabbath. Unfortunately, according to Berdyaev, this principle is 
not often put into practice; Christ was creative but the Church is not, St. 
Francis had the creative flam e of the spirit, as did Luther, but 
Franciscans and Lutherans have lost the creative i n s t i n c t . W h i l e  moral 
acts, for instance, are not usually associated with creativeness, 
Berdyaev sees a necessary connection between the two. "One ought 
always to act individually and to solve every moral problem for oneself, 
showing creativeness in one's moral activity, and not for a single moment 
become a moral autom aton."42 Again, we see this difference between 
Berdyaev's and Shestov’s attitudes to morality; to Shestov one must 
dispense with morality, to Berdyaev, it is true morality which must be 
created.
It is fairly clear that Berdyaev sees an indissoluble bond between the 
divine spirit and creative activity. Everywhere we see this connection: 
God is a creator and so is man, creative intellection brings one into 
contact with the Divine Being, moral man is a creator, and therefore is 
truly Christian. A thinker such as Nietzsche, who himself declared the 
creation of a new order of thought which would overthrow slavish, 
normative Christianity, is condemned by Berdyaev for misunderstanding 
Christianity, by identifying it with legalism, when it is just the opposite, 
it is a source of the creative spirit.43
We can begin to see how Berdyaev seems to stand between Shestov on 
the one side and Solovyov and Frank on the other. Man must strive for the 
moral element, but he must do so only as an individual, as a creator.
V
Personality
Berdyaev believes that man himself is at the centre of all meaning in 
the universe. The primary aspect of his thought, which always places
18 0
man back at the centre, is what he calls his Personatist philosophy. So 
much of an individualist is Berdyaev that he wants to extend beyond the 
term "individual" to "personality"; he endorses Kierkegaard's view that 
from the religious standpoint the individual has priority over the species, 
but in wanting to emphasize the absolute uniqueness of the individual he 
prefers to describe him as a personality.
"The personality is spirit,"44 he says; it is through this medium that 
creativeness, freedom and the divine breathe. (It is worth noting that 
Kierkegaard begins his book The Sickness Unto Death with the words "The 
human being is spirit." Clearly the same idea is at work with both 
thinkers.) Personalism  is Berdyaev's primary reason for refuting 
systematic thought, or monistic thought. Platonism, Thomism, Frank's 
and Solovyov's all-unity, all are incompatible with the personality  
because the system is at the centre and not the person. "The idea of 
universal order and harmony has no moral or spiritual value, because 
there is no implicit relationship with the personality's inner life."45 it 
would be better, thinks Berdyaev, for one to reject all attempts at 
finding some harmony in this fallen world, and to accuse oneself of being 
a degraded being, as does Dostoevsky's Underground Man, because then at 
least attention is focussed on the personality. In this respect Berdyaev 
and Shestov share sim ilar views, although Shestov exalts the 
Underground Man's tragedy, while Berdyaev believes that the personality 
is much more than a breaking down of old values, it is a value unto itself.
He best describes the personality by saying that it is "never a part but 
always a whole, never a datum of the external natural world but always a 
datum of the inner world of existence. It is not an object, and has no 
place in the abstract objective world. It is not of this world: when
confronted with the personality, I am in the presence of a Thou."45 It 
would seem that Berdyaev borrowed this concept of the Thou from Martin
181
Buber, (with whom he became acquainted in France) who writes in I and  
Th ou ,  published fifteen years earlier than Solitude and Society, from 
which Berdyaev's quote was taken; "When Thou is spoken, the speaker has 
no thing for his object. For where there is a thing there is another 
thing...But when Thou is spoken there is no thing. Thou has no b o u n d s . "47 
The two above quotes are very similar; both indicate a wholeness, an 
undividedness of the personality. For Berdyaev, however, this wholeness 
excludes the external world (or the objectified world, the world of the 
herd-man). To be whole, according to him, the personality must reject 
this world and become united with the divine forces. As suggested 
earlier, man is a creator because he is made in God's image, and God is 
the Creator. The same is true of the personality; it is the image and 
likeness of God, and because of this it rises above the natural world. For 
Berdyaev the existence of personality is so vital that he associates it 
with the existence of God. Our biological existence can be explained 
through evolution, but "the existence of personality presupposes the 
existence of God...If there is no God as the source of superpersonal values, 
personality as a value does not exist either; there is merely the 
individual entity subordinate to the natural life of the g e n u s . "48
As with creativeness, personality is intimately connected with the 
divine. Berdyaev is seen by many as primarily a philosopher of freedom, 
and indeed he insists that freedom must be present if there is to be any 
real life, but he refuses to condone the notion that personality (as well 
as creativeness) is free-floating, independent of every influence and 
com pletely self-reliant. The personality, he believes, is most truly 
itself when it most fully participates in the kingdom of God. Only when 
the personality is freely subordinated  to God does it have the possibility 
of thriving. Berdyaev firmly rejects the idea that man's personality can 
survive in emancipation not only from the fallen world but from God as
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well. It is not surprising, therefore, that Berdyaev should declare true 
Christianity to be the religion of personality. He believed that Jesus, by 
freeing himself from legalism, Pharisaism, in a word, from the law, did 
not thereby become a kind of rebel without a cause, but was freed in the 
sense that he rejected this world so as to accept the kingdom of God. In 
being "bound up" in the divine, Christ realized personality in the world, 
and more so than any other man, according to Berdyaev. He thinks that 
Christianity is best equipped to declare the truth of Personalism. He 
even believes that Christianity gave rise to personality; pre-Christian  
man's moral consciousness was formed by the tribe, or clan, and the idea 
of blood vengeance and moral concepts, for instance, are related to the 
group and not to the individual. In antiquity: "Personality as a moral
subject was not yet born. Only Christianity finally freed man from the 
power of cosmic forces and of the blood-tie."49 It is clearly debatable 
whether this is true or not; if personality is inextricably connected with 
Christianity, and is the source of all meaning in the world, then non- 
Christians are presumably to be cast into outer darkness, or at least 
obliged to convert, as Solovyov and Frank would have liked to see. At any 
rate, Berdyaev is not a fundam entalist Christian; what he sees in 
Christianity are the principles of personality, i.e. spirituality, freedom  
and unique individuality, and he contrasts these principles with those he 
sees in the fallen world: egocentricity, objectification, renunciation of
freedom .
The contemporary Soviet critic A.L. Andreyev accuses Berdyaev of 
making an abstraction of the personality itself. "With Berdyaev, the 
personality is not a defin ite person, but a certain m etaphysical 
construction. Therefore it is characterized quite abstractly, outside of 
any sort of conditions, outside of time and place. The ordinary affairs of 
man, his daily needs, his joys and sufferings, essentially have little
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interest for B e r d y a e v . "5o it is certainly true that Berdyaev accepts the 
validity of general terms such as "spirit", and "the divine", but the 
personality, as Berdyaev would have it, is just the opposite of abstract, 
even though it is metaphysical, or beyond the merely physical.
So as a philosophical anthropologist, Berdyaev is neither a pessimist 
nor an optimist. In the herd-man he sees a complete submission to the 
values of this degraded world, and in man's psychological make-up he 
acknowledges deep and disturbing currents which force man to turn 
against himself and reject any inclination towards ultimate happiness. 
But he also sees individual man as a potentially creative being, who has a 
unique personality and is called upon by God to realize it. Berdyaev's 
outlook, in recognizing that man is largely formed by biological, 
sociological and psychological factors, also insists that the single 
personality is greater than the species; he recognizes a spiritual, 
creative, individualistic side of man in which all his meaning on earth is 
to be found.
V I
Subjectivism and Objectivism  
Having examined Berdyaev's attitudes toward Christianity and man, we 
can form some idea of the direction in which this thinker travelled to 
arrive at his Christian Personalism. As an anti-systematic philosopher, 
one might say an irrationalist, it may seem  as if he rejected  
philosophical knowledge for the sake of the individual human being, as 
does Shestov. He himself denies having a consistently logical approach to 
ideas, saying in his book The Meaning of the Creative Act that "my 
thoughts and the normal course of philosophical argument seem ed to 
dissolve into v i s i o n . I f  this were always true, then Berdyaev would be
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either a failed philosopher or an anti-philosopher like Shestov. But 
neither is the case, because throughout his work he does indeed explore 
traditional philosophical arguments, not from the outside as Shestov 
does, battering away at the foundations of philosophy, but from the 
inside. Like Frank, Berdyaev believed that knowledge could be ‘living’.
Berdyaev was a very prolific writer who in the course of half a century 
produced many books. To review all of his philosophical positions might 
itself occupy several books, but here it is useful to focus on three of the 
most im portant areas of his thought: nam ely, his attitude to
subjectivism and objectivism, to freedom, and to time. In each of these 
areas Berdyaev establishes a standpoint which never loses sight of his 
Personalism .
The argument between subjectivism and objectivism is as old as 
philosophy itself. Which is closer to the truth, the subject himself with 
his own mental and emotional and spiritual life, or the objective agents 
from which man acquires these various forms of life? For our purposes 
it is enough to state what may already be obvious, that Berdyaev himself 
was a subjectivist. Even before his Christian views had fully developed 
we can see, by the very title of his first book, S u b je c t iv is m  a n d  
Individualism in Social Philosophy, that he was committed to the subject 
over the object. Berdyaev believes that every philosopher, even the ones 
most seemingly loyal to objectivism (such as Plato, Plotinus, Spinoza, 
Hegel) formed their beliefs based on reflection of their own destiny, i.e. 
they reflected subjectively. "The faculty of apprehension is essentially 
that of the Ego, of man as a concrete being, as a personality, and not that 
of the universal spirit or of the universal reason, of the impersonal 
subject or of the general c o n s c i o u s n e s s ."^2 The various arguments 
surrounding the question of the subject and the object go back and forth 
endlessly (Frank, as one example, sees man in a much more objectified
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light than does Berdyaev), and Berdyaev as a philosopher might even be at 
some disadvantage, since he himself admits that his thought is not 
logically-based. His arguments for the subjective are not founded upon 
logical reasoning but upon an appeal to the human heart, to faith, and to 
the experience  of human existence as the ch ief crite ria  for 
su b je c tiv ism .83 This is basically a restatement of Pascal's maxim, "Le  
coeur a ses raisons, que la raison ne connaît pas”. Berdyaev says, "Since 
there is no way of apprehending M e a n in g  without a criterion of value, its 
apprehension is primarily based on the knowledge of the heart. 
Philosophical apprehension involves man's entire being, that is, the union 
of faith and knowledge."84
This definition places meaning in man and not in the world, that is, 
subjectively and not objectively, but Berdyaev also insists on the 
legitimacy of spirit which is not outside man, as objectivism might 
demand, but which still encompasses all men. He says that, "the spirit 
lies beyond a rationalized opposition between subject and object. Truth 
does not mean staying within some closed ideas, in an inescapable circle 
of consciousness: truth is an unlocking, a revealing. Truth is not
objective but rather trans-subjective."8s We can say that Berdyaev is a 
subjectivist, but with the proviso that truth is not limited to the single 
person, but is spread across all persons, at least potentially. One is 
strongly reminded here of Frank's and Solovyov's all-unity. Both of these 
thinkers saw spirit spreading across mankind, an immanent spirit which 
lived in each person (Solovyov’s Sophia and Frank’s ‘reality’ would both 
fit this description). Berdyaev as a trans-subjectivist wants to have the 
primacy of the personality a n d  a universal spirit, an outlook which would 
ce rta in ly  d is tan ce  him from S h es to v ’s stark, uncom prom ising  
ind ividualism .
His attitude to objectivism can be expressed by his use of the term
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"objectification", which to Berdyaev is a process that inheres in th is  
world, rather than in the divine one. He says;
Objective processes abstract and disrupt existence. They 
substitute society for community, general principles for 
communion, and the empire of Caesar for the kingdom of God.
There is no participation in objective processes...the result of 
objectification in knowledge as elsewhere is not only to isolate 
man but also to confine his activities to an essentially alien
w o rld .86
There is a paradox here, because, as Berdyaev claims, knowledge which 
seeks to be general, or objective, is in fact isolated and alienated. We 
have already looked at his views on the herd man and the natural world as 
opposed to the divine world, and it is clear that objectification, in the 
seeking of knowledge or in the living of life, belongs to the degraded  
world. Berdyaev, in surveying the development of thought throughout 
history, declares that the philosopher has had very little time to escape 
the clutches of objectivism. Platonist, Aristotelian and m edieval 
Scholastic thought were all based on objectivism, and by the time 
philosophy began to emancipate itself at the end of the medieval era, 
science (the most objectified form of knowledge) was around the corner. 
This is not to say that science is entirely bad, since it can provide a 
universal means of communication between men, but it does so "without 
at the same time establishing any true communion between them."87
Thus Berdyaev does not reject knowledge but says that it must be 
united with faith to be valid, which is no different from what Frank says 
about "living knowledge". If one wishes to reject the truth of the human 
heart, then Berdyaev's argument will seem to crumble, because it is not
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rooted in logic or reason. On the other hand, if it is an irrational 
argum ent, it is not a nonsensical one; Berdyaev is calling for a 
"humanization" of knowledge, which does not give primacy to objectified 
reason. He is clearly on the side of the subject over the object, the 
individual over the collective, but he never calls himself a Subjectivist 
or an Individualist, but mainly a Personalist, which is an extension of the 
first two categories.
V II
Freedom
In all Berdyaev's writings the subjectivist (or trans-subjectivist) 
standpoint can be at least tacitly understood. He accepts the general 
assum ptions of subjectivism  and interprets them  in his own, 
personalistic, way. More difficult to come to terms with in his 
philosophy, though, is his notion of freedom. We have seen how the image 
of Christ as the greatest representative of freedom in the "Legend of the 
Grand Inquisitor" had such an influence on Berdyaev. Throughout his 
writings he insists that freedom is the condition which is absolutely 
necessary in order to realize personality, creativeness and a divine- 
human union. He has been called "a captive of freedom", and says of his 
thought that "at the foundations of my philosophy I placed not being, but 
freedom...In freedom is concealed the secret of the world,..Freedom is at 
the beginning and at the e n d . "88  it will not hurt us to ask what may seem 
like an unnecessary question: What does Berdyaev mean by freedom?
It may be surprising to learn that he did not believe freedom issues 
from God. Although one expects Berdyaev to connect value in man's life 
with the divine, he makes the statement: "Initial freedom is rooted in
'n o th in g '..."89 Berdyaev is reluctant to give God the responsibility for
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freedom which allows man to be evil, so as a result man must be not 
merely a child of God, but also a child of freedom - or of nothing, of non- 
being. This means that God is not really omnipotent, because he has 
power only over being, and not over non-being from which freedom  
springs. Indeed, to trace Berdyaev's complicated cosmogony, God himself 
was created in this non-being, and he in turn created the world and man. 
He expected man to respond to him from the depths of freedom, which 
man did, but then man rebelled against God (in the Fall). "All rebellion 
against God is a return to non-being, and is a victory of non-being over 
the divine light. And it is only then that the nothing which is not evil 
becomes evil."6o So evil has arisen because in freedom man chose to turn 
away from God, towards nothing. This requires that God (in the form of 
Christ) descend into non-being to conquer evil freedom by enlightening it 
from within. According to Berdyaev, freedom is not about categorical 
imperatives, but is intimately linked with creativeness. However, this 
theme of the relationship between creativeness and freedom is a familiar 
one in his thought - freedom could never be imposed from without - and 
therefore it seem s som ewhat alien to his methods and style of 
philosophical analysis that freedom should find itself now more a product 
of non-being than of God, and further, find itself rooted in the kind of 
abstract theological conjecture which he claims that many theologians 
are guilty of.
On the other hand this theory, so Berdyaev declares, is in fact based on 
a refutation of positive theology, which attempts to explain why God 
created a world in which evil and suffering thrive. By releasing God from 
the burden of the world's evil, man can turn to negative theology, which 
does not try to rationalize mystery but exalts it. Such concepts as Jacob 
Boehme's Ungrund, the primeval abyss from which creation sprung, gave 
rise to Berdyaev's own perception of freedom.6i In his book on Berdyaev,
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An Apostle of Freedom, M. A. Vallon offers a definition of Boehme's 
theory:
Jacob Boehme (1575-1624) held that back of the whole universe, 
both spiritual and physical, there is the primal 'groundlessness' - 
the Ungrund  or the Absolute. Active in it is only an inchoate and 
subjective will which Boehme called the 'Unmanifested Abysmal 
Will'. Boehme's Ungrund goes deeper than God. It is the Godhead 
preceding God, It is the undetermined, the unconditional basis of
God and the world alike. More precisely, the Ungrund  is
nothingness longing to become something.
Frederick Coplestone, in his Philosophy in Russia, tries to come to some
understanding of this notion of freedom ; he thinks there is no
inconsistency in the idea that freedom has its origin in God and that it
also has its origin in the U ngrund,  although, he admits, the statements
appear to c o n f l i c t . T h e r e  is irony in the fact that Berdyaev's
fundamental belief in man's freedom over external compulsion and the 
laws and norms of this world should be beclouded by mystical 
philosophical notions, which somehow seem to be unrelated to man as the 
personalistic being which Berdyaev claims has priority over all other 
principles in the world.
Shestov once again wrote on Berdyaev's thought in an essay published in 
1938, entitled, "Nicholas Berdyaev: Gnosis and Existential Philosophy", in 
which the question of Berdyaev's definition of freedom arises. This essay 
is more important than Shestov's first one on Berdyaev since it was 
written when both thinkers w ere fully developed; the fundam ental
difference of their thought is clearly manifested here.
The task that Shestov sets himself in his essay is to prove that
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Berdyaev's philosophy derives not from human existence but from  
philosophical knowledge. Shestov quotes Berdyaev's definition of 
freedom :
Freedom gives birth to evil as well as to good. Therefore 
evil does not deny the existence of meaning, but affirms 
it. Freedom is not created, because it is not nature, 
freedom precedes the world, it is rooted in primordial being.
God is omnipotent over being, but not over n o th in g ,  n o t  over 
freedom. And as a result, evil ex is ts .®^
According to Shestov, this may be true and it may be false, but it is
definitely knowledge, and knowledge leads away from God.
Shestov thinks that the result of Berdyaev's theory is that God is
deprived of his right to be all-powerful. If freedom has the final say,
then even the Creator must submit: for God all things are not possible. In 
his later thought Shestov is largely preoccupied with the question of 
God's utter freedom; so free must he be that he could make the past not to
have happened. C learly Berdyaev's theory offends against this -
traditional philosophy has given him the assurance that for God all things 
are not possible - and in the end Shestov condemns his friend to being no 
more than a philosopher of culture, rather than a true adherent to the 
Bible^s, a damning blow from Shestov. He ends his essay with these 
words: "Freedom comes to man not from knowledge but from faith, which 
presupposes an end to all our s u f f e r i n g s . "86  it is not so easy as Shestov 
makes out to cut Berdyaev off from his own philosophy, and to insist that 
he is only a pure gnostic, a knowledge-seeker, but Shestov does make it 
clear that Berdyaev's theory of the origin of freedom does not escape the 
clutches of knowledge.
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One of the crucial questions of this dissertation is, Whose definition of 
the individual is more convincing, Shestov's or Berdyaev's? Since they 
are both passionately concerned with the individual, one would hope to 
find common ground between the two, but Shestov will have none of this, 
as he berates his friend for taking refuge in knowledge. In fact the two 
are closer than Shestov is willing to admit; while Berdyaev uses the 
tools of philosophy to arrive at his definition of the individual, 
nevertheless both thinkers see existence as having primacy over 
knowledge (Although Berdyaev's philosophical forays occasionally yield 
such booty as the Ungrund, which do not help his Personalist argument.) 
To decide whose ideas are more valuable concerning the individual, 
Shestov's or Berdyaev's, one has to decide which approach is better, the 
one which repudiates all the aims of philosophy, or the one which works 
within philosophy.
But Berdyaev is a philosopher of man rather than of the cosmos, and his 
vision of the beginnings of freedom is less important than how that 
freedom  relates to man. Certainly he is more occupied with the
redemptive freedom which Christ (in the "Legend") has given to man.
Berdyaev in his autobiography says of freedom, "A huge mass of people do 
not love freedom at all, and do not search for it. The revolutionary 
masses do not love freedom. I have acquired much along my spiritual 
path, in the experience of my life, but for me freedom is primary, it is 
not acquired, it is the a priori of my l i f e . "87 Because Berdyaev's  
philosophy is so centred around the personality, from which stem  
creativeness and communion with the divine, freedom becomes vitally 
necessary, because otherwise it cannot live. A personality restricted by 
the norms of society, the morality of the herd, etc., is not really a 
personality, because it is not free.
Freedom is such a nebulous term that it must be emphasized that in
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Berdyaev's case he links it - usually - with religious experience. This of 
course is not a self-evident association; the Russian revolutionary 
thinker Mikhail Bakunin, to take one example, was also a "captive of 
freedom", but he disdained any religious approach to life. He says in a 
speech on education that "we are sincere, unhypocritical partisans of 
individual freedom.”^  ^ And yet, "Divine morality is based on two immoral 
principles: respect for authority and contempt for hum anity."89 It is
easy to see that Bakunin here would have been reacting against 
authoritiarian, hierarchical, official religions, which to Berdyaev also 
were often based on immoral principles, but while Bakunin rejects divine 
morality because it denies freedom, Berdyaev insists that freedom is 
intimately connected with the divine. The problem arises, according to 
Berdyaev, when human morality assumes for itself the mantle of divine 
m orality .
The masses do not love freedom because, thinks Berdyaev, it does not 
bring satisfaction, delight and ease, but rather is a burden which will 
make life harder, more tragic and full of responsibility.7o This is an idea 
which runs through much of his thought: freedom is essential for
religious life and yet it brings with it spiritual struggle which is absent 
in the herd man. (If freedom and spiritual struggle are so important to 
Berdyaev, why is Shestov so critical of his friend? It is Shestov’s 
uncompromising stance which creates such a great division between the 
two.) Again there is the idea that spirituality (freedom, creativeness, 
personality, Christianity) em ancipates one from the fallen world but 
binds one to the spiritual world. Conscience, which seems to chain man 
to responsibility, is in fact the call of freedom.
VII I
Time
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One of the greatest dilemmas for Berdyaev is encountered in the 
problem of time. "Time is the nightmare and the torment of our life in 
this world,"71 he says. The fact that man is born, lives and dies within 
time means that unless there is some escape from its chains life is 
meaningless, because death is final. On the other hand, he thinks, death 
itself can give meaning to life, because if life continued forever there 
would be no meaning to it. Meaning, he claims, lies beyond this world, 
beyond tim e ,72 and it is death which transfers us finally to another 
world. Berdyaev does not believe that our lives are meaningless until we 
die; but meaning has to be captured in opposition to time; the fulfillment 
of meaning in the world is the negation of time. In a word, he establishes 
the eternal in contradistinction to the temporal.
Berdyaev subscribes to the belief that man finds his greatest meaning 
in the world by living in the present rather than the past or the future. 
He says, "Wherein lies the root of time's evil? It lies In the fact that 
man finds it impossible to experience the present as a complete and 
joyful whole, as a part of eternity, or to shake off, even while enjoying 
the present instant, the dread of the past and of the future, and of their 
n o s ta lg ia ."73 The present, if it is a "complete and joyful whole", is not 
part of time, but of eternity. One of man's greatest problems, Berdyaev 
insists, is that he is continually putting himself into the grip of time, 
proving incapable of living in the present. But this is not to say that the 
present has value if it is divorced from the spiritual. There are two 
different types of "instant", he claims. The first is part of the objective 
world, just one of a succession of instants which are m easured  
m athem atically. In our technological world, the instant loses its 
richness and becomes merely a stepping stone to the next instant. There 
is no wholeness in the human Ego, only a succession of instants in time. 
Yet this is the opposite of the instant when it is not disintegrated, which
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is "the instant of the eternal present, indivisible and integrally part of 
e te rn ity ."74 This sense of wholeness recalls Berdyaev's description of 
the personality, which is indivisible, not a thing among things. The  
present has validity only if it is spiritual, or eternal, which opposes the 
temporal. The paradox for the herd man where time is concerned is that 
with all his power to forget time and death, by trying to live in the 
"fallen present" (i.e. through intoxication, obsession, evil, base fear) he 
lives in death.
Fundamentally related to this problem of time are Berdyaev's attitudes 
towards Heaven and Hell. The whole notion of good and evil in this or any 
other world suggests punishment or reward for one's actions, but 
Berdyaev is very sceptical about a Hell which exists simply to punish the 
wicked. The Old Testament, for instance, is filled with pleas for God to 
ensure the triumph of justice and the retribution of the wicked, but 
Berdyaev considers this to be a kind of fairy-tale, borrowed from our 
worldly ex istence.75 Nor does he have a Dante-like map of Hell, with 
descriptions of who gets what, and how. Hell, he claims, is exclusively 
linked to the subjective, and to time. "Hell is not eternity at all, but
endless duration in time...In Hell are those who remain in time and do not 
pass into eternity, those who remain in the subjective closed-in sphere 
and do not enter the objective realm of the kingdom of God."76 Berdyaev's 
perspective as a thinker requires eternal values - creativeness, 
personality - and to be forbidden access to these values is to be doomed 
to isolation from God, or to be in Hell. Man who rejects God, not just by
name but by God's spirit, man who takes his fate into his own hands and
cannot pass into the transcendental, is abandoned in the abyss of the 
tem poral. It is impossible to understand this argum ent rationally,
because if, say, to be evil is to be rooted in time, then death presumably 
releases the evil man from time. But the victims of evil may suffer far
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more than the perpetrator of the evil. Does this "time-perdition" persist 
after death, so that the evil-doer lives in time "eternally"? Berdyaev is 
not sympathetic to the notion of paying eternally for one's sins; rather, 
his philosophy acknowledges the mystery of the beyond. But it is 
apparent that his notion of Hell is rooted in man's fallen world, in the 
world of time.
Heaven, then, is just the opposite of Hell. It is not a reward for having 
lived an upright life, for having obeyed the Ten Commandments and gone 
to church every Sunday, etc. And we cannot think of it in our own 
descriptive terms, imagining a Garden of Eden. Man has fallen away 
forever from a state of pre-sin innocence. But we can attain to paradise 
here on earth, by means of an escape from time to the eternal. He says 
that "Paradise is not in the future, is not in time, but is in eternity. 
Eternity is attained in the actual moment, it comes in the present - not in 
the present which is a part of the broken-up time, but in the present 
which is an escape from time."^^ In this way the onus for paradise and 
perdition is placed on man himself. God plays his divine role through 
grace, but man cannot toil, pay hard cash, or adhere to the laws of his 
society to attain paradise; it takes place in his life, by his initiation and 
with the grace of God. Heaven and Hell exist only in life, there is no 
Heaven and Hell beyond life; but Berdyaev's intention is not to deny an 
afterlife , rather it is to declare the essential im portance that man 
himself has in creating paradise and perdition. "The kingdom of God 
comes not only at the end of time but at every moment. A moment may 
lead us from time into eternity...There are two ways to eternity - through 
the depth of the moment and through the end of time and the world."7 8 
Partly because of Berdyaev's suspicion of the lack of good in goodness, 
and of the dullness and static essence of most human conceptions of 
paradise, he cannot Imagine what Heaven would actually look like. But
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also, in seeing the problem of time as being so fundamental to man's 
understanding of life and death, he places the possibility of paradise 
inside our own lives, but outside of time.
Berdyaev claims that he is not a dualist, that is, he does not make the
distinction between two spheres of being, the m aterial and the
s p ir i tu a l .79 Because he is not a systematic philosopher, and an
understanding of his thought does not rely on an explanation of the world 
in abstract, "non-personal" terms, one can hardly find the sort of
cohesive world-explanation which inheres in the thought of such a 
philosopher as his contemporary Semyon Frank. On the other hand it is 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that Berdyaev's thought tends towards 
distinguishing between the fallen and the spiritual world. This fallen 
world which we inhabit and the kingdom of God, the subjective and 
objectification, time and eternity, the personality and the herd man, all 
of these opposites indicate a strong sense of duality. It is fairly clear 
that Berdyaev makes a distinction between the worldly and the spiritual, 
which is very much what Solovyov and Frank do, they whom Berdyaev 
accuses of being too systematic. Solovyov's and Frank’s sense of the 
religious individual only m anifested itself on the spiritual, divine, 
eternal plane, and it seemed that with Berdyaev we were concentrating 
more on the individual than on the world-system, but it does appear that 
he too makes the same distinctions as Solovyov and Frank, although not 
so systematically.
By the same token, Berdyaev's Personalism is as man-centred as 
Shestov's Groundlessness. Berdyaev works within knowledge and 
philosophy to form his beliefs, but he insists that only the individual 
human being can m anifest God's will on earth, through his unique 
personality. In Berdyaev's philosophy it is impossible for man to escape 
his responsibility; it falls on him alone to use freedom creatively, and to
1 97
realize true Christian principles. That is, not just to realize them  
through the Church, (i.e. through the spiritual leaders who offer peace and 
happiness in exchange for freedom, like the Grand Inquisitor), or through 
the herd. Man must realize these principles through his own life. This 
philosophy presents several paradoxes: man must be free to live
meaningfully, but the freedom must also bind him to spirit; man can hope 
to find release from his earthly sufferings only in the spiritual world, 
but the spirit itself demands suffering; the spirit is revolutionary, since 
it overthrows the world, but those who perform this revolution become 
aristocrats of the spirit. These paradoxes, how ever, are not 
contradictions; rather they express, according to Berdyaev, man's 
position between the earthly and divine worlds. Man can respond to this 
position only through his personality.
XI
S ociety
W hile Berdyaev was primarily a philosophical anthropologist, trying 
above all to understand the essential nature of man, he was also a social 
philosopher, who wrote extensively on the social and political conditions 
which influence the personality. He recognized the individual as having 
primacy over the species, but at the same time believed that each 
person's participation in divine life did not occur only with God, but with 
other persons as well. Like Frank, Berdyaev paid close attention to his 
own society as it underwent radical change, and he worked hard to 
awaken the Russian spirit to what he saw as its destiny.
Berdyaev was very sceptical about the ability of the State or the 
Church to play a positive role in the development of the individual. The 
State, he declares, belongs to the objective world; it does not take the 
personality into account, even when it is upholding its rights, "for it
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regards the personality as an abstract unity rather than as a living 
e n t i t y . "80  The State's role is essentially to introduce order, law and 
authority, which can help the personality to survive but do not affect it 
directly. We have seen that he holds a similar attitude in respect to the 
Church; it can have value as a means of uniting people in a religious 
community, but he believes that its tendency is to become objectified, to 
adapt the norms of the particular society and thereby to lose its value. In 
general it could be said that all institutions, the Church and the State 
being the most notable ones, are aspects of objectified society, which, 
qua institutions, elude the divine world.
The personality and society are not identical...The function of 
society Is to establish a more or less permanent and stable mode 
of communication between men; it is a material phenomenon 
manifesting itself in the degraded world; its rule is the law of 
the greatest number.81
But this is not to suggest that man is forced into isolation to find 
meaning in his life. Berdyaev believes that the personality is manifested 
not through communication but through communion. Communion in 
Berdyaev's sense of the term is like Khomyakov's sobornosf: it is an
internal bond between personalities, rather than simply an external 
meeting of like-minded believers. Khomyakov intended so b o rn o s f  to be 
the basis of the Church, while Berdyaev thinks that communion can take 
place in varying social environments. Communion does away with the 
objective world, and focusses on the divine: "The communion of the I and 
the Thou  gives rise to the W e\  the communion of two personalities is 
consummated in a third."82 Thus, amongst other men, man is bound to 
assert his unique personality. This means that all the efforts of the
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State to create a utopia, and all the efforts of the Church to bring the 
kingdom of God down to earth, are doomed to fail because they remain 
outside the mystery of the personality, and will never be able  
permanently to incorporate personality Into their structure. An essential 
feature of communion for Berdyaev is the freedom which it embodies. 
W hile the State often uses force and compulsion when necessary to 
achieve its end, and society as a whole uses its social pressures to keep 
its members tethered to norm and tradition, communion is entirely free. 
Berdyaev says, "When the individual is organically attached to the Church, 
then the Church cannot be for him an external authority. Christian 
freedom is realized for him in communal life."83 Part of Berdyaev's debt 
to nineteenth-century Russian religious thought is this notion of freedom  
within spiritual togetherness, which recognizes no external pressures. 
Certainly Solovyov embraced such a notion, but its origin goes back to 
Khomyakov, who first envisaged spiritual unity within the authoritarian 
Orthodox Church. Berdyaev did not support many aspects of official 
Orthodoxy, because in fact the official Church rejected s o b o rn o s f ,  
claiming that it undermined authority. Further, communion was not 
ecclesiastically-related for Berdyaev; unlike Frank, he saw little value in 
the rituals and traditions of the Church.
The danger for a thinker like Berdyaev in the notion of s o b o rn o s f  is 
that it can seem to strip the participants in this spiritual togetherness 
of their individuality. Instead of the objectified herd one could imagine a 
kind of spiritual herd, which tramples the individual. But Berdyaev has 
sufficient faith in the personality to claim that the group, no matter how 
spiritually orientated , will not have priority over the individual's  
creativeness and divine calling. The personality, he says, which is only 
partly accessible to other personalities, can make communion difficult 
because of its distinctness, but nonetheless by entering this spiritual
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world the personality finds not adversaries and hostility, but unity and 
fratern ity .84 Communion which hinders the personality is not communion, 
but communication, or some form of objectification.
The belief in communion over communication puts Berdyaev directly 
Into the mainstream of traditional Russian religious thought, and we 
often find him trying to awaken the Russian spirit to its communal 
potential. He tells us that “in the depths of the Russian people is a living 
spirit...The development of Russia to its role in the world presupposes its 
spiritual rebirth ."85
X
S ocialism
Berdyaev's social philosophy is governed by spirituality, union in the 
divine world and freedom. All of these principles are also present in the 
anthropological and Christian aspects of his thought. But while  
communion between men does not at all require the intrusion of the State 
or other social institutions, nevertheless Berdyaev believes that society 
must be ordered in such a way as to give communal life the greatest 
opportunity to flourish. In political terms, he believed that the best way 
to do this was neither through capitalism nor communism. As has already 
been mentioned in this essay, the Russian religious thinkers at the turn 
of the century did not generally turn towards capitalism after rejecting 
comm unism ; their criticisms were based on spiritual factors, not 
economic ones; and Berdyaev is no different. "In reality I am a supporter 
of a classless society, which is to say that in this respect I am closest 
to communism. But in spite of this, I am also a supporter of...spiritual 
a r i s t o c r a t i s m . " 8 6  His harshness towards what he sees as the de­
personalization of man in capitalist society is hardly less sharp than 
Marx’s. Capitalism, Berdyaev says, "is an absolutely cold world in which
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one cannot even see the face of the master and enslaver; it is slavery to 
abstract phantasms of the capitalist world. All spiritual bonds between 
men are finally severed, society is completely atomized, and the 'free' 
individual is utterly forsaken and left to himself, helpless in a terrible 
and alien w o  r i d .  "87 One could hardly imagine such strong language from 
the communist ideologues who expelled Berdyaev from the Soviet Union. 
In fact, the similarity with Marx is not a coincidence; although Berdyaev 
claimed that his revolutionary tendencies were based not on Marxism and 
socialism, but on spirituality, he nonetheless says that he fully accepted 
the Marxist criticism of capitalism .8® Berdyaev disassociates himself 
from Marx because of what he sees as the latter's materialism and his 
disregard for the individual personality In society, but the two thinkers 
share a hatred for what they see as the exploitation inherent in 
cap ita lism .
On the other hand, socialism, Berdyaev claims, as it is theorized about 
and practiced, is a rejection of the spiritual world which has priority 
over the earthly world. At some points socialism and Christianity are 
capable of agreement, because both deny the value of personal property 
and both struggle for an acknowledgement of all men as equal. Berdyaev 
thinks, however, that the motives for Christianity and socialism are 
com pletely at odds. Socialism as practiced through m aterialistic  
communism is plunged into the kingdom of this world, and denies 
spiritual reality.89 Because its values are limited to this world, it is no 
better than capitalism; both systems avoid spiritual solutions. For one 
who believes in the reality of the spiritual world, as do Berdyaev, 
Solovyov and Frank, any political philosophy which sees the aims of 
society as being purely earthly ones has to be unsatisfactory, whatever 
its noble ideal.
Berdyaev believed in a socialism which would allow for the personality
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to express itself. But he developed as a thinker during a period in which, 
so he claims, the socialist-communist movements denied the personality. 
He gives a detailed analysis of the failure of materialistic socialism to 
solve any of the problems of freedom, equality or individuality. He felt 
that in Russian society, socialism in its various guises, while remaining 
rooted in materialism, nevertheless had a kind of fervent approach to the 
transformation of society that could only be considered religious in 
nature. For the Russian revolutionary, socialism was not merely the 
means to a better society, or a correcting of social injustices; it was an 
ultimate value in itself, demanding complete faith and allowing of no
other gods. Communism "itself wants to be a religion; advancing towards 
a replacement of Christianity; It pretends to respond to the religious
needs of the human soul and to give sense to life."9o According to 
Berdyaev, communism sees Christianity not from the internal subjective 
standpoint, but objectively, i.e. it identifies Christianity with the Church. 
Orthodoxy has not only been inextricably linked to the autocratic  
monarchy, but it also draws its members away from the revolutionary
movement, and thus can play no part in a communistic system. In fact,
B erdyaev says that a socialist Christian is more harmful to a
revolutionary m ovement than a bourgeois C h r i s t i a n , b e c a u s e  the 
bourgeois Christian can be used as an opponent along the way to realizing 
socialism, while the socialist has divided loyalties which can only hinder 
the cause.
Berdyaev points out that communism demands atheism, because it 
maintains a total-outlook. He thinks that Lenin is a prime example of the
revolutionary who was willing to sacrifice every old value for the sake of
the new society. "Lenin is an absolutist, he believes in absolute
truth...Totalitarian Marxism, dialectical Marxism, is an absolute truth. 
This absolute truth is a weapon of the revolution and the organization of
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the d ictatorship ."92 Such absolutism on the part of Lenin, Berdyaev 
claims, led him to distort Marx's teachings by giving primacy to the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, which would ensure that the new  
communist values were established.
A.L. Andreyev, in his essay on Berdyaev, denies that Lenin was an 
absolutist, claiming that no one who was acquainted with Lenin saw in 
him a narrow-minded fanatic; on the contrary, his love of art and his 
selflessness were well known. Andreyev accuses Berdyaev of not being 
able to prove his notion of Russian messianism in communist thought, but 
only declaring it as true, and supporting his beliefs with arbitrary 
analogies but not a thorough analysis.93 But if for no other reason, 
Berdyaev's impartiality seems to be made legitimate by the fact that he 
was highly critical both of capitalism and of the old Church and State, 
the main enemies of the Russian revolutionary. It is primarily worth 
mentioning this defence of Lenin because the book in which this essay 
appears {The Origin and Meaning of Russian Communism) was published in 
1990; glasnost has cleared the way for the reemergence of Berdyaev in 
Russia, but it is notable that as late as 1990 there was still an "official" 
response attached to this attack on Russian communism.
Berdyaev's perspective on the revolutionary movement is basically the 
same as Frank's. Frank, it will be remembered, saw Russian socialism as 
being nihilistic, overturning the old values while not replacing them with 
positive new ones. Berdyaev sees a movement which insists on absolute 
values, but values which are rooted in materialism, and thus have no 
higher meaning. Like Frank he thinks that Russian communism has missed 
out on the natural development of European thought, and instead combined 
traditional Russian Messianism with the latest socialist Messianism, 
which in part creates the paradoxically religious nature of the Russian 
revolutionary movement.
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Berdyaev, it might seem, would have welcomed any revolution in Russia 
as a necessary development in the country's history, as it got rid of the 
old, ossified order. But as has been been pointed out, he considered 
himself to be a revolutionary of the spirit, which he thought was very
different from a revolutionary of this world. He sees revolution in the
national sense as being closer to genocide than to regeneration. "A
revolution cannot be regarded as a new and better life, it is an illness, a
catastrophe, a passage through death. A revolution always brings with it 
an avenger who performs the greatest cruelties and acts of v i o l e n c e . "94
Ironically, while it is through religion that man finds the greatest 
expression of his personality, according to Berdyaev, it is also the 
religious frame of mind which turns its energies into a fanatical desire 
to bring about revolutionary change, culminating in elements in society 
such as religion being stamped out. (As Berdyaev points out, early  
socialists such as Chernyshevsky and Dobrolyubov were the sons of 
p r ie s ts .95 For that matter Stalin himself trained in a seminary in his 
youth.) The symbols of scientific socialism had replaced the symbols of 
Christianity; however, the fervor and the absolutist nature of religion 
remained, but they turned against religion itself. Berdyaev supports a 
type of socialism which is not anti-religious, since he sees in the Idea of 
equality a fundamental Christian precept, and he feels that the methods 
of the religiously fanatic anti-religionists are badly misguided.
Berdyaev in his mature writings shows a clear awareness of the 
corruptibility of the good, and he sees in old systems which have failed 
(the Russian autocracy being a prime example) an abuse of good. They 
have formulated their lofty principles but failed to realize them .96 But 
he claims that it is a mistake to suggest that revolution will rid itself of 
decayed good and in its place put fresh, pure values. In an essay written 
for /z  glubiny, which fo llow ed the orig inal a n ti-rev o lu tio n ary
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compendium Vekhi, Berdyaev counters the claim that revolution is in any 
way healthy by a reference to Gogol. In the novel Dead Souls there are 
many highly unappealing characters: Chichikov, Sobakevich, Nozdryev are 
all motivated by pettiness, greed, hypocrisy. The Russian revolutionary 
thinks that such characters as these have been formed by old Russia and 
will disappear through revolution. But, says Berdyaev:
In the revolution the very same old, eternally Gogolevian Russia 
was revealed, an inhuman, beastlike Russia of mugs and 
snouts...Futile were the hopes that the Russian Revolution would 
reveal a human form, that the human personality would ascend to 
its full height after the autocracy fell...There is no longer 
autocracy, but Russian darkness and Russian malice have
rem ained.97
Berdyaev is not blind to the tragic necessity of social and political 
change, even that which may be violent, but he rejects the notion that 
such violent change will bring true renewal.
In the case of the October Revolution, he believes that the totalitarian 
governm ent which resulted from it was more im portant to the 
revolutionaries than any adherence to the Marxist theories of society. 
For better or worse, capitalism was not a part of the economic 
developm ent of Russia, even though Marxist belief holds this as a 
necessary step on the road to communism. But Bolshevism was far more 
interested in seizing and keeping power than waiting for capitalism to 
have its day, and Berdyaev sees these totalitarian instincts as being the 
most evil aspect of Russian communism. "In other countries communism 
is able to be less despotic."98 The fervent orthodoxy of the Russian 
revolutionary makes totalitarianism seem inevitable. When we see that
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Berdyaev's philosophy is centered around the notion of freedom, it is 
obvious that this idea obtains in the political world as well. If 
capitalism creates slavery through attaching economic value to man, then 
socialism creates its own slavery by forcing man to renounce his freedom  
in the name of the "ideal". A society which is not pluralistic, no matter 
what its social ideals, Berdyaev believes, will always become victimized 
by tyranny and the oppression of the personality.
How then can he reconcile his beliefs in a socialistic state (i.e., one 
which upholds the equality of all men) with his clear condemnation of 
socialism as it is practiced? In effect, his ideas in this respect differ 
little from Frank's. They are based upon a Christian understanding of 
society. Man is not just a part of the social and economic process as 
capitalism and socialism have it, but he must be seen as having a higher 
significance.
Namely Christianity teaches that the human soul is more 
valuable than all the kingdoms of the world, Christianity is 
eternally attentive to each individual man and to his 
individual fate. Man, always individual and 
un-repeatable, is for Christianity a more primary and basic 
reality than society.®9
Thus Berdyaev voices the view expressed from the time of the 
Slavophiles; indeed in this respect he is almost indistinguishable from 
Khomyakov, Solovyov and Frank. What Berdyaev adds to this view is the
emphasis on personality. Because it has precedence over the species, the
personality itself is more important than the State. It is the State which
must cater to the individual, and not the other way around.
Berdyaev died in Paris in 1947, never having returned to his homeland.
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It caused him much grief, he says, that his books which were popular all 
over the world were banned in the Soviet Union, In his autobiography 
written at the end of his life, he says, "I think much about the tragedy of 
Russian culture, of the Russian rupture, which the West has never known 
in such a form. There is something which is tormenting in the Russian 
fate. And it is necessary to endure it to the end."i°®
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Chapter Six 
A Summary
1
Philosophical Thought 
Let us now try to bring our four thinkers together, so as to determine 
what features of their thought are similar, what dissimilar, and what 
conclusions can be drawn about the idea of the religious individual in each 
one. There can be little doubt at this point that each of them was 
religious, and that each of them addressed in some way the individual, but 
we have also seen variety and disagreement in their differing attitudes to 
the religious individual. This divergence of views is a natural one, of 
course: although all of them were influenced by Slavophilism and/or the 
spiritual leaders of nineteenth-century Russia, their own individuality 
denied them the comfort of belonging too securely to any movement. And 
yet, each of the thinkers that we have studied raised in some way the 
battle-cry for the individual, and each one did so on religious grounds (or, 
as Shestov might have preferred to say, on religious groundlessness).
There are two areas in which the individual can be looked at in our 
discussion of these four thinkers. The first is on a purely philosophical 
basis; i.e., we can ask where the single human being fits into their 
systematic or non-systematic thought. The second is from a social and 
political standpoint, i.e., how do each of these thinkers treat of the 
individual as a member of society?
Philosophically, Solovyov cannot be said to have made the individual the 
be-all and end-all of his system. As Berdyaev says of him, "The most 
extraordinary, fundamental thing about Solovyov - that which appeared
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throughout his life - is his feeling of ecumenicaiism, his universalism. In 
his thought there is no individualism, no particularism."^ Berdyaev 
however does not say this critically - he is not accusing him of being 
indifferent to the individual - but claims that his system was one which 
sought to unite rather than to isolate. Solovyov is the single one of the 
four who lived (but for a few months) only in the nineteenth century; his 
thought was influenced by the movements of the 1840s and Slavophile 
concepts like sobo rnos f .  He moved away from Russian Orthodoxy not 
towards a more exclusive concentration on the individual, but in the 
opposite direction, towards even greater all-unity, which he hoped would 
occur with the reuniting of East and West, Orthodoxy and Catholicism. His 
notion of Sophia, his acceptance of the positivist Auguste Comte's Le  
Grand Etre, his all-unity {v s e e d in s tv o ) ,  all these different theories, 
embraced at different times throughout Solovyov's life, indicate a never- 
ending attempt to encompass rather than to isolate. Solovyov is not a 
pure individualist; the most critical response to this comes from Shestov, 
who says that "any philosophy which strives for all-unity is preoccupied, 
above all, with removing man's freedom...Solovyov, as we know, sought for 
this with all his strength, in order to remove man's freedom from him."2 
Shestov has not decided finally the question as to whether or not Solovyov 
stripped man of his freedom, but the basic point he makes is a valid one, 
namely that the individualist, the Underground man or the modern man 
searching for meaning in isolation, will not find a personal philosophy in 
Solovyov's thought. All-unity is the conditio sine qua non of his beliefs, 
if we recognize this basic outlook of Solovyov's, then we can see if, at the 
depths of this philosophy, there is any message addressed to the 
individual.
Solovyov believed firmly in the spirit. In his development as a thinker 
he critic ized Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, even
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Christianity as a whole, but he never denied that a divine spirit is present 
in man. Indeed his whole acceptance of all-unity is founded upon the 
notion of Godmanhood, the idea that man is called to realize God's spirit 
within him (and the idea that was close to Berdyaev and Frank). And 
contrary to Shestov's claim that Solovyov denied man freedom, it is 
th rough  freedom, so Solovyov claims, that God and man must meet. 
Berdyaev describes his philosophy thus: "He sees the essence of
Christianity in the free uniting in Godmanhood of two natures, divine and 
human. In Solovyov's creativeness there are several periods...But through 
them all the question about the active expression of the human being stood 
for him at the centre."® Solovyov always looked towards the universal, 
but he did not regard man as merely a passive agent, acted upon by a 
world-spirit which brought about the kingdom of God without man's 
participation (although sometimes man does seem to be a passive agent in 
concepts like Sophia, but as Solovyov developed as a thinker he gave an 
ever-greater role to man in the world-spirit). Rather, Solovyov believed, 
each person must freely find divine expression in himself. Each individual 
is possessed of God's spirit, and it is his responsibility to respond 
actively to it.
Towards the end of his life Solovyov disassociated himself from his 
earlier belief that the kingdom of God was realizable here on earth. His 
optimistic philosophy eventually seemed to him incorrect; sooner than 
mankind advancing towards the divine kingdom, an anti-Christ would 
appear which would have to be destroyed - this is Solovyov's claim in his 
A Short Tale of the Anti-Christ. His views on history certainly altered 
but, as Berdyaev points out, Solovyov never abandoned his spiritual 
outlook. The importance of Godmanhood for the individual is perhaps seen 
more clearly when Solovyov's philosophy is contrasted not with Shestov's 
anti-systematic thought but rather with the materialistic philosophies in
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Russia which also stemmed, like Slavophile thought, from German 
idealism. While freedom was a fundamental concept of so b o rn o s f  - and 
Berdyaev more than any other Russian philosopher relates freedom to the 
individual - Russian socialist philosophy of the 1860's and onwards tended 
to be characterized more by remarks like Belinsky's - that if blood need be 
shed to attain socialism, then so be it - than by a genuine awareness of 
the free spirit living in man and in mankind. All-unity from one angle may 
seem like a show of indifference to the individual human spirit - and in 
Shestovian terms it is just that - but from another angle, that of the 
contrast between Godmanhood and a rejection of any spiritual values, 
Solovyov's system does offer the freedom of the spirit. Frank says that 
such a philosophy as Solovyov has, whatever we may think of its worth as 
a system, "shows the spiritual path which alone can lead humanity out of 
its present impasse."4
Frank himself is in basically the same situation as Solovyov regarding 
his philosophical outlook on the individual. He was an admirer rather than 
a disciple of Solovyov's, but the nature of their systems is almost 
identical. Both thinkers are concerned with all-unity and tend to view
anything or anyone cut off from all-unity as being isolated (rather than 
individualistic). As a philosophy this may seem too limiting, since it is 
more interested in the community than in the individual, (although the
spirit itself which unites is a loving one). Can a monist philosophy such 
as Frank's have anything to say to the individual? Berdyaev thinks that one 
of the great obstacles of monist thought consists in the absence of man's 
freedom. He says; "From the point of view of all-unity, the problem of the 
relationship between God and the free human being is unresolved. Freedom 
is a scandal for this philosophy. Frank, of course, does not deny freedom,
but he is unable to find a place for it..."® Frank was certainly an advocate
of a sobornos f - type  of Orthodoxy, rather than a hierarchical, "external"
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type (although he was much more ecclesiastically-minded than was 
Berdyaev), and like Solovyov, spirituality for him would have been 
unthinkable without man's own free participation. But Berdyaev's point 
still holds, that system atica lly , or purely ph ilosophica lly , Frank 
constructs a set of beliefs which are not focussed on the individual. Man 
is certainly not just a cog in the universal machine - this would negate 
the power of the spirit which lives in each person - but nevertheless man 
must be integrally a part of all-unity, lest he be cut off from the source 
of life.
A general problem with systems such as Solovyov's and Frank's is that 
they tend to have a limited understanding of human nature. Thus while 
Frank, who was not a naive thinker, understands that there is evil in the 
world, he nevertheless does not place it in his system in a sufficiently 
convincing way, and this seems to restrict his understanding of human 
potential. Berdyaev believes that such a system as Frank's cannot fully 
understand problems such as evil, freedom, the personality,® because man 
is not at the centre. Frank himself acknowledges that docta ignorantia, or 
"the unfathomable" is a necessary element of “ living knowledge", and his 
own system does not try to explain everything. One can accept or reject 
Frank's concepts of reality or all-unity, but in any case it is apparent that 
such systematic thought penetrates less to a complete understanding of 
the individual, (with all his complexes, his potential for evil), than does a 
more person-centred philosophy.
But as with Solovyov, so too with Frank, the individual does have scope 
to breathe within this all-unity; indeed, that is where he finds his 
greatest meaning. Frank is critical of thinkers such as Nietzsche, who 
have rejected all of the values of Christianity and the positive role which 
the divine plays in the world, but he does not reject Christian 
individualists such as Pascal, Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky (even if they
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are not the cornerstones of his thought, as is the case with Shestov). 
Rather, the individual meets with all-unity, or reality, on the level of 
‘reality’. This is to say that man is not simply invaded by the divine
spirit; man does not wait passively for the kingdom of God, but through
“ living knowledge", that knowledge which comes into closest contact 
with the divine, each man's life is given significance. Beauty, music, 
literature, religious faith, all these are values to be apprehended by the 
individual, and their meaning is attained through this form of knowledge. 
Frank is generally scornful of the "far-off" love which he sees in 
revolutionaries who love the common folk en masse but who have little 
sense of love for their neighbour. Like Solovyov's system, Frank's is 
directed towards all-unity but it works through each human spirit. And
like Solovyov, Frank's all-unity is not similar to the totalitarian
materialism which Berdyaev claims is inherent in Russian socialist 
philosophy. If it is true, as Shestov would have us believe, that 
systematic thought imposes the tyranny of knowledge, nevertheless the 
substance itself of this thought in Frank's case lays great emphasis on 
each human being as a free agent of the spiritual world.
The real battle for the individual in Russian philosophical thought takes 
place in the struggle between Berdyaev and Shestov. Both of these 
thinkers were anti-systematic in their approach, and yet their methods 
and their outlooks greatly differ. Of the two, Berdyaev was the real 
philosopher, working within knowledge to defend and exalt the individual 
personality. His concept of knowledge is similar to Frank's: it is not
something which is understood from without, grasped externally or 
objectively, but which penetrates to our depths, and which we go out to 
meet in active participation. Knowledge, Berdyaev thinks, is revelation. 
It is intimately connected with the individual. He says that "effective 
knowledge involves familiarity, or in other terms, a subjective approach,
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an identification of oneself with the subjective existence."7 As we know, 
Shestov entirely disagreed with this definition, and saw Berdyaev's own 
attempt at formulating knowledge as being typical of philosophy's general 
aims, which were opposed to the individual. If every philosopher 
envisages a different theory to explain the world, then how, according to 
Shestov, can we say of one or another theory that it is a revelation? He 
says, "Berdyaev refers to experience, Berdyaev refers to intuition, but we 
already know that experience does not guarantee truth, and moreover, if 
the experiences of various people bear witness to various things, then how 
do we find out which experience reveals the truth?"® Berdyaev has no 
system; the centre of his philosophy is man, man as a personality, but for 
Shestov this is not sufficient. The very notion that any kind of knowledge 
can be good (on a philosophical, not a worldly level) is rejected by him, 
and thus the question can be posed: whose outlook gives more meaning to 
the individual, Berdyaev's, which allows for the possibility of creative 
knowledge, or Shestov's, which does not?
In Berdyaev's defence, the substance of his own philosophy is rooted in 
the individual, unlike Frank's, whose “ living knowledge” embraces all­
unity. Man is not a building-block to Berdyaev but the whole building. In 
the deepest sense, he believes, it is not a collection of human beings who 
are free, who create, who participate actively in the divine, but only 
single human beings, possibly, although not necessarily together. Man was 
not made for the Sabbath but the Sabbath for man; this idea is 
fundamental to Berdyaev's thought as he refuses to accept that any 
movement, any tradition, any utopian ideal is valid if it hinders the free 
expression of the individual. Christianity represents not a historical 
movement so much as the revelation of personality in the world, an 
example for the free, spiritually aristocratic personality. As one 
interpretation of Berdyaev's thought has it: "Personality is a religious
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category. That is to say, the human being is a person only as related to 
God. Indeed, there cannot be a genuine society of persons unless this 
religious dimension is recognized, unless it is understood that the human 
being is more than a member of society."®
Berdyaev is critical of any philosophy which does not establish the 
human being as the focus of all meaning in this world. More than any 
philosopher before him in Russia (and certainly more than anyone after 
him in the Soviet Union), Berdyaev found philosophical expression for man 
as an even greater being than an individual: man as a personality 
{l ichnosf).  How then can there be any doubt that the individual in Russian 
thought is given a more profound definition than that given to him by 
Berdyaev?
Indeed, there could not be any doubt, were it not for Shestov. It is 
Shestov who raises the question of whether the individual is actually 
being harmed by the very attempt to define him. Solovyov is an easier 
target than Berdyaev on this count, but even Berdyaev is called to answer 
for his apotheosis of the personality when he tries to formulate a reason 
for and the origin of freedom. Both of these thinkers passionately strove 
for freedom, but Shestov declares that Berdyaev's explanation of it only 
limits man and God, and does not emancipate either one. Because Berdyaev 
claims that God himself cannot overcome freedom, Shestov basically 
accuses Berdyaev of abandoning it. "And why," Shestov asks, "if God is 
unable to overcome freedom that is not created by him, is the God-man 
(who is of the same essence as God) able to overcome the freedom which 
is also not created by him?"^®
The primary difference between these two thinkers, which both 
recognized, is that Berdyaev worked within knowledge, while Shestov 
worked against it. But it would be a mistake to lump Berdyaev together 
with every thinker who is operating, according to Shestov, on the wrong
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side of knowledge. In fact, Berdyaev is much closer to Shestov than he is 
to Solovyov and Frank, despite his affinity for some of the spiritual ideas 
of the latter two and his assertion, repeated at various times, that the 
fundamental difference between him and Shestov is the value each of them 
placed on knowledge. If Berdyaev has one lapse as a philosopher of the 
personality, then this is it: his attempt to explain the origins of freedom
(i.e. through Ungrund  ) seems to have little to do with man himself, a being 
who cannot be explained by abstract theories. If Shestov is right, that 
Berdyaev's use of experience as a means to knowledge and Berdyaev's 
explanation of freedom, are not legitimate ways fully to apprehend man as 
an individual, then it would seem that the whole foundation of Berdyaev's 
thought may be weaker, paradoxically, than the foundation-less thought of 
Shestov.
But we can hardly say that Berdyaev's thought is drained of all its 
meaning because of this. If Berdyaev chooses knowledge over existence, as 
Shestov thinks he does,i^ then it can still be said that through his own 
form of knowledge he worked out the most profound definition of the 
individual known to Russian thought. He insisted on the reality of the 
divine world, on the fact that Christianity brought man and God into a 
close relationship, on suffering and creativeness and freedom, on the 
reality of the tormented psyche, not so as to add stones to his 
philosophical edifice but to declare the unsurpassable worth of the single 
personality.
Shestov is the one Russian thinker of the four who made no effort to 
define the individual, at least not in theological or philosophical terms. 
The very attempt to give final, decisive attributes to man, or to God, was 
to Shestov the greatest sin. So great a sin was it that man lost paradise 
in doing so. An individual's experience does not give him the right to seek 
after knowledge: in experience lies delusion. Berdyaev sums up his
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friend's thought thus: "For Lev Shestov human tragedy, the terrors and
sufferings of human life, the endurance of hopelessness were the sources 
of p h i l o s o p h y . "12 For a philosopher to disregard this and to try to reason 
a way out of the tragedy - even for one such as Socrates, who offered his 
very life rather than turn away from his philosophy - was to prove just 
how far man had fallen away from God. Man's truest expression of 
individuality lay not in the accuracy of his understanding of the individual 
- and accuracy, as Shestov often points out, cannot be proven by any human 
means - but in his courage in rejecting philosophical palliatives and 
instead living through the tragedy.
All of Shestov's attentions were directed to this battle for meaning in
philosophy; he either attacked those thinkers who relied on knowledge, or
he glorified those who rejected it. He was not a social or political 
philosopher; his thought was dominated by this struggle alone. But could 
it be said that he was so determined to wage war against knowledge that 
he lost the individual in the process, as Berdyaev sometimes loses the 
individual in his definition of freedom ? It is not surprising, given 
Shestov's attitude towards the Fall, that he should wage war against the 
greatest defenders of knowledge, Socrates, Spinoza, Hegel, etc., but he is 
also prepared to turn against his very heroes, those who themselves 
spurned the pretensions of knowledge, when they fail to be, according to 
Shestov, sufficiently conscious of the spirit of their own thought. He 
criticizes Nietzsche for formulating his theory of eternal recurrence, 
Dostoevsky for his tendency towards prophecy, and K ierkegaard for 
refusing to admit that the knowledge which man gained through the Fall is 
the greatest of all evils. His attacks on specific philosophers so often 
have a striking similarity, as if his criticism of Philo or Socrates would
be roughly the same as his criticism of Kant or Schelling. In his essay on
Solovyov, "Speculation and the Apocalypse", he writes that "in the first
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chapters of the Bible it is told of how 'theoretic necessity' led our 
forefather to the greatest woe. The Fall, which brought death, and after it 
all the terrors of our mortal existence to the earth, began when Adam 
surrendered himself to his theoretical demand, and despite the warning of 
the Creator, tore away and tasted the fruits from the Tree of the 
Knowledge of Good and Evit."i3 it is insignificant that such a passage 
comes in Shestov's essay on Solovyov in particular; it could have been 
written in any of his essays and books, and is the theme which runs 
throughout his work. It often seems as if Shestov if less interested in the 
content of the philosophers' thought than in the opportunity he sees to 
expose them as knowledge-seekers.
But if we can question this emphasis of Shestov's, and wonder why it 
would lead him to reject even a philosophy which is centred around the 
individual, such as Berdyaev's, then we can still claim that his motives 
spring from the impassioned desire to protect the individual. There is 
irony in the fact that while his thought is the least original of the four 
Russian philosophers, in the sense that he was mainly responding to the 
thought of other thinkers - while each of the other three formulated many 
different concepts, Godmanhood, "living knowledge", Personalism, etc. - 
nevertheless it is Shestov whose individual emerges as the most 
significant creation. It is Shestov who struggles most to protect the 
"rights" of the individual. Not his rights in a legal or political sense, but 
in the sense that the individual has a right to be bound by no laws, such as 
the law of Good, or the law of Morality. The individual's rights are that he 
makes or breaks his own laws and is not conditioned by the laws, norms or 
traditions of others. Knowledge is a kind of law, imposing as it does 
limitation, and thus for such thought as Shestov's, knowledge is a genuine 
tyrant, which wants in any way it can to hinder the individual. If 
knowledge and existence can be happily married, if one can be a knowing
2 2 2
creature and an existential creature at the same time, then Shestov's 
whole orientation is a mistaken one, and it is for this reason that he 
wants to ensure that there is no blurring between knowledge and the 
individual. He says, "Before the face of the Creator there are no laws, no 
'you must', no compulsion; all the chains fall from man and crimes cease 
to exist. Before the face of the Creator our original freedom, created by 
God, comes to life in man, a freedom which is limited by nothing, which is 
unbounded possibility - like the freedom of the Creator himself."1 ^
The aspect of Shestov's thought which most concerns this essay is the 
religious emphasis that he places on the individual. One cannot say that 
he is insistent that meaning is to be found only in the divine; even in his 
later writings he defends such a one as Nietzsche (whom Berdyaev and 
Frank are both critical of for his denial of the divine, and whom Solovyov
would never in his wildest dreams have accepted). But where Zarathustra
and the Underground Man were once his gods, it is the biblical God whom 
he later acknowledges, and his heroes become, amongst others, Abraham 
and Job. Faith in the Absurd (Kierkegaard), revelation rather than 
knowledge, God for whom all things are possible, the outlook of the Holy 
Scriptures rather than the whole history of philosophy (Jerusalem rather 
than Athens) - Shestov defends all of these, claiming that they lead to the 
deepest possible expression of the single human being. Since it is the 
individual who is at the root of all his thought, his journey from the
godless Nietzsche to the faithful Abraham is shorter than Solovyov's or 
Frank's or Berdyaev's journeys from socialism to Christianity. In the end, 
his individual stands, in the deepest sense, in relation to God.
Philosophically, it is Shestov's person who, amongst our four Russian 
thinkers, can most assuredly call himself an individual. He stands without 
any support, with nothing to soothe or to placate him, and faces the stark 
tragedy of human life, which may reveal God himself.
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Political Thought
Based on the nature of this essay, we can say that the p h ilo s o p h ic a l  
definition of the individual concerns us more than other types of 
definition, and, therefore, here it is Shestov, with Berdyaev not far 
behind, who is most concerned with the individual per se. But given the 
time and the place in which all four thinkers lived, and their own social 
consciousness, we have also given consideration to the role that the 
individual played in their social and political writings. The span of the 
lives of these four writers covers the entire transformation of Russian 
society: Solovyov was born several years before the emancipation of the
serfs, and the other three lived until the Soviet state and the Stalinist 
system had been well established. (One might say that they l iv ed  until 
this time because they were far removed from Russia during her most 
violent changes.)
While Shestov is the most significant of the four in his approach 
towards the individual in philosophical terms, politically speaking he has 
little to say. The social revolutionary and the defender of tsarism and 
Orthodoxy could find little in his thought to support their ideology; his 
writings in the main were simply not concerned with social issues. The 
meaning of this for his philosophy is that his defence of the individual 
spirit is given even more weight, since Shestov proved to be such a 
personal thinker. If we cannot find any real political substance in his 
thought, however, we can still see based on his life that his attitude to 
the Russian revolutionary movement was no different from the attitudes 
of the other three. (He did, though, as we have mentioned, write a small, 
little-known book attacking Bolshevism.) He was at one time a Marxist, 
but left that movement forever while still in his youth; when he realized
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that the Bolshevik Revolution was going to succeed in his homeland he left 
the country with his family. Thus Russia lost its most profound 
interpreter of religious individuality.
Solovyov, however, much more than Shestov, tries to find a solution for 
the individual in society. In Russian society he himself was one of the 
most unique men of his time. He was not content to uphold the idea of 
Russian Messianism - a primary Slavophile tenet - and thus he was 
subjected to Slavophile criticism when he showed his support for a more 
universal religious system  (w hile still defending Russian spiritual 
concepts such as sobornosf).  He resigned his university post as a result 
of his unpopular view that capital punishment was unjust even for the 
assassins of a tsar; and he incurred strong disapproval for his claim that 
non-religious humanism had more justice in it than medieval Christianity. 
No movement, no society, no Church could keep Solovyov permanently 
under its wing; even Shestov admits this, saying that, "His first 
books...w itness to the fact that Solovyov, although he was just over
twenty years old, was his own man in all regions of philosophical
k n o w l e d g e . "15 And Berdyaev remarks of him, "One can say about Solovyov 
with equal justification that he was a mystic and a rationalist, an 
Orthodox and a Catholic, a man of the Church and a free-thinking gnostic, a 
conservative and a liberal. Contradictory movements considered him to be 
one of them. But he was in life and remained after his death solitary and 
m isunderstood."16
Clearly it is not just in the realm of philosophy that Solovyov remains 
his own man. In trying to find theoretical and practical ways in which all 
mankind could be united in the kingdom of God, he was bound by no school. 
His main concern was to find the means by which man could live a
spiritual life in community. One might expect to see Solovyov supporting 
a strong, forceful ecclesiastical authority, one that would go to any
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lengths to ensure unity. But in fact the opposite is true. Solovyov was 
indeed attracted to the unifying powers of Catholicism, but he gradually 
grew more and more dismayed by the lack of spiritual unity within the 
Church. Solovyov made the mistake - which he later corrected - of 
thinking that there was a necessary connection between ecclesiastical 
and spiritual movements, but he moved away from the Church when it did 
not pay sufficient homage to internal faith. Berdyaev felt that Solovyov's 
interpretation of Christianity was one that involved man freely and 
actively in the union with God, and this meant that no external compulsion 
could bring about this union; indeed, in the 1890's we see Solovyov turning 
against historical Christianity for its failure to provide a humane (i.e. a 
spiritual) answer to the discord in the world.
It is interesting to compare Solovyov’s thought with that of the 
socialist thought contemporary with him, for both types have in mind the 
transformation of the world. Most of the main Russian socialists of 
Solovyov's time (Tkachev, Bakunin, Nechaev) viewed revolution as a 
religion and a philosophy;")  ^ it is fair to say that the intolerance to 
divergent views of the post-Revolutionary period in Russia was inherited 
from the radical revolutionary thought of the nineteenth century. The 
Russian socialists of Solovyov's time did not want social reform, they 
wanted revolutionary change. Solovyov does not simply wish for everyone 
to become Christian by name, he insists upon a humane attitude to life 
which is not ultimately contingent on race and creed. Solovyov never 
ceased to believe that Christianity, and no other faith or ideology, was 
capable of transforming the world, but the end definitely did not justify 
the means.
In the chapter on Solovyov it was suggested that his philosophy tries to 
establish the idea that man is dependent upon relationship to complete his 
personality, and that he cannot survive simply as an isolated being. If in
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Solovyov's systematic thought this point does not at all times seem to do 
justice to the individual, in his social and political thought the various 
relationships of the individual becom e all-im portant for the aims of 
society, because they are the means through which society becomes 
spiritualized. Solovyov is concerned mainly with the aggregate of persons 
in a society, but concerned that each person in the aggregate has the 
opportunity to express himself freely, and that no compulsion forces him 
into a false relationship with his fellow-man or with God. Humankind is 
organically joined together by humanity; humanity makes each man neither 
abstract nor isolated.
It is when we come to Berdyaev and Frank that we find the individual in 
society given the most sym pathetic treatm ent. Solovyov's humane  
Christianity is related to these later thinkers' social ideas, but Berdyaev 
and Frank found themselves responding to the very breakdown of the old 
society, which required more direct statem ents to the revolutionary  
forces than Solovyov had ever made. Both Berdyaev and Frank claim that 
their thought in general is connected more with spiritual questions than 
with political ones, but both made significant contributions to the anti­
communist movement; each of them wrote essays in the compilations 
Vekhi and Iz gJubiny, and each produced a book highly critical of Russian 
communism. (Berdyaev's was entitled The Origins and the Meaning of 
Russian Communism, and Frank's, Beyond Right and Left.) The political 
views of these two thinkers are very sim ilar even though their 
understanding of philosophy differed.
For Frank, as for Berdyaev, the belief in a spiritual element within man 
informed more than anything else his political orientation. He hoped for a 
spiritual regeneration in society which the forces of revolution blithely 
ignored. Unlike Solovyov he did not optimistically believe that the world 
was advancing ever-closer towards the kingdom of God. But he decisively
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rejected the idea that man could solve all his problems by himself, that 
"mangodhood" could have precedence over Godmanhood. The Age of Reason 
and the French Revolution, the socialist revolutionaries in Russia, all told 
man that he could be master over himself and his society without the 
mediation of God. But this according to Frank is wrong; man requires the 
light of God in which to flourish. Left to himself he will die in darkness. 
Any Orthodox supporter trying to defend a crumbling empire might hold the 
same beliefs, but Frank was far from trying to preserve the old order; in 
his essay in Iz glubiny, entitled De Profundis (both of these titles mean 
"out of the depths"; a term from Psalm 130) he says that "Russian 
conservatism, which was officially guided by and dream ed abstractly of 
being guided by definite religious belief and a national-political ideology, 
was weakened, and weakened itself, by its factual disbelief in the living 
force of spiritual creativity..."1® Frank was himself a Christian, and a 
Russian Orthodox, but like Solovyov it was not simply the superficial fact 
that he called himself a Christian that concerned him so much as the 
spiritual "reality" which lay beneath the labels. Frank called for a society 
which bore no relation to the ossified and corrupted Russian Orthodox 
Church under tsarist rule, but one which was nevertheless founded on 
religious principles:
In addition, Frank considered the October Revolution to be an 
unmitigated disaster. Given that he was highly critical of the old regime 
and that he had declared himself to be a socialist (albeit a Christian one), 
it is a damning comment on the socialist revolutionaries in Russia who 
also derided the old system.. As we have seen, Frank cam e to realize 
eventually that one could not associate the left with those who sought 
justice and the right with those who clung onto the status quo. Frank's 
own religious orientation is conservative, since he defends the value of 
trad itional Christianity in an ecclesiastical environm ent (while still
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being highly critical of the Church in Russia), yet he is politically liberal, 
since he sees social equality as being of paramount importance. But these 
terms in the light of the Revolution - right and left, conservative and 
liberal - are sapped of much of their previous meaning. Frank's political
beliefs are inspired by his philosophical beliefs, which are based on an 
all-unifying spirituality in the world. What most concerned him about 
Russia was not who was winning the political battle - the tsarists or the 
Communists - but that this most fundamental aspect of his philosophy, 
spirituality, was apparently missing everywhere. At the time of the 
Revolution he writes, with uncharacteristic vehemence, that revolutionary 
socialism in Russia was poisonous and had led to "a fatal illness, a 
gangrenous decay of the brain and the heart of the Russian state...The 
destructiveness of socialism in the final analysis is conditioned by its 
materialism - by its negation of the natural, authentically-founded,
unifying forces of society...""’ 9 The primary difference between Frank and 
the Russian revolutionaries is that he recognized a higher, positive value
in the world, while they, so he claims, did not.
Brought into the political sphere, Frank’s and Berdyaev's views, often
different in their respective philosophies, are strikingly similar. Frank is 
mindful of the creative and religious possibilities of the individual and 
insists that he needs the freedom to express them. He sees more
importance in spiritual unity in society than does Berdyaev, for whom 
spirit related directly to the individual, but the requirement for society 
is, in both cases, that there be some kind of spiritual foundation.
As a philosopher, Frank's reputation has not spread nearly so far as 
Berdyaev's has; his writings for the most part lack the dramatic quality
which is evident in Berdyaev’s books. However as a social thinker -
although it wasn't his main concern - he has gained a reputation as a
passionate defender of freedom. Recently the chess player Garry
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Kasparov, an aspiring politician, quoted Frank's hope, expressed in the 
aftermath of the October Revolution, for a spiritual renewal in Russia: "In
these days of our national misfortune, rooted in nihilism, we may console 
ourselves that the sheer depth of the abyss into which the Russian people 
has fallen does not only testify to its blindness, but also to the grandeur 
of its misguided spiritual strength."2o Frank saw the individual in Russia 
stripped of all his rights by a system which denied higher values, but he 
also remained hopeful that the spirit would someday manifest itself again 
in his homeland.
The struggle between Berdyaev and Shestov for the truest defence of the 
individual in philosophical thought becomes irrelevant when the argument 
turns into a political one. We need not question Berdyaev's definition of 
“uncreated freedom” to accept fully his concept of the individual in 
society. As with Frank, the most essential point to consider is his 
acknowledgement of the spirit as the fundamental aspect of man's life; 
this means that man requires social and political freedom to express his 
s p ir i tu a l i ty .
Berdyaev is in a paradoxical position similar to Frank concerning his 
conservative/liberal make-up. Although he was not very sympathetic to 
ecclesiastica l movements, nonetheless he was a member of the 
aristocracy, as well as a Christian socialist. As with Frank, the fact that 
Berdyaev rejected the status quo of tsarism, and looked for social justice 
and equality makes his repudiation of the Russian revolutionary 
movements all the more legitimate. Of course, his argument for socialism 
was not simply based on economic factors: "The significance of
Communism as a goal of human life is essentially religious. Communism 
involves partic ipation, reciprocal partic ipation, in te rpene tra tion ."2 1 
Communion has spiritual meaning, but communism as Berdyaev saw it 
practiced in Russia does not, and in fact in trying to make the state
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absolute, the personality - the agent through which the spirit passes - is 
doomed to disappear or be destroyed.
Based on Berdyaev's philosophical beliefs, we can see that his defense 
of the individual in soc iety  follows naturally. If in a monist philosophical 
system creativeness and personality are diminished, then in a monist 
political system the same is likely to happen. "A pluralistic social 
system corresponds more to the freedom of the human spirit than a 
monistic system. A monistic social system always leads to tyranny and 
the oppression of the human personality. The monism of the Marxist 
system is its main defect. "22 Berdyaev is in a sense better equipped than 
Frank or Solovyov to offer constructive, practical political advice, 
because his whole notion of freedom insists upon a democratic solution to 
social life (a democratic, rather than an anarchistic, solution), whereas 
the latter two have to base their hopes partly on the advance of 
spirituality in the world, an advance which was certainly not evident in 
their own times. This is hardly to nullify the value of Frank's and 
Solovyov's contributions to social thought, because they both keenly 
understood the danger of rejecting higher values in society (whether they 
be called humanistic or spiritual). But even in Berdyaev's political 
orientation the human personality is central; political life must adapt 
itself not to the few but to each individual. However, we have also seen 
that Berdyaev's individual is made all the more whole by his participation 
in a genuinely spiritual collective, in sobornost’; society does not need to 
adapt itself merely so that the individual can exist in his splendid tower
of isolation, but so that he can respond to spirituality, both personal and
communal.
Berdyaev's own life continually expressed the struggle for the freedom
of the individual in society. As a youth we find him exiled for two years
because of his socialist activities, but his insights into social justice
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could not be limited by the Russian socialism of the day. In his articles in 
Vekhi and Iz glubiny he attempted to expose the spiritual vacuum of the 
revolutionary movement before it was too late; it was, of course, too late. 
Like Frank and Solovyov, Berdyaev had become a firm believer in the realm
of the spirit, and thus his arguments against Russian nihilism had their
spiritual foundation. (It is interesting to note that while Shestov 
criticizes Berdyaev, in his early essay on him, for being so eager to 
embrace notions like idealism and Christianity, it is Berdyaev, and n o t  
Shestov, who was most vocally opposed to a movement which b o th  
thinkers considered to be misguided.) When the Revolution actually 
arrived, Berdyaev was as determined to struggle for social justice in his 
actions as in his writings. His friend Evgeny Rapp describes this 
determination in one telling instance:
News had reached us from St. Petersburg that the
Revolution had begun. Along the streets of Moscow crowds
were gathering, and from mouth to mouth the most impossible 
rumours were passed...N.A. [Berdyaev], my sister and I decided 
to join the revolutionary crowd, which had advanced to the 
riding-school. When we approached, the riding-school was 
already surrounded by a huge crowd. Troops ready to fire stood 
on the square near the riding-school. The threatening crowd 
advanced closer and closer, pressing itself upon the square in 
a tight ring. A terrible moment had arrived. We expected a salvo 
to burst forth. At that moment I turned to N.A. to tell him 
something, but he had disappeared. Later we learned that he had 
made his way through the crowd to the troops, and had delivered 
a speech asking the soldiers not to shoot at the crowd, not to 
spill blood...The troops did not shoot.
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To this day it is a wonder to me that at this very place he 
was not shot by the commanding o f f i c e r  23
Given the bloody circumstances of the post-Revolutionary period, 
Berdyaev was very fortunate to survive. His criticism of Bolshevism did 
not become less sharp, and before his exile he was even hauled in front of 
Dzerzhinsky, the chief of Cheka, the secret police, for a personal 
interrogation. ("Keep in mind," Berdyaev told him, "that I consider it my 
duty as a writer and a thinker to tell you exactly what 1 think."24) Abroad 
his attacks on the new political order continued, although he was willing 
to acknowledge the Soviet Union as a legitimate state; he did not see a 
return to the old system as a healthy idea.
Today in his homeland Berdyaev's reputation as a struggler for the rights 
of the individual is, like Frank's, growing. Journals and newspapers such 
as Moskva, Sobesednik, and Novy mir have recently printed essays by or 
about him, his books are being published in the Soviet Union, and his name 
has become a symbol for freedom of conscience and of religious 
expression. (Even when his ideas are not always clearly understood. At a 
lecture at the Lenin Museum in Kiev, in May, 1990 entitled "Nikolai 
Berdyaev and Self-Education", the lecturer spoke for three hours and 
mentioned the name of Berdyaev twice, both times in passing.) Of all the 
pre-Revolutionary thinkers in Russia it is Berdyaev more than any other 
whose ideas are today, in the climate of freedom, being remembered, 
discussed and valued.
We have seen how these four thinkers differed from each other; let us 
now look at what they all hold in common. At first sight it may seem 
impossible for Shestov to have any common ground with Solovyov or Frank, 
but there are several similar elements which inhere in the thought of 
them all. The first, and most important similarity is that they all
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affirmed the validity of the religious spirit. That Solovyov, Frank and 
Berdyaev do so is self-evident; they wage continual war against 
materialism and insist on the priority of the spirit. What Frank says 
about Solovyov’s vision of the spiritual world could hold true for all three; 
"It has for him the kind of obviousness with which ordinary people 
perceive the sensuously given world of objects."25 Shestov poses a more 
difficult problem. He does not defend the spirit as an obvious aspect of 
man; indeed, his defence of Nietzsche, and of Chekhov's sense of 
hopelessness, might indicate that he rejects any type of higher sphere, be 
it called divine or spiritual. Most of his attacks on philosophy are based 
on the assumption  (made by philosophy) that spirit does exist.
But it is important to realize that Shestov does defend religious spirit. 
Living as he did in turn-of-the-century Russia, it would have been easy for 
him to have attached himself to a materialist bandwagon. But nothing 
could have been farther from his intentions. Shestov attacks the ideas of 
Solovyov, Berdyaev, Tolstoy and other Russians of his epoch, yet it is not 
his wish to attack the spirit per se, but only the interpretations given of 
it. After all, Nietzsche himself was not a materialist; he threw out the 
morality of Christianity, but defended a spirit of his own (although not a 
religious one). All four of the Russian thinkers we have examined went 
through a phase akin to materialism, by supporting the socialism and 
Marxism of the day. But all four rejected this type of thought - Shestov no 
less than the other three - for the sake of the spirit.
Connected with spirit is the relationship between man and God, and the 
defence of internal reality is close to them all. Solovyov’s Godmanhood 
expresses this internal, divine relationship, and Berdyaev and Frank 
enthusiastically follow him. Both of them are always arguing for the 
closeness of God In man’s spiritual life. And we have seen how Shestov’s 
attack on Spinoza and Tolstoy, among others, centred around the way that
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God was removed from man by morality or a mathematical equation. 
Shestov does not want to define God (none of them do, really), but he does 
insist that God can be revealed to man. For all four thinkers, God is to be 
found only in the internal life of man.
The notion that they all affirmed a belief in the spirit can be supported 
by another point at which they all meet, and this is in their youthful 
advocacy of revolutionary thought and their subsequent rejection of such 
thought. Not one of the four declared himself afterwards to be a tsarist, 
or a capitalist, but rather their recognition of the spirit made it 
impossible for them to continue their involvement with revolutionary 
socialism. Given the different directions these thinkers advanced in, and 
given their analysis of the nihilism of the social materialist, it is not 
easy to resist the conclusion that their understanding of the revolutionary 
movement was far more profound than was that of the revolutionaries 
themselves.
Another point of similarity is their preference between the two 
greatest Russian writers of their day, Tolstoy and Dostoevsky. With each 
of them Dostoevsky looms the larger figure. For Shestov and Berdyaev he 
is fundamental to their thought; the Underground man for Shestov and the 
“Legend of the Grand Inquisitor’’ for Berdyaev are themes central to their 
respective bodies of work. Solovyov was a personal friend of 
Dostoevsky's, and Frank saw Dostoevsky's value amongst other things in 
the novelist's recognition of the impotence of the Russian revolutionary 
(who could not act but could only reject and s n ig g e r ) .26 As for Tolstoy, 
Shestov saw him as the grand moralist, worshipping ‘the good’ but 
disregarding the individual in the process. Solovyov's story A Short Tale 
about the Anti-Christ was in part a polemic against Tolstoy, and both 
Berdyaev and Frank saw Tolstoy as being another negative element in the 
revolutionary movement, reject as he did the value of the state. As
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Berdyaev says: "Tolstoy was an extreme anarchist, the enemy of any type 
of government, based on his moral-idealistic foundations...Tolstoy was an 
exponent of the anti-governmental, anarchic instincts of the Russian 
p e o p l e . "27 This is not to negate, in a few short sentences, Tolstoy's 
significance as a writer; all four thinkers recognized this significance. 
But it is worthwhile to note that, for different reasons, Dostoevsky’s 
religious fire was more inspiring to all of them.
A final word about Berdyaev's and Shestov's relationship with 
Dostoevsky is in order. Both of these thinkers base the essence of their 
philosophy on a specific concept of the Russian novelist's, and both return 
again and again to these concepts. Neither Berdyaev nor Shestov ever 
tired of Dostoevsky. But the "Legend of the Grand Inquisitor" covers a 
couple of dozen pages in an 800-page novel; Notes from Underground is a 
very short novel, dwarfed in size by half a dozen of Dostoevsky's other 
works. Basically, Dostoevsky developed each of these ideas once, and 
returned to them occasionally, but never with the same force. However, 
Berdyaev and Shestov liked to think that the particular idea that they have
latched on to represents the real Dostoevsky. It is important to remember
that each of these thinkers, in their defence of the individual, are looking
at two essentially different Dostoevskys.
Conclusion
The four thinkers that have been discussed in this essay hardly exhaust 
the list of Russian religious writers at the turn of the century. 
Philosophers such as Pavel Florensky and Sergey Bulgakov, two spiritual 
heirs of Solovyov, are just a couple of the many thinkers who contributed 
to religious thought in Russia as socialistic materialism became an 
increasingly influential force in the intellectual life of the country. It is
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on the one hand, unfortunately, a matter of irrelevance how large the 
cultural renaissance was at the turn of the century, because it was based 
on spiritual principles which could hardly resist the socialism of the 
time, which had no qualms about transforming the society through non­
spiritual means. On the other hand, fortunately, what this renaissance did 
not accomplish in political terms, it did accomplish in its original thought 
which had not only Russian but worldwide influence. Out of all the 
thinkers in the cultural revival, it is three, Shestov, Berdyaev and Frank 
who most powerfully defended and glorified the spirit, be it in individual 
or universal terms. Solovyov was an influence upon, rather than an actual 
participator in, the cultural life at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
but the mark he made upon Frank and Berdyaev, at least, was a strong one.
The movement recognized the rights of the spirit which were 
independent of social utilitarianism; this means that social questions 
need not interfere in any way with spiritual questions. Throughout much 
of this thesis we have looked at the thought of these philosophers often 
without regard to its social significance, but only with the idea that the 
thought has value unto itself. Such is the case with Lev Shestov. 
Although he was anti-Bolshevik, his thought is not fundamentally social, 
and we have examined it purely from the standpoint of its value in 
philosophical terms.
Also in terms of Solovyov, Frank and Berdyaev, the focal point of our 
examination of them as thinkers has not been their political beliefs, but 
their philosophical ones, which have then led to their understanding of 
society. As a consequence of their philosophical thought they arrived at 
social beliefs (not the other way around), and we have attempted to 
develop these social beliefs out of their philosophy. We can see that there 
was a great and significant debate occurring at the turn of the century 
over the meaning of the spirit and how it relates to the single person. Lev
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Shestov and Nicholas Berdyaev are more passionate defenders of the 
individual in philosophical thought than are Vladimir Solovyov and Semyon 
Frank; the individual, despite the differences between Shestov and 
Berdyaev, is central to their work. But Solovyov and Frank too found a 
spiritual plane for each human being. When we look at all four in 
contradistinction to the political trends of their time, we can see that 
each of these thinkers recognized values for the individual which were 
simply denied him by theories such as dialectical materialism and 
revolutionary socialism. The transition from philosophy to politics finds 
all four men in agreement, that the effort to transform a society into one 
in which the political and economic aims are sought for without a 
recognition of religious values, can only end in disaster.
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Chapter Seven
Modern Soviet Criticism
Note: The demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 meant of course the end of
Soviet restrictions on the printed word. It is far from certain that the
menace of censorship has been quashed forever in Russia, but Soviet 
censorship is now a thing of the past.
This dissertation has been compiled and written almost entirely while 
the USSR was in existence, and the present chapter offers a sampling of 
Soviet commentary on our four thinkers. It would have been possible to
add post-Soviet commentary to this and other chapters, but it seems to
me that the Soviet criticism is valuable by itself, since it gives us insight 
into the increasing freedom of the press in the USSR in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s.
For Shestov, Berdyaev and Frank, Soviet repression was all too real, and 
it is surely fitting here to round out the dissertation by examining how 
they were slowly brought back to life in their homeland w hile  the party 
that exiled them was itself facing banishment from power.
W e have seen that to a large degree the four thinkers we have studied 
were not widely accepted in Russia during their lifetimes. While each of 
them no doubt had sym pathizers, their beliefs w ere generally either 
ignored or attacked. But seven decades on from the revolution, glasnost 
has revived (or introduced) free speech into the Soviet Union, and these
2 4 0
four thinkers are no longer treated with the open, inevitable hostility that 
they once faced in the Soviet press. And no longer do copies of their books 
need to be smuggled into the Soviet Union, because these books are now 
published in Russia. The process of bringing back the names of these 
Russian religious thinkers has not been a rapid one, but it is certainly 
taking place and journals are now, or so it seems, free to respond to these 
writers in whatever way they choose: critically, admiringly, respectfully. 
W e can be fairly satisfied that Solovyov, Shestov, Frank and Berdyaev are 
receiving just, if not always uncritical, treatment at the hands of Soviet 
scholars. (Although as we have seen in the instance of Andreyev,
responding to Berdyaev's The Origins and Significance of Russian  
C o m m u n ism ,  the reflex to criticize anyone who appears to be anti-Soviet 
has not yet been completely overcome.) Because of this it is worthwhile 
to survey various of the articles on our four thinkers written by Soviet 
critics during the period of glasnost, to see to what extent these  
philosophers have been rehabilitated.
Let us start in general terms and look at an article written in
Literaturnaya gazeta  in May, 1991, on the Vekhovtsi: the contributors to
V ekh i  and also to Iz glubiny, the compendium which was put together in 
the wake of the October Revolution. This article gives us a good 
indication of the change of attitude to religious writings in the Soviet
press; it is appreciative of the Vekhovtsi without admiring them blindly.
First of all, the author, Svetlana Semyonova, believes that Frank,
Berdyaev, Struve, etc., were very prescient in predicting the woes that the 
Soviet Union would meet:
The analytical panorama - presented in these articles 
by S.N. Bulgakov, A.S. Izgoev, P.B. Struve and S.L. Frank - 
strikes the reader of today by how quickly, in about
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half-a-year, everything was discovered, literally everything, 
which was later unravelled in the following decades, up to 
this very day: all the failures, the consequences and tendencies, 
all the hypocrisy and demagogyJ
This is a significant statement, because it seems to present the failures, 
hypocrisy, etc, as an almost objective historical fact (it comes from 
Literaturnaya gazeta, remember, and not from sam izdat'. The ‘nightmare’ 
of the October Revolution is presented here as incontrovertible, and the 
Vekhovtsi are regarded as something akin to prophets). But they are not 
hero-worshipped by Sem yonova, indeed in a constructive way she is 
critical of them, because for all of their insights she claims that they do 
not really come to terms with the practical problems - social, economic - 
of their society, but try to ‘spiritualize’ Russia, an undertaking which one 
can hardly imagine being realized. As Semyonova points out. Western 
societies which have put secular principles at the heart of their 
constitutions - even making sure to separate church and state - have 
succeeded far better than Russia .2 “In searching after the ‘absolute 
good’, what is lost is the vital ‘world of relativity in which we live’; high- 
minded religious pathos stands in the way of the practical structuring of 
our earthly life.”3 What Semyonova says is true: we cannot picture a
world in which Berdyaev’s and Frank’s visions of an ideal society are 
realized, because their emphasis on spirit does not sufficiently address 
the sorts of practical problems that the Bolsheviks were addressing. 
N everth e less  they fo resaw  how the spiritual em ptiness of this 
revolutionary movement would lead to destructive ends.
This article is like others now being written in the Soviet Union; the 
vision which these religious thinkers had is contrasted with the beliefs 
and practices of the Russian revolutionaries. It is not always the most
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natural of contrasts, because not one of our four thinkers is essentia lly  a 
political w riter; w hat most concerns all of them  are m atters of 
philosophy and theology, and their political attitudes stem from their 
spiritual orientation. Yet at times they are written about in such a way as 
to draw more attention to their exile from the Soviet Union or to their 
political beliefs. N. Motroshilova, for exam ple, begins her article on 
Shestov in Voprosy fHosofii with a lament for the talent that was lost in 
Russia when such a fine thinker as he was cut off from his homeland, and 
although she is generally unappreciative of his thought, she ends her essay 
thus: "Shestov's books are practically unknown to a wide reading audience
[in Russia]. I hope that they become accessible to those who are striving 
to know the culture of the homeland..."4 Shestov himself would no doubt 
have felt damned by such faint praise. He did not yearn - as did Berdyaev - 
to return to his homeland. This is not the major thesis of Motroshilova's 
essay on Shestov, but it is typical of the attitude of many who now write 
on the banished intellectuals of pre-Revolutionary Russia.
W e find a more direct attack on Soviet repression in E. Rashkovsky's 
essay on Solovyov, also in Voprosy filosofii. The author quotes a standard, 
Old-Soviet description of Solovyov, which calls him a "religiously- 
orientated, reactionary philosopher-idealist, a bourgeois-gentrified social 
writer, a theologian and poet-mystic"5, and after analyzing each term, 
Rashkovsky confesses: "We all, either willingly or unwillingly, but
unanimously, signed our names to provincialism and i n e r t i a . W h a t  we 
see here, as we see in the other articles already mentioned, is a taking- 
for-grantedness that for long decades Soviet society followed all the 
wrong paths and moved in all the wrong directions, and now, with more 
breathing space, old, long-forgotten or long-forbidden voices such as 
these religious ones, can now be heard again.
2 4 3
One of the greatest signs of glasnost in these writings is the freedom  
that is felt to criticize constructively and not according to the Party line. 
Thus, Renata Gal'tseva, writing in Literaturnaya gazeta, takes issue with 
B erdyaev's view that Russian comm unism  is especia lly  prone to 
despotism. She points out that while Berdyaev was a lw a y s  a fierce critic 
of capitalism, he accepted certain principles of communism, and that his 
attacks on the October Revolution and on the development of Russian 
socialism focus more on the defects of the Russian character than on the 
defects of socialism. Berdyaev saw "the Russian idea" as being a "form of 
striving for an all-em bracing sa lvation ."7 We have talked about this 
before; he believed that the Russian character tended to relate to ideas 
from the perspective of absolutism. In other words, the R u s s i a n  
revolutionaries possessed a Messianic, religiously-fanatical belief in the 
aims of socialism. The reason Russia was in such a state was because 
"certain immemorial, primordial qualities, the 'metaphysical formation' of 
the Russian nation...appear as the main sources of the unprecedented  
social o rd er."3 This is an interesting point because it suggests that 
although Berdyaev was considered an intellectual enem y of the Soviet 
Union, and he wrote artic les and books attacking the Russian  
revolutionaries, he was not in fact hostile to the idea itself of socialism, 
but to the practitioners of the idea, the Russians. Gal'tseva writes that 
"unfortunately, Berdyaev for all his insight seized hold of the ‘Russian 
idea’ as the guilty party in the historical tragedy of Russia, and as a 
result led many people astray.’’®
W e can hardly say, however, that Berdyaev had some kind of ingrained 
prejudice against the Russian character, because along with his criticism 
of the religiously-fanatical nature of Russian socialism, he also saw  
great potential for the Russian spirit in the world community. In his book. 
The Destiny of Russia, he writes, “From days of old there was a
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premonition that Russia was foreordained to do something great - that 
Russia is a unique country, similar to no other country in the world."i® To 
a Russian, Berdyaev may seem to place more accent on "Russian" than on 
"communism" in the failure of Russian communism, but it should be fairly 
clear that he did not think that Russia’s position was hopeless in the 
world. In any case Berdyaev's views on society lend themselves to varying 
interpretations; the term berdyaevshchina  was coined in Soviet philosophy 
to refer to anti-Soviet thought, while in the em ig re  press the same term 
indicated a pro-Soviet stanceM 1
The theme of “the Russian idea" in Berdyaev’s thought arises in another 
article, in Russkaya literatura, published in 1990, this time, however, 
focussing more on how it relates to Russian literature than to Russian 
society. Its author, V.A. Kotel’nikov, says that Berdyaev defined “the 
Russian idea" as “an aggregate of the spiritual motives of national life 
and a supra-national calling.’’“i 2 G al’tseva criticized the way in which 
Berdyaev attacked the Russian character, as he claimed that it abused its 
spiritual motives and its calling, but Kotel’nikov declares that Berdyaev 
was also partly possessed of this character. He was attracted to 
Stavrogin in Dostoevsky’s The Devils, precisely because of this “fiery 
thirst for a new revelation" in Stavrogin, which is not religiously-based 
at all. To Kotel’nikov, Berdyaev’s thought has a dual nature, which wavers 
between a sober religio-philosophical outlook and the temptation of a 
Stavrogin: measureless willfulness.'*3
Kotel’nikov further claim s that the explicitly religious figures of 
Alyosha and Father Zossima in The Brothers K aram azov  were of little 
interest to Berdyaev, since he saw asceticism and monasticism as being 
harmful to the personality. The author admits - and how could he not? - 
that Berdyaev was powerfully influenced by “The Legend of the Grand 
Inquisitor”, but he returns to his belief in the dual nature of Berdyaev’s
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thought by saying: “In the entire ‘phiiosophy of freedom' of Berdyaev lies
the ‘reflection’ of the Legend - or the shadow of the Grand Inquisitor.””'^ 
Let us now look at several of the articles which deal with the 
philosophy, as opposed to the political ideas, of these religious thinkers. 
E. Rashkovsky, in his 1988 article in Voprosy filosofii, "V. Solovyov on the 
Fate and Significance of Philosophy", focusses especially on the element 
of individual freedom In Solovyov's thought. Recognizing that all-unity is 
Solovyov's main idea, Rashkovsky tries to highlight the accent on human 
freedom which is contained in this concept: "It is affirmed throughout all
the philosopher's creative activity that no spiritual and humanistic values 
can act in the world as such if the human spirit does not accept them  
f r e e l y . " 1 5  As we have discussed in the chapter on Solovyov, it is a great 
paradox in his thought that the spirit must be wholly free and yet part of 
all-unity. It is certainly possible to give an uncritical assessm ent of
Solovyov's thought by putting more of an accent on all-unity than on 
freedom (as another contemporary scholar, N. Utkina, does in her essay 
"The Theme of All-Unity in the Philosophy of V. Solovyov"), but Rashkovsky 
feels that freedom is the most important aspect of Solovyov's thought, 
and that this freedom is even integrally related to all-unity.
W e can remember how critical Shestov was of Solovyov’s system, and 
even Berdyaev criticizes it for being monist rather than dualist, but 
Rashkovsky has no problem with the idea that, as he describes Solovyov’s 
system, “out of the notion of all-unity flows the principle of human
f r e e d o m . ”16 it must be said that the author of this article is mainly 
presenting an overview of Solovyov’s beliefs, and not analyzing their 
philosophical worth, but it is fairly clear that he is sym pathetic to 
Solovyov’s basic ideas, and wishes to atone for the hostile attitude to the
philosopher which once reigned. He writes: ‘And I m yself...feel
responsible for what h a p p e n e d .
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N. Utkina gives a much more thorough and detailed analysis of Solovyov's 
thought, also in Voprosy filosofii, in her 1989 article, “The Theme of All­
unity in the Philosophy of Vladimir Solovyov". While she is generally of 
the same mind as Rashkovsky, thinking that Solovyov's all-unity leads to 
spiritual freedom, nevertheless she recognizes that his desire to unite 
e x te rn a lly  as well as in te rna lly  exposes him to the accusation of being 
against freedom, and she tries to defend him. "The adherence by Solovyov 
to the principle of autocracy and monarchism may evoke surprise in any
reader of his brilliant social works, which were written above ail in a
spirit of l i b e r a l i s m . . . " 1 8  Utkina is well aware that Solovyov progressed 
through many stages of development, but claims that all-unity remained 
the most fundamental and enduring aspect of his systematic thought, and 
m oreover that his all-unity was imbued with moral principles. She 
describes him as trying initially to go beyond the "abstract rationalism" 
of Hegel by introducing a more explicitly moral factor into his system  
(with the peculiarly Russian concept of Sophia), while not forgetting 
about the individual: "Eternity belongs not to the idea of man, it is the
fate of 'each separate person,'"i9 she says in describing his thought. She 
too does not see the individual disappearing in all-unity, rather she 
appreciates Solovyov's insistence on the active role that each person must 
play in the spiritualization of the world. "Progress is unrealizable if the 
participants in it become objects, moving by someone else's will. True 
progress is connected with the activity of subjects which possess their 
own wills, their own personal substance."2o
The articles of Utkina and Rashkovsky are both primarily summaries of
his ideas, although Utkina had more of a focus with her accent on 
Solovyov’s all-unity. Neither one reacts very strongly to Solovyov’s 
thought, although the attitudes of both critics might be summarized by 
Utkina’s friendly if not entirely convincing final line: ‘And we can hope
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that present-day civilization will recognize the necessity of the union of 
a freely-m oral mankind.’21
Both Utkina and Rashkovsky agree that Solovyov was a moralist, whose 
all-unity was supported by a "justification of the good". This is also the 
conclusion of S. Averintsev, writing in Novy mir, in 1989. It is true that 
he finds Solovyov much less of an inspirational figure than do the former 
two, preferring to point out the strange nature of the philosopher's 
character - he was reported to be the prototypes for both peace-loving 
Alyosha and rebellious Ivan in The Brothers Karamazov, he had the look of 
a biblical prophet and a Christian martyr, he seemed to be, as Blok called 
him, a 'knight-monk'.^z But Averintsev recognizes the philosopher's basic 
idea;
For V. Solovyov, a fragile man liable to fits of melancholy, the 
idea of truth [pravda] genuinely cheered him. This is always 
expressed in his style: whenever the philosopher returns to his 
cherished task of 'the justification of the good', to his explanation 
of moral perspectives, his eloquence blazes, the flow of his speech 
becomes light and winged, as if it were d a n c i n g . 2 3
Averintsev in this short essay does not attempt to explore Solovyov's 
ideas in depth, but even a general statement like this one sees morality as 
the main pillar of Solovyov's all-unity construction, and sees nothing 
‘reactionary’ in this morality.
Each of these three critics - Rashkovsky, Utkina and Averintsev - 
acknowledge the Russian philosopher as a moral teacher, whether they put 
the em phasis on human freedom , all-unity or the complexities of his 
character. The notion that Solovyov was a "bourgeois, gentrlfled social 
writer" Is nowhere to be found in these critiques; rather, there is a sense
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in each of the essays that Solovyov is being welcomed back into Russian 
in tellectual life, that while he is not always easily understood or 
uncritically appreciated, it is at least possible to discuss his ideas 
o b jec tive ly .
The modern Soviet critic who wants to take seriously the work of Lev 
Shestov must resist the temptation to view him in any way but as a 
thinker concerned exclusively with philosophical and religious ideas. 
Solovyov, Berdyaev and Frank provide plenteous material for a discussion 
of the fate of Russia or the dangers of materialist socialism, but one 
could bring Shestov into the political arena no farther than does N. 
Motroshilova in regretting the loss to Russia of a fine thinker (cited 
above). Fortunately, despite the unpolitical nature of his writings, and 
despite the fact that, as one critic says, "The phiiosophy of Lev Shestov is 
not for each and every p e r s o n " 2 4 ,  he has nevertheless not been overlooked 
in the revival of Russian religious thought.
Motroshilova, as has been mentioned, does not place herself in the ranks 
of Shestov admirers. Her essay, "The Parabola of the Living Fate of Lev 
Shestov", published in Voprosy filosofii, in 1989, is, however, in no way a 
bullying one - of the sort that might have been written a decade ago - but 
gives credit to Shestov for initiating a genuine dialogue with philosophers 
from Socrates through Kant to Hegel, Schelling, etc., and for initiating 
this dialogue in such a way as to seem to bring to life thinkers who have 
been dead for over two millennia. This is reminiscent of Berdyaev's 
com m ent on Shestov, that phiiosophy was for him not an academ ic  
speciality, but a matter of life and death.25 She also grants that his main 
virtue as a thinker is his defense of freedom and individuality. But this 
critic sees in Shestov what other philosophers and critics have seen in 
him, namely, a narrowmindedness based on his blanket refusal to admit 
that philosophy, the pursuit of knowledge, can have any value at all. For
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instance, she claims that although Edmund Husserl, a friend of Shestov's, 
had done a great service to philosophy by rejecting relativism , 
psychologism, scientism, etc., Shestov saw in him only a rationalist, and 
refused or was unable to look any deeper into his thought. Although this is 
not an original idea (indeed Husserl himself complained to Shestov about 
the same thing, as did Berdyaev) it is a valid point; an admirer of Husserl
would likely have little sympathy for Shestov's wholesale rejection of
philosophy. This critic accuses Shestov of not taking the trouble to
understand Husserl, and she declares: "Shestov desperately needed...a
strong opponent; he wanted very much to find a contemporary incarnation
of rationalism ."26
Husserl is not her only example. Motroshilova herself appears to be 
sympathetic to the type of systematic thought which Germ an idealist 
philosophy produced, and she thinks that what Shestov has done is to 
create an improbably rigid definition of this philosophy, and then attack it 
for its rigidity. "Shestov sees in classical German philosophy primarily 
one side - an apology to the all-general, a glorification of necessity to the 
detriment of the individual, to the detriment of f r e e d o m . " 2 7
Shestov is open to such criticism. The radical and even combative 
nature of his thought finds passionate but not widespread approval. 
Motroshilova clearly has much more sympathy with systematic thought 
than does Shestov, and his own devotion to Sola fides - faith alone - finds 
in her a sharp critic. Even so, she graciously welcomes him back to 
Russian soil as an important voice in the long-lost tradition of Russian 
religious thought.
Least known today of these four thinkers is Frank, about whom fairly 
little has been published in the Soviet Union in recent years. Frank is 
known today mainly as one of the intellectuals exiled in 1922, who was a 
defender of political freedom. In Teatra l'naya z h iz n \  in 1989, Boris
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Lyubimov wrote a short biographical sketch of Frank, citing favorable 
remarks by Berdyaev, Zenkovsky and others. While the article itself casts 
Frank in a very positive light, the author himself is unwilling to commit 
himself to any more substantial assertions about Frank than that he made 
a deep impression on others and that a love for philosophy never abandoned
him .28
In a 1990 article in Novy mir, A. Kazakov introduces Frank’s essay, 
“Beyond the Right and the Left’’, by summarizing briefly his life and work. 
Kazakov claims that Frank saw through the weakness of both political 
sides, to the extent that he was able to follow that most un-Shestovian 
principle, "Weep not, laugh not, despise not - but understand."29 We have 
already covered some of the reasons why Frank (and Berdyaev) were 
suspicious of both conservative and liberal in Russian political life - they 
saw an absence of true religious inspiration on both sides. Kazakov 
elaborates somewhat on this, but offers no comment either pro or con 
such an outlook.
In contrast to Frank, Berdyaev has become widely known again in his 
homeland. The essays by Andreyev, Renata Gal'tseva and Kotel’nikov have 
already been cited. Berdyaev is the most controversial figure of the four 
b e cau se  his thought lends itself to seem ing ly  contrad icto ry  
interpretations - we have seen how berdyaevshchina  has has been viewed 
as a pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet term. Generally, though, he is now 
acknowledged as an inspiration because of his analysis of freedom and 
culture within Russia. In the afterwards to Berdyaev's book. The Destiny 
of Russia, published in the USSR in 1990, K. Kovalyov says of him; "There 
was much, very much, that he foreordained and d i v i n e d . V .  Tod res says 
In his short essay in S o b e s e d n ik  that "Berdyaev thoroughly rejected any 
kind of dictatorship."31 He is credited with understanding, perhaps better
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than any Russian thinker, the significance of freedom and the disasters
that follow when it is removed, at least in the political sense.
Even in matters of love and sex Berdyaev commands respect. In a review 
of Berdyaev’s book, Eros and Personality. A Philosophy of Sex and Love, 
Jacob Khotov, in Novy mir, says that a reader of his book “discovers the 
possibility of love as the free and creative essence of m a n . " 3 2
Berdyaev, however, like the other three, is subject to criticism in 
Russia today, but this criticism is markedly different from that of earlier 
generations, in that it is usually constructive. W hat we can say about 
most of the articles we have looked at so far is that they mainly present 
summaries of our thinkers’ ideas. There are exceptions: G al’tseva’s and
Kotel’nikov’s essay on Berdyaev, Motroshilova’s essay on Shestov, the 
discussion of the Vekhovtsi, there is not much attempt to grapple with the 
ideas themselves. Mostly we are now seeing overviews of their thought, 
and a sense of gladness that they have returned to Russian culture. These 
are all positive changes, even if they are stiil scratching the surface. 
W hat can be unequivocally stated is that there is no longer a ban on the 
open and objective discussion of religious thought in the Soviet Union.
Let us finally look at the current attitude in the Soviet press to one of 
the events which sparked off the decline and fall of Russian religious
discussion in the USSR: the exile of intellectuals five years after the
revolution. In 1922 it was widely felt that the Bolshevik leaders in the 
Soviet Union were loosening their grip on Soviet society. The economic 
programme NEP had allowed for greater freedoms in the marketplace, and 
intellectual life in the country was still flourishing, as new philosophical 
societies were being created and lectures, courses and seminars on 
philosophical and religious topics were being offered at the universities. 
But suddenly these freedoms were curtailed, and with little warning the
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crackdown began. As it is explained in O g o n y o k ,  in June, 1990, the 
communist apparatchiks:
...saw unmistakeably In the rebirth of a free market a deadly 
threat to their positions and their party privileges...but the new 
class did not dare to attack NEP openly, because the fruits of the 
free market were too obvious. Instead they led an attack into the 
sole area were the Bolsheviks believed themselves to be 
indisputably right - into ideology. The first victim of this 
secret attack on NEP was the intelligentsia."33
Berdyaev and Frank were not in active opposition to the Bolsheviks. 
Although they had attacked the revolutionary character in V ekh i  and Iz  
g l u b i n y ,  they did not belong to any political parties and were not 
sympathizers with the old regime. The only threat that they and other 
members of the intelligentsia posed was in their p o ten tia l  to support the 
Bolshevik opposition in the future. They were by them selves politically 
insignificant. However, as Trotsky put it, “they are a potential weapon in 
the hands of our possible e n e m i e s . "34  No crime had been committed by 
these members of the intelligentsia - indeed, no crimes were hinted at by 
the Bolsheviks - but solely because they were not like-minded thinkers 
with the Communist leaders, it was felt that they could be a threat to the 
new order.
So in the autumn of 1922 Berdyaev, Frank and other intellectuals with 
their famiiies took a train to Petrograd, a ferry across to Finland, and 
from there made their way to Berlin. From that time on in the Soviet 
Union, says V. Kostikov in Ogony ok ,  "the concepts 'mind', 'honour', and 
'conscience' acquire a com pleteiy d ifferent, perverted s e n s e ..."3 s 
However, the refugees were undoubtedly more fortunate than they would
2 5 3
have ever believed at first. Abroad most of them were welcomed, offered 
jobs, etc., because of their great stature in the world of European thought. 
In their homeland by the end of the decade the Stalin Terror was 
beginning, from which they would have had no hope of escape.
The arrest and exile of those intellectual leaders in Russia were 
explored in a series of two articles, on 9 May and 6 June, 1990, in
Literaturnaya gazeta ,  by Sergey Khoruzhy. The author admits that the
whole event was shrouded in mystery; there are no extant documents 
which point to a decision or to a decision-maker. However, there could 
have been only three people capable of making such a decision: Trotsky,
Zinoviev and Lenin. Khoruzhy believes that Trotsky played virtually no 
role, and Zinoviev a minor one. “The entire responsibility and command, 
all the general and operational principles of the exile belong to Lenin."36
The author's proof of this is scanty, and there seems to be no certainty
that Lenin did indeed order the exile. W hat is most remarkable is that the 
accusation should be made at all in an official Soviet newspaper; the
inviolable Lenin is made the scapegoat for the infamous operation.
The exile began to take shape when, on the night of 16 August, 1922, 
arrests took place in cities throughout Russia. Those arrested were 
interrogated, then indicted with “contrarevolutionary activity during a 
period of great difficulty in the country,”37 which was Article 57 of the 
Soviet criminal code. Then the accused were informed of their impending
exile, and told that if they tried to return to the country they would be
s h o t.38 They were allowed to take with them one sheet, one suit, two
shirts, but no books and none of their writings.39
If all this sounds severe, it should be remembered first of all that they 
w ere for the most part welcomed in their new lands (and they even
departed Russia in a certain style; Frank’s students from Moscow
delivered a farew ell address, declaring that his teaching was an
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inspiration)^^ , whereas had they remained in Russia they would certainly 
have met their end In far crueller circumstances. Also, some of the 
accused actually welcomed the exile. Prince S.E. Trubetskoy said that “I 
feared only that something might hinder our departure."41
So it has to be admitted that, despite the initial blow to many of them 
when they discovered they were to be deported, they were more fortunate 
than they would initially have realized. It was the Soviet Union which 
suffered the greatest loss. As Sergey Khoruzhy says, "With the 
deportation philosophy was finished in Russia; and that which since then 
has been called philosophy here, in fact is only one of the services of the 
to talitarian m a c h i n e . " 4 2
"Lately the theme of Russia has tormented me," wrote Berdyaev at the 
end of his life.43 Each of these four men was tormented by Russia: 
Solovyov tried many times without success to ignite the spiritual fire in 
the Orthodox Church, and by the end of his life his society had more or less 
rejected all his ideas. Shestov had had to flee his home to save himself 
and his family, and Frank and Berdyaev were forced into exile. These  
latter three men, who had contributed significantly to intellectual thought 
in Russia, spent the remainder of their days outside their own country. In 
their work, ideas of the religious individual continued to be explored and 
developed, but now in foreign places, in Berlin and Paris and London. For 
the rest of their lives, Russia no longer had ears for them.
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